Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
Volume 10
Issue 1
SYMPOSIUM:
The Treatment of Financial Contracts in Bankruptcy
and Bank Resolution

Article 2

2015

Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy
Treatment of Financial Contracts
Rizwaan J. Mokal

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agency Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Business
Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons,
Contracts Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Organizations Law Commons, Secured
Transactions Commons, Securities Law Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rizwaan J. Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts, 10 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L.
(2015).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjcfcl/vol10/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

LIQUIDITY, SYSTEMIC RISK, AND THE
BANKRUPTCY TREATMENT OF
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
Rizwaan Jameel Mokal*
ABSTRACT
Parties to repos, and to swaps and other derivatives are accorded
privileged treatment under the bankruptcy laws of several dozen countries.
Several key international Rbest practice; standards urge legislators in other
jurisdictions to provide likewise. The beneficiaries of these privileges are
solvent counterparties enabled, unimpeded by bankruptcy moratoria, to
implement close-out netting arrangements, and to dispose of collateral. The
purported rationale is mitigation of systemic risk.
Taking a broad international perspective, this Article explores the
Rdomino; contagion view of distress that motivates these privileges. This
view derives from the outdated Rmicroprudential; understanding of
systemic risk, and is theoretically flawed and empirically false. Drawing
instead on the Rmacroprudential; approach, this Article argues that the
elements of the broad close-out netting processTcontractual termination,
marked-to-market valuation, netting, and unimpeded collateral disposalsT
* Chair of Law and Legal Theory, University College London. The views expressed in
this Article, the mistaken ones in particular, are mine alone. The Article has had a lengthy
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exacerbate systemic risk by increasing common exposures to risk, systemic
uncertainty, procyclicality, and leverage, while reducing lending standards,
collateral utilization, and regulatory capital buffers.
A recent attempt to provide a new rationale for financial contract
privileges highlights their contribution to the Rexponentiation; of liquidity.
This Article shows that the privileges diminish the liquidity of markets and
financial institutions alike. What they exponentiate is Rfroth.; This rather
unfamiliar label describes the all too familiar state in which assets are
persistently and/or progressively overvalued and in which negative netvalue projects obtain funding. The exponentiation of frothTthe textbook
recipe for systemic crisesTshould only be attractive to financial institution
decision makers whose remuneration perversely tracks the riskiness of their
institutions.
This Article also throws new light on the international spread of
financial contract privileges. It expands on existing literature by mapping
the path-dependent process by which national legislators and international
standard setters were persuaded as to the alleged value of these privileges. It
illustrates the key mechanisms by which any consideration of the costs of
the privileges was precluded.
The Article concludes by rebutting the argument that bankruptcy law
should not play any role in systemic risk mitigation, and by consolidating
proposals to reform bankruptcy laws to protect the social welfare-enhancing
features of financial contracts without encouraging systemic risk, value
destruction, or unfairness.
INTRODUCTION
It seems obligatory, when writing about financial contracts and markets,
to mention the eye-watering sums at stake. The global market for over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives alone is notionally worth $630 trillion USD, with
about $21 trillion USD at risk excluding netting, or $3.4 trillion USD with
netting. 1 On-exchange, futures worth $27.5 trillion USD and options
totaling $41.4 trillion USD are outstanding.2 In addition, the global repos
market is estimated at .15 trillion EUR.3 The sheer scale of these markets
dwarfs anything most readers are likely to encounter elsewhere. It may
1. These figures are for notional amount outstanding, gross market value of outstanding
contracts, and gross credit exposure, respectively, as of December 2014. BANK FOR INT7L
SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2014
1V2 (2015), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1504.pdf. The U.S. $3.4 trillion figure overstates the
value at risk since it does not take account of collateral. Id. at 2.
2. Notional principal, as of March 2015. BANK FOR INT7L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY
REVIEW, at A146 (2015), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1506.pdf.
3. Estimate attributed to the ICMA Centre, Reading University. See How Big is the Repo
Market?, INT7L CAPITAL MKTS. ASS7N, http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-andMarket-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/4-howbig-is-the-repo-market/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
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appear uncouth to suggest that the dominant players in these gargantuan
markets should play by anything like the rules that apply to lesser mortals.
Indeed, the bankruptcy and bank resolution laws of several of the world7s
most advanced economies oblige by according unique privileges to
financial contract counterparties. Similarly, special treatment is urged upon
other jurisdictions by several international soft-law instruments that identify
Rbest practices; in the domain. The privileges are said to be justified
because they mitigate systemic risk. An even more important justification,
it has recently been claimed, is that they enhance market liquidity.
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007V2009, the systemic
risk rationale for financial contract privileges has come under sharp
scrutiny. 4 Most such debates relate to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 5 This
Article adds to the literature from a broader international perspective. It
focuses on enterprise bankruptcy regimes,6 though it also considers issues
and evidence relating to special resolution regimes for banks and other
regulated financial institutions. Drawing on international bankruptcy bestpractice standards, as well as on the EU7s Financial Collateral
Arrangements Directive (FCD), this Article examines the rationale and
justifications for financial contract privileges. It finds that these
privilegesTa relic of a bygone understanding of the nature and genesis of
systemic riskTmore likely exacerbate than reduce that risk. Nor do they
have beneficial effects on liquidity, whether it be liquidity of assets,
markets, or market participants.
Part I provides a primer on systemic risk and liquidity. It explains the
micro- and macroprudential conceptualizations of systemic risk. Espousing
4. For some illuminating examples from before, as well as after, the crisis, see Robert R.
Bliss & George B. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout, 2
J. FIN. STABILITY 55 (2006); Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84
AM. BANKR. L.J. 123 (2010) [hereinafter Lubben, Safe Harbors]; Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives
Market1s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011); David
A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 152 (2012); Edward J. Janger, Arbitraging Systemic Risk: System Definition,
Risk Definition, Systemic Interaction, and the Problem of Asymmetric Treatment, 92 TEX. L. REV.
SEE ALSO 217 (2014); Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe & Christopher S. Sontchi, Rolling Back
the Repo Safe Harbors, 69 BUS. LAW. 1015 (2014); Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The
Bankruptcy Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives: A Path Dependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1715 (2014); Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and
Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699 (2015) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Derivatives].
5. For two valuable exceptions, see Louise Gullifer, What Should We Do About Financial
Collateral?, 65 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 377 (2012), and; Philipp Paech, The Value of Financial
Market Insolvency Safe Harbours, 36 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2016).
6. English bankruptcy lawyers addressing a U.S. audience usually offer a word on
terminology. In England, Rbankruptcy law; is taken to refer to the law that applies to the
bankruptcy of natural persons, whereas Rinsolvency law; governs other entities. This usage, a relic
of path dependency, unhelpfully confuses the factual state of a debtor7s insolvency and the legal
processes which may be invoked in response. The distinction between factual insolvency and legal
bankruptcy, employed in this Article, is often more analytically useful than that between the legal
bankruptcy of a natural person and that of other debtors.
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the latter, it considers the vulnerabilities that make systems prone to crises,
the channels through which risk is transmitted, and the factors that amplify
it. This Part also introduces the concepts of market, asset, institutional, and
funding liquidity. Adopting the rather unfamiliar label of Rfroth; to describe
the very familiar state in which markets persistently and/or progressively
overvalue assets, it provides an initial characterization of how the amount of
credit and leverage in the system is linked with the constituents of systemic
risk.
Part II introduces bankruptcy law as a potential bulwark against
systemic risk. The primary purposes of collective distress resolution
regimesTthe preservation of value in distressed estates and the distribution
of that value in a normatively defensible mannerTare discussed, as is the
related distinction between payment priorities within a bankruptcy
proceeding and immunities from such proceedings. This Part analyzes the
effects of immunities and priorities both on the attempts to restructure
distressed, but viable, enterprises and on the ex post allocation of
bankruptcy harm. Part II also introduces two international soft-law
instruments that provide guidance on best practices in bankruptcy law, both
generally and in their application to financial contracts. These instruments
are the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (Guide) promulgated by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and
the Principles on Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Rights Systems
(Principles) issued by the World Bank. The role of four bankruptcy valuepreservation mechanisms is explained with reference to these instruments.
While familiar to bankruptcy lawyers in the United States, these
mechanisms neither function fully in most other jurisdictions, nor are their
rationales properly understood. It is in relation to these mechanisms that
financial contracts receive a privileged position.
Part III introduces the relevant financial contracts and their immunities.
The descriptions of the contracts are sufficiently detailed to enable a
nonspecialist to contextualize the discussion to follow. The immunities
derive from the FCD, the Guide and the Principles, and a third specialist
soft-law instrument, the Principles on the Operation of Close-Out Netting
Provisions, which the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law issued in 2013 (UNIDROIT Netting Principles).7
Part IV explains the effect of the immunities on market discipline. It
rebuts recent assertions that there is no fundamental difference between
these effects and those of Rstandard; secured credit. Standard secured credit
reduces counterparty credit risk by mitigating financial agency and adverse
selection costs. By contrast, bankruptcy immunities, at best, merely shift
7. INT7L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW [UNIDROIT], PRINCIPLES ON THE
OPERATION OF CLOSE-OUT NETTING PROVISIONS (2013) [hereinafter UNIDROIT NETTING
PRINCIPLES], http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/netting/netting-principles2013-e.pdf.
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that risk to those less able to bear it. Like any other method for
externalization of the downside costs of decision making, the immunities
thereby reduce the average quality of funded projects and counterparties in
the system. The focus of this Part is on the immunities themselves, and it
argues that, all else equal, any form of funding that is immune to
bankruptcy would tend to weaken market discipline.
Part V turns to the particular mechanism of netting. A product of the
increasingly disfavored microprudential approach to systemic risk, netting
is based on the simplistic view that systemic risk is pro tanto reduced to the
same extent as the reduction in risk to each individual financial institution
in the system. In fact, however, netting encourages greater leverage and
inter-party concentrations, weakens lending standards by exacerbating
financial agency and adverse selection costs, redistributes counterparty risk
rather than reducing it, exacerbates market volatility in times of stress, and
thus creates an additional channel for risk transmission, propagating the
effects of shock through the financial system. Drawing on the discussion
thus far, Part V also shows that the immunities do not enhance the type of
market, or any other, liquidity that represents a public good. The type of
fair-weather Rliquidity; that the immunities do exponentiate, by contrast, is
a menace since it is the main channel for systemic risk. Financial sector
regulators, in (re)discovering some of these costs, have somewhat
moderated their misguided reliance on netting as a risk mitigant. Netting
nevertheless maintains an exaggerated hold on their imaginations, not least
because perversely incentivized financial market participants continue to
lobby hard for it.
Part VI confronts the core argument in favor of the immunities, namely,
that they mitigate systemic risk. The argument is premised on the existence
of Rdomino risk;Tthe view that a significant market participant7s failure to
meet its obligations would result in similar failures by its counterparties.
Domino risk is another relic of the microprudential understanding of
systemic risk. The domino risk argument misconstrues how financial
systems become susceptible to crises, is based on implausible assumptions,
and is contradicted by all available evidence. The same evidence is
examined to show that financial contract immunities, defended because they
protect against the nonexistent domino threat, end up actually exacerbating
real risk.
The discussion thus far leaves us with a mystery. Several dozen
sophisticated legal systems have incorporated financial contract immunities.
Immunity enthusiasts insinuate that the explanation for this phenomenon
must lie in the immunities7 welfare-enhancing effects. Part VII draws on
and extends an alternative, debunking explanation based on path
dependence. The immunities resulted from intensive lobbying of extremely
well-resourced interest groups over a period of three decades. Accumulating
extensions of the immunities in the United States resulted from
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unsubstantiated, ever-bolder and ever-less-nuanced assertions about their
contribution to systemic stability. The vast U.S. immunities were then cited
to foreign governments in lobbying for similar changes in their own
jurisdictions, and in international fora to shape soft-law instruments. The
process was accompanied by the marginalization, or complete exclusion, of
any consideration of the costs of the immunities. This Article uses examples
of lobbying by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA), whose members include dominant financial market participants, to
illustrate the process. The formulation of the Guide and the UNIDROIT
Netting Principles provides illustrations of the information and reputation
costs associated with exploring alternatives to path-dependent immunity
extensions. This Part concludes by highlighting the costs of cross-border
financial integration, of which financial contract immunities are a
particularly troubling component.
Part VIII suggests how a well-designed bankruptcy regime would treat
financial contracts. It begins by assessing the argument that a bankruptcy
regime should not seek to mitigate systemic risk at all, which should be left
to Rregulation.; Even if, arguendo, bankruptcy regimes should not seek to
mitigate systemic risk, the argument fails to show why they should be
designed so as to add to it. The argument, in any case, misunderstands both
the nature of systemic risk and, therefore, the necessarily multifactorial
response that it demands. Part VIII then turns to the legitimacy and
importance for bankruptcy regimes to facilitate certain constituent practices
of financial contracts, such as the posting of Rmargins; and the netting of
appropriately connected contracts. Bankruptcy regimes should also strike a
careful balance between at least three, sometimes competing, objectives: the
prevention of systemic contagion, the maximization of the value of the
bankruptcy estate, and the interests of solvent financial contract
counterparties in closing out and netting their positions, and disposing of
collateral.
I. A PRIMER ON SYSTEMIC RISK, LIQUIDITY, AND FROTH
This Part draws on the literature examining systemic risk and crises to
provide the conceptual framework for the discussion in the rest of the
Article. It introduces two understandings of systemic risk, and explains its
preference for one over the other. It describes the factors that make a system
vulnerable to risk and those that amplify this risk. It concludes by
explaining the relevant concepts of liquidity and draws attention to the
importance of distinguishing it from froth, with which liquidity is often
damagingly confused.
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A. SYSTEMIC RISK: TWO APPROACHES
There are two ways to conceptualize systemic risk.8 The first, which
was dominant amongst financial sector regulators until the onset of the
2007V2009 crisis, is the Rmicroprudential; approach. Microprudential
regulations are rooted in the desire to protect individual financial
institutions and each institution7s depositors and investors. Each institution
is considered on a stand-alone basis, disregarding its relationships with
other institutions and its position within the system. The risk it faces is
regarded as mostly exogenous to its own and other institutions7 behavior.
Systemic risk is viewed in a bottom-up manner as a simple aggregation of
the risk of individual institutions, with the implication that Rthe whole
financial system is sound if and only if each institution is sound.;9 Systemic
crises are conceptualized as being triggered by exogenous shocks to
individual institutions, with the failure of one institution spreading, dominolike, to others, mostly through payment and settlement systems. With this
Rdomino; conception of systemic risk in place, microprudential regulations
seek to protect each institution against shocks and are coupled with the
strengthening of payment and settlement systems so as to dampen shock
transmission.10
The microprudential approach suffers from the Rfallacy of
composition,; which is the assumption that what is good for an individual
financial institution is ipso facto good for the financial system as a whole.11
This approach focuses on procyclical measures of risk. When the financial
sector is stable, a credit boom takes hold, credit costs fall, asset prices rise,
and the spreads between government and corporate bonds narrow, the
microprudential approach regards the risk in the system as declining.
Conversely, risk is thought to increase during stress and recessions. As
discussed below, however, this gets things exactly the wrong way around,
afflicting the microprudential approach with the Rparadox of financial
instability,; that is, R[a] system [that] looks strongest precisely when it is
most vulnerable.;12 Even assuming that the procyclical focus is rational for
individual market participants, it is systemically problematic. Credit ratings
8. See Claudio Borio, Rediscovering the Macroeconomic Roots of Financial Stability Policy:
Journey, Challenges, and a Way Forward, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECONS. 87, 88V91 (2011). For an
excellent discussion of the nature, propagation, and regulation of systemic risk, see Iman
Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2011).
9. Borio, supra note 8, at 88.
10. In this light, close-out netting can be seen as a mechanism for enabling the counterparties
of a distressed entity to seek to insulate themselves from that distress by terminating their
relationships with it.
11. Borio, supra note 8, at 89. For another regulator7s take on fallacies of composition in the
design of international financisL +UQ(Ls)O01h *UU "U10j) !X(+qh coUYf "Wf [U4rU+h c(+0-Us1
Central Bank, Paradigm Lost: Rethinking International Adjustments, Address at Egon and Joan
von Kashnitz Lecture, Clausen Center for International Business and Policy (Nov. 21, 2015).
12. Borio, supra note 8, at 100.
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based on this view have long been recognized as failing timeously to
predict crises, and bank capital and loan loss provisioning regulations
premised on it have proven potent amplifiers that exacerbate financial
sector stress.13
Against this background, this Article draws and expands on the
Rmacroprudential; approach, to which regulatory authorities have
increasingly turned in the wake of the 2007V2009 crisis. 14 The ultimate
objective of this approach is to protect, not stakeholders of an individual
institution, but the real economy.15 The approach is top-down, starting with
system-wide cost/benefit analyses of regulatory requirements, such as those
relating to solvency and capital, and deriving from these its treatment of
individual institutions in a way that is sensitive to their relationships with
others and their position within the system.16 The macroprudential approach
regards risk as accumulating in booms, and materializing when the cycle
turns. While the micro- and macroprudential approaches are partly
complementary, they do yield conflicting recommendations, particularly in
a downturn.17
In this Article, systemic risk is understood schematically as the risk that
(i) given attributes of the financial system that weaken its resilience
(Rvulnerabilities;), (ii) an event in either the financial or real sectors (a
Rshock;) would trigger (iii) financial sector Rstress,; in the form of loss of
economic value or confidence, and attendant rise in uncertainty, resulting in
(iv) serious adverse effects on the real economy. The effects of shock on the
financial system, and of financial sector stress on the real economy, are
propagated between sectors, and between different economies, through
Rchannels,; and may be heightened by any of several Ramplifiers.;
Systemic risk increases when new vulnerabilities, amplifiers, or channels
are created, and when existing ones are exacerbated or enlarged. 18 It is
13. FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ADDRESSING
PROCYCLICALITY IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 8 (2009) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY FORUM],
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0904a.pdf.
14. R[O]ne widely shared lesson of the crisis is that financial supervision and regulation need
to become much more 9macroprudential7 (rather than remaining 9microprudential7), that is, they
should be geared towards containing systemic risk (rather than the risks of individual
intermediaries or markets).; Olivier de Bandt, Philipp Hartmann & José-Luis Peydró, Systemic
Risk in Banking After The Great Financial Crisis, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 667,
668 (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson eds., 2d ed. 2015) (footnote omitted).
15. See Borio, supra note 8, at 93.
16. For an illuminating illustration, see Céline Gauthier, Alfred Lehar & Moez Souissi,
Macroprudential Capital Requirements and Systemic Risk, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 594, 597
(2012).
17. de Bandt, Hartmann & Peydró, supra note 14, at 674.
18. This draws on and develops notions of systemic risk from several sources. See, e.g., Borio,
supra note 8; Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell7Ariccia, Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, Lessons and
Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis 11V12 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/10/44,
2010) [hereinafter Claessens et al., Lessons]; IMF, Effects of Consolidation on Financial Risk,
Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector 126V27 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Report on
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understood as partly endogenous: the collective behavior of financial
institutions affects systemic vulnerabilities, channels, and amplifiers. This
collective behavior has both a temporal and a cross-sectional dimension.
The temporal dimension manifests in Rprocyclicality,; which is Rthe
dynamic interaction[] (positive feedback mechanisms) between the
financial and the real sectors of the economy.; 19 The cross-sectional
dimension consists of common exposures to the same vulnerabilities
(Rcorrelations;). A systemic crisis results when systemic risk materializes.20
B. VULNERABILITIES
A number of important factors are strongly associated with systemic
crises. 21 The factors interact in complicated ways, which the following
discussion greatly simplifies. The objective is not comprehensiveness,
which is unattainable anyway, but rather identification of factors arguably
relevant to the bankruptcy treatment of financial contracts.
The factors may be regarded as clustering together in this way: financial
liberalization tends to be associated with increased systemic uncertainty,
weakened market discipline, and credit booms, which, in turn, are
associated with asset price bubbles, and eventually with excessive leverage.
Each of these features appears to contribute to financial system
vulnerability, and a significant combination of them may confidently be
taken as Rclassic telltales of [impending] banking crises.;22
RFinancial liberalization; is a broad term used to describe a variety of
ways of deregulating the financial sector, including loosening of: credit
controls, reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state
control of the banking sector, a sector7s prudential regulation and
supervision, capital account restrictions, and security market policy,
Consolidation]. The Group of Ten Report on Consolidation was coauthored by finance ministry
and central bank officials from the Group of Ten industrialized countries, and representatives of
intergovernmental supervisory bodies, including: the IMF, the Bank of International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
19. FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 13, at 8.
20. The literature adopts a rough and ready classification of systemic crises as currency,
banking, and sovereign crises. See, e.g., Adrian van Rixtel & Gabriele Gasperini, Financial Crises
and Bank Funding: Recent Experience in the Euro Area 2 (Bank for Int7l Settlements, Working
Paper No. 406, 2013) (reporting that from 1970 to 2011 there were 218 currency, 147 banking,
and 66 sovereign crises). Where relevant, this Article focuses on banking crises as a proxy for
crises in the financial system as a whole.
21. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles, Crises, and Policy, OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL7Y, Autumn 1999, at 9.
22. Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell7Ariccia, Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, Cross-Country
Experiences and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis, 25 ECON. POL7Y 267, 272
(2010) [hereinafter Claessens et al., Cross-Country]. For accessible introductions to systemic
crisis literature, see Claessens et al., Lessons, supra note 18, and; CARMEN M. REINHART &
KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (reprt.
ed. 2011).
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including in relation to the development of derivatives markets.23 Financial
innovation, such as securitization and option pricing, may both result from
and be a cause of liberalization. 24 The benefits from context-appropriate
liberalization are potentially vast and include the stimulation of domestic
productivity, savings, and growth, along with reduced reliance on foreign
capital flows. These benefits are linked with the ability of banks and other
financial intermediaries to fund riskier projects. Inevitably, there are costs.
In particular, Rany mechanism that may prevent bank managers from
appropriately evaluating the downside risk of their lending decisions
becomes especially dangerous.; 25 Also dangerous are mechanisms that
enable the downside risk to be externalized. Liberalization that outstrips
legislative, regulatory, and supervisory understanding and capacities makes
the financial system vulnerable. This is often the case, and there is a strong
correlation between liberalization and systemic crises. For example,
eighteen of the twenty-six banking crises between 1970 and 1995 followed
within five years of financial liberalization.26 Another analysis of fifty-three
economies between 1980 and 1995 found that, controlling for a variety of
factors, including adverse macroeconomic developments and policies, and
balance of payments vulnerabilities, financial liberalization exerts a
significant independent negative effect on the stability of the financial
system.27
A Rcredit boom; occurs when growth in the availability of credit to the
private sector significantly exceeds its long-run trend. 28 Booms are
associated with general economic upswings, and thus with above-trend
expansions in real output, consumption, and investment. 29 They are also
strongly associated with systemic crises. Indeed, the authors of an analysis
of fourteen developed countries between 1870 and 2008 refer to financial
crises as Rcredit booms gone wrong.;30 Another analysis of twenty-seven
booms in industrial economies and twenty-two in emerging ones between
1960 and 2006 indicates that while only a minority of booms end in a crisis,
23. See Abdul Abiad, Enrica Detragiache & Thierry Tressel, A New Database of Financial
Reforms 17 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/08/266, 2008).
24. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 22, at 208.
25. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, Financial Liberalization and Financial
Fragility 8 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/98/83, 1998).
26. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking
and Balance-of-Payments Problems, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 473, 480 (1999) (cited in REINHART &
ROGOFF, supra note 22, at 155V57, 165).
27. Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, supra note 25, at 1. These effects can be partially
mitigated by effective law enforcement, an efficient bureaucracy, and absence of corruption.
28. Enrique G. Mendoza & Marco E. Terrones, An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence from
Macro Aggregates and Micro Data 5 (Nat7l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14049, 2008).
29. Claessens et al., Lessons, supra note 18, at 5.
30. See Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy,
Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870M2008, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1029, 1032 (2012) (also
finding that larger financial sectors are more crisis prone).
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crises are more likely to occur in the wake of a boom, and their severity and
duration are positively correlated with those of the preceding boom. 31 In
emerging and industrialized economies alike, a credit boom resulting from a
sustained surge of capital inflow into the economy is strongly procyclical
and strongly associated with crises.32 The primary relevant mechanisms by
which booms contribute to systemic vulnerabilities are the creation of asset
price bubbles, weakening of lending standards, and excessive leverage.33
An Rasset price bubble; exists when prices significantly exceed their
fundamental values, which are the discounted, present values of the assets7
future payoffs.34 Three of the reasons canvassed in the literature for bubble
inflation are particularly relevant. First, the availability of cheap credit,
often sparked by financial liberalization, is an important cause.35 Second,
Rprices [may] overreact to a potentially informative signal about
fundamentals,; such as when markets overestimate the positive effect, on
some aspect of the real economy, of the advent of railroads, electricity,
information technology, or securitization. 36 A third source is a decision
maker7s ability to pass on to others the downside costs of his decisions.37
Two ways in which bubbles contribute to systemic risk are worth
noting.38 First, lenders increasingly lend on the expectation of a continuing
rise in the prices of assets offered as collateral rather than on the basis of a
borrower7s cash flow assessments. Such lending weakens market discipline.
Second, lenders7 risks become increasingly correlated as they crowd into an
inflating market for a piece of the action, so that the same factor that might
cause loss to oneTthe bursting of the bubbleTmay instead end up stressing
a significant part of the financial system.39
Lending standards decline in line with a lender7s ability to externalize
the net downside costs of its lending decisions on to others. The greater its
31. See generally Mendoza & Terrones, supra note 28, discussed in Claessens et al., Lessons,
supra note 18, at 5.
32. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 22, at 141V74.
33. Claessens et al., Lessons, supra note 18, at 4V5; Frederic S. Mishkin, How Should We
Respond to Asset Price Bubbles?, 12 FIN. STABILITY REV. 65, 66V67 (2008).
34. For the complexities of defining a bubble, see Jeremy J. Siegel, What Is an Asset Price
Bubble? An Operational Definition, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 11 (2003).
35. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 22, at 208.
36. Anna Scherbina, Asset Price Bubbles: A Selective Survey 20 (IMF, Working Paper No.
WP/13/45, 2013) (citing Behzad T. Diba & Herschel I. Grossman, On the Inception of Rational
Bubbles, 102 Q.J. ECONS. 697, 697V700 (1987)). This point goes back to Irving Fisher, The DebtDeflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337, 349 (1933) (RThere is probably
always a very real basis for the 9new era7 psychology before it runs away with its victim.;).
37. See generally Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, Churning Bubbles, 60 REV. ECON. STUD.
813 (1993); Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite, Finite Bubbles with Short
Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information, 61 J. ECON. THEORY 206 (1993).
38. See Mishkin, supra note 33, at 65V74.
39. Claudio Borio, Craig Furfine & Philip Lowe, Procyclicality of the Financial System and
Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options 4V5 (Bank for Int7l Settlements, BIS Paper No. 1,
2001), https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap01a.pdf.

26

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 10

ability to do so, the riskier the projects funded, with the attendant
accumulation of systemic risk. Contributing to this are any techniques that
weaken the ability and/or incentives of a lender to assess potential
borrowers ex ante, and to monitor them over the term of the loan.40
RExcessive leverage; is a part of the flip-side of the credit boom coin.
For our purposes, leverage may be understood as the ratio of total assets at
risk (Rexposure;) to equity. 41 Leverage adds to systemic risk in several
ways. Debt enables a borrower7s decision makers to externalize part of the
borrower7s downside risk to the lender. This means that the greater the level
of debt in the borrower7s balance sheet, the more likely this borrower is to
take on risk. Further, the higher the level of a debtor7s leverage, the greater
the proportion of its revenue stream it must allocate to debt servicing. All
else equal, therefore, the borrower is correspondingly more likely to be
rendered illiquid and/or insolvent because of smaller drops in those
revenues or rises in the cost of debt.42 The problem is particularly acute
when the excessively leveraged borrower is a financial institution. 43 The
quality, not merely the quantity, of the borrowing undertaken by a financial
institution matters; a desire to participate in the rewards of a credit boom
may encourage banks to lend in excess of available retail deposit funds, and
to cover their own funding gap in more volatile wholesale markets.44 This
reduces the resilience of the banking system.
RExcessive uncertainty; is a key financial system vulnerability, playing
a role in several of the factors described above. It is a constitutive factor in
legislative, regulatory, and supervisory weaknesses in the face of financial
liberalization and innovation, to the inflation of bubbles, and to the decline
of lending standards.45 In the 2007V2009 global financial crisis, the opacity
inherent to complex collateralized debt obligations and similar instruments,
and to banks7 incentives to keep risks off balance sheets until forced to do
40. See Claessens et al., Lessons, supra note 18, at 6V8. See generally Constantinos Stephanou,
Rethinking Market Discipline in Banking: Lessons from the Financial Crisis (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 5227, 2010); Giovanni Dell7Ariccia, Igan Deniz & Luc Laeven,
Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market, 44 J.
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 367 (2012); Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage
Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 Q.J. ECONS. 1449
(2009).
41. For a new measure of leverage, introduced to Rrestrict the build-up of leverage in the
banking sector to avoid destabilising deleveraging processes that can damage the broader financial
system and the economy,; see BANK FOR INT7L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO FRAMEWORK AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 1
(2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf.
42. For a clear explanation of the role played by excessive leverage in the demise of the UK
bank, Northern Rock, see Hyun Song Shin, Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that
Heralded the Global Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 101 (2009).
43. See Claessens et al., Lessons, supra note 18, at 9V10.
44. Vanessa Le Leslé, Bank Debt in Europe: Are Funding Models Broken?, paras. 6V7 (IMF,
Working Paper No. 12-299, 2012).
45. See, e.g., Allen & Gale, supra note 21, at 12V13, 15.
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otherwise, was a fruitful source of risk externalization, bubble inflation, and
systemic vulnerability.46
C. CHANNELS AND AMPLIFIERS
The discussion thus far describes a financial system primed for crisis. A
shock may result in Ra sharp change in risk perception;47 and thus spark a
crisis. In the 2007V2009 crisis, the shock was the bursting of the U.S.
Rsubprime; property bubble, signaled by a spike in delinquency rates and
market exit of key lenders.48 These shocks resulted in up to $500 billion
USD in losses from subprime mortgage defaults and, in turn, in many
trillions of dollars of losses to the global economy.49 The purpose of this
sub-Part is to explore some of the primary mechanisms by which an initial
shock translates into severe systemic harm.
RAsset value contagion; is amongst the most important risk
amplifiers.50 It is a collective action problem in which an asset price shock,
such as that resulting from the bubble bursting, Rcauses balance sheet
constraints on asset-holders to tighten, causing assets to be liquidated,
lowering asset prices further, and so on.; 51 This contagion may operate
through forced sales of assets52 because of pressures in relation to any or all
of leverage, margin, collateral, or capital. In each case, the amplifier results
from individually rational attempts to liquidate assets, triggering price
collapses, and thus proving systemically disastrous. For example, a
regulated financial institution that has suffered losses may be faced with the
requirement either to raise new equity or to reduce its exposure. Assuming
that the losses have resulted from financial system stress, it may be difficult
in this circumstance to raise equity, and the institution may be forced to sell
assets instead. However, since the system is stressed, other institutions are
likely to be selling similar assets, creating a downward pressure on prices,
46. Claessens et al., Lessons, supra note 18, at 7V8. For an accessible and interesting account,
see James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the
3New Financial Architecture1, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECONS. 563 (2009).
47. Timothy Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference: Liquidity Risk and the Global Economy
(May 15, 2007), http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2007/gei070515.html. For
background, see Gary Gorton, Banking Panics and Business Cycles, 40 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
751 (1988).
48. Claessens et al., Cross-Country, supra note 22, tbl.I.
49. See, e.g., Arvind Krishnamurthy, Amplification Mechanisms in Liquidity Crises, AM.
ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS, July 2010, at 1, 1; U.S. GOV7T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS: LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT (2013).
50. See Roe, supra note 4, for perhaps the finest account of bankruptcy immunities7
facilitation of collateral value contagion. Roe7s work has deeply influenced the thinking
underlying this Article.
51. Krishnamurthy, supra note 49, at 2.
52. A Rforced sale; occurs when the seller cannot meet its own obligations without selling
assets. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, 25 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29, 30 (2011) [hereinafter Shleifer & Vishny, Fire Sales].
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and making it correspondingly harder for each institution to regain capital
adequacy.53 Recognition of the importance of this amplifier is not exactly
new. Irving Fisher wrote about it in 1933 as a key dynamic in the economic
cycle:
Assuming . . . that . . . a state of over-indebtedness exists, this will tend to
lead to liquidation. . . . Debt liquidation leads to distress selling . . . [which
in turn results in a] fall in the level of prices. . . . [I]f the over-indebtedness
with which we started was great enough, the liquidation of debts cannot
keep up with the fall of prices which it causes. In that case, the liquidation
defeats itself. . . . [The] very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of
debts increases it, because of the mass effect of the stampede to liquidate
in swelling each dollar owed. Then we have the great paradox which . . . is
the chief secret of most, if not all, great depressions: The more the debtors
pay, the more they owe.54

Asset value contagion has repeatedly been identified in the wake of
crises, and is thus a well-studied phenomenon. 55 In relation to financial
contracts in particular, it seems that it was forgotten until the 2007V2009
crisis, notwithstanding a sharp reminder around 1998.56
RMarked-to-market; valuation, when linked with risk management and
investment decision rules, has proved strongly procyclical and thus another
powerful amplifier. 57 Such valuation is part of the Rfair-value; approach
that is mandatory for financial instruments such as derivatives under
international accounting standards. Fair-value accounting consists of three
hierarchical Rlevels,; at which value is assigned by reference, respectively,
to (i) quoted prices in active markets for identical instruments; (ii) quoted
prices for similar instruments or observable attributes of the valued
instruments, such as interest rates and yield curves; and (iii) unobservable
attributes of the instruments.58 The first two levels reflect different degrees
of the marked-to-market approach, while the third is Rmarked-to-model.;
While accounting standards exclude forced sales and inactive market prices
from feeding into the valuation processTthus permitting a switch from
level one and/or two to level threeTthe process involves discretion and

53. See, e.g., Robin Greenwood, Augustin Landier & David Thesmar, Vulnerable Banks, 115
J. FIN. ECONS. 471, 471 (2015).
54. Fisher, supra note 36, at 341V42, 344. See also Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
Literature Review of Factors Relating to Liquidity Stress M Extended Version 14 (Bank for Int7l
Settlements, Working Paper No. 25, 2013).
55. For a finance literature survey at the onset of the 2007V2009 episode, see Krishnamurthy,
supra note 49, at 1V15.
56. See infra Part VII.
57. IMF, Financial Stress and Deleveraging: Macrofinancial Implications and Policy, Global
Financial Stability Report, at 109, 115 (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter IMF, Financial Stress].
58. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1126/2008, IAS 39, paras. 48V49, app. A at AG69V
AG82, 2008 O.J. (L 320) 270.
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uncertainty, and does not eliminate the adverse feedback. 59 Marked-tomarket valuations thus incentivize banks to increase their leverage during
booms, and when the cycle turns, also encourage asset sales that can set off
or exacerbate asset value contagion by tightening regulatory capital and
collateral constraints. 60 Economists have long recognized this amplifier.
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz quote the N.Y. Federal Reserve7s
Deputy Governor explaining to his Board in 1931 that the bonds with the
most active marketsTwhich were thus susceptible in effect to being
marked-to-marketTwere causing the most serious risk to bank solvency as
a result of forced sales and the subsequent declines in market prices.61
RInformation contagion; occurs when market participants suffer
unexpected uncertainty and react so as to exacerbate financial sector
stress.62 Of particular importance is RKnightian; uncertainty, which exists
when the relative odds of events are unknown. By contrast, risk exists when
such odds are known. 63 Knightian uncertainty is most likely, though not
exclusively, to arise when imperfectly understood financial innovations
behave in unexpected ways, R[in] environments where market participants
have had a limited experience in dealing with a particular asset.;64 Consider
the example of AAA-rated subprime loan tranches, which suffered losses in
the run-up to the 2007V2009 financial crisis:
Investors were not surprised that high-risk homeowners defaulted on some
loans; rather, they were surprised that such defaults had a material effect
on the values of the most senior of the tranches backed by pools of
subprime mortgages. Moreover, given that a myriad other credit products .
59. The switch away from marked-to-market valuations has its own problems. An experienced
bank examiner told me that level three, and to a lesser extent, level two, are sometimes described
in the trade as Rmarked-to-supervisor,; in recognition that they are what sectoral supervisors can
be persuaded to allow institutions to get away with. The result is an increase in market opacity.
60. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Mark-to-Market Accounting and Liquidity
Pricing, 45 J. ACCT. & ECONS. 358 (2008); Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and
Leverage, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 418 (2010); Urooj Khan, Does Fair Value Accounting
Contribute to Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry? (Columbia Bus. Sch. Research Paper, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911895; Douglas W. Diamond & G. Raghuram Rajan, Fear of Fire
Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes, 126 Q.J. ECONS. 557 (2011); Craig B. Merrill,
Taylor D. Nadauld, René M. Stulz & Shane M. Sherlund, Why Were There Fire Sales of
Mortgage-Backed Securities by Financial Institutions During the Financial Crisis? (Charles A.
Dice Center, Working Paper No. 2013-02), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=22
12684.
61. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 355V56 (1971).
62. This term is owed to Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market1s Payment Priorities as
Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 567 (2011).
63. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (Houghton Mifflin,
1st ed. 1921).
64. Krishnamurthy, supra note 49, at 22. For a discussion of the role of such uncertainty in
relation to asset-backed commercial paper in the 1970 Penn Central Railroad default, portfolio
insurance strategies in the October 1987 stock market crash, and the hedge fund crisis in 1998, see
id. at 22V23. The last of these is discussed in Part VII, infra.
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. . had been structured in much the same way as subprime investments,
investors7 model-uncertainty went across the entire market.65

The rational response may be to assume the worst, which may trigger
demands for more collateral, thus stressing counterparties7 liquidity and
then solvency; to dispose of assets, thus risking asset value contagion; and
perhaps to disengage from the market so that market liquidity evaporates.66
Information contagion also creates cross-border risk transmission channels,
with investors exposed to Knightian uncertainty in one jurisdiction treating
it as a Rwakeup call,; and becoming wary of another, which they recognize
as sharing attributes that they perceive as relevant.67
RCommon lender effects; create another channel for risk transmission
between countries. On the one hand, subsidiaries of well-capitalized foreign
banks might react countercyclically, and thus beneficially, in relation to a
local crisis. 68 On the other, lendersTand investors more generallyTwho
come under capital or margin pressures in one country, especially in a
country that has suffered a crisis, might rebalance portfolios by reducing
lending in other countries. 69 Several of the amplifiers discussed above
might play a part in heightening this effect. A local crisis in one economy
might thereby spread to another.
Since the debate about financial contracts is littered with loose talk of
Rliquidity,; a preliminary note of caution is merited on the relationship
between systemic vulnerabilities on the one hand and liquidity on the other.
D. LIQUIDITY AND FROTH
Liquidity is an attribute of markets, assets, and institutions. An asset is
liquid to the extent that it robustly retains a market value at or near its
fundamental value.70 A market is liquid to the extent that it easily enables
realization of significant volumes of assets at or near their fundamental

65. Id. at 15V22.
66. Id. at 15.
67. Thomas Moser, What Is International Financial Contagion?, 6 INT7L FIN. 157, 162V66

(2003).
68. IMF, Financial Stress, supra note 57, at 73V105.
69. See, e.g., Caroline Van Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, Sources of Contagion: Is it
Finance or Trade?, 54 J. INT7L ECONS. 293, 295 (2001); Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M.
Reinhart, On Crises, Contagion, and Confusion, 51 J. INT7L ECONS. 145, 154 (2000); Itay
Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, Contagion of Self-Fulfilling Financial Crises Due to Diversification of
Investment Portfolios, 119 J. ECON. THEORY 151, 152 (2004); Claessens et al., Cross-Country,
supra note 22, at 274.
70. Roughly parallel to this is the understanding of asset illiquidity as the difference between
the asset7s fire sale price and its value in best use. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343, 1344
(1992). A Rfire sale; is a forced sale in a distressed market. See Shleifer & Vishny, Fire Sales,
supra note 52, at 30.
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value.71 An institution is liquid to the extent that its balance sheet contains
more liquid assets, and its liabilities consist more of Rsofter; claims like
equity and less of Rharder; ones like debt, particularly short-term debt.
Funding liquidityTthe ease with which a market participant may raise
external financeTis best understood as a function of asset and market
liquidities, since it is the sale of a particular asset, namely, a contingent
claim to a part of the borrower7s value. A Rflight to liquidity; occurs when
investors seek to dispose of less liquid assets in favor of more liquid ones.72
Liquid markets, which enable assets to change hands at or close to their
fundamental value, enhance social welfare since they enable social
resources to remain at or near their most economically valued use.
However, market liquidity must be sharply distinguished from a very
different state with which it is characteristically confused, which we will
call Rmarket froth.; A frothy market is one in which assets are progressively
and/or persistently overvalued. 73 That is, froth characterizes a market in
which an asset price bubble is inflating, typically fed by a credit boom.
Froth is thus associated with a decline in lending standards and excessive
leverage. It is inherently fragile. In the end, assets either generate the cashflow necessary to service the claims in relation to them, or the claims suffer
default. The greater the discrepancy between the cash-flowsTwhich are
constitutive of the assets7 fundamental valueTand the claimsTrepresented
by the assets7 market priceTthe greater the likelihood of default.74 Indeed,
froth may contain the seeds of its own destruction, as, for example, when a
frothy housing market results in an oversupply of housing, which in turn
causes declines in the fundamental value of the housing stock. 75 This
heightens divergence between market prices and fundamental value,
thereby increasing both the probability and severity of a market price
readjustment (i.e., a crash). Accordingly, froth is a major systemic
vulnerability, both a mechanism for, and a sign of, risk accumulation. Keep
this in mind when we turn to assessing the argument that financial contract
immunities exponentiate liquidity.

71. A derivatives industry advocacy document describes a liquid market as Rone in which it is
possible to transact immediately with minimum effect on price and minimum loss of value,; and
considers four dimensions to liquidity: immediacy, cost, depth, and resiliency. David Mengle, The
Economic Role of Speculation 4 (Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, Research Notes No. 2, 2010).
72. These definitions are adapted from Krishnamurthy, supra note 49, at 25V28.
73. Olivier Blanchard and Mark Watson7s Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial
Markets is a seminal work on froth, though the term itself is not used. Olivier J. Blanchard &
Mark W. Watson, Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial Markets, in CRISES IN THE
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 295 (Paul Wachtel ed., 1982).
74. James Crotty has made an analogous point. See Crotty, supra note 46, at 576.
75. Blanchard & Watson, supra note 73, at 301V02. Fundamental value, which here is the
present value of housing services (rents), falls as supply increases while demand remains constant.
Id.
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II. BANKRUPTCY LAW AS COUNTERCYCLICAL BULWARK
This Part highlights the ways in which paradigmatic features of a welldeveloped bankruptcy regime can serve to disrupt or weaken procyclical
dynamics. It also adds to the social welfare-oriented discussion so far (i.e.,
how social value may be preserved or destroyed) with considerations of
fairness (i.e., how value ought to be distributed). The source of the relevant
features within bankruptcy law is the Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor
Regimes Unified Standard (ICR Standard) constituted by the
Recommendations of the Guide, read together with the Principles.76 While
nonbinding soft-law, the ICR Standard is regarded as the international best
practice in the domain. It is one of fourteen such standards recognized by
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to be Rbroadly accepted as representing
minimum requirements for good practice that countries are encouraged to
meet or exceed [and whose implementation is] key for sound financial
systems and deserving of priority implementation depending on country
circumstances.; 77 Intergovernmental organizations, including the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), use the ICR Standard as
the basis for assessing domestic bankruptcy regimes and for recommending
reform. 78 The discussion begins by distinguishing between bankruptcy
law7s two main functionsTpreservation of value and distribution of
valueTconceived at the most general level.
A. PRIORITY, IMMUNITY, WELFARE, AND FAIRNESS
Categories of claims accorded Rpriority; over others within a
bankruptcy proceeding enjoy a superior repayment position. By contrast, a
claim given Rimmunity; finds itself in the privileged position of being
excluded from relevant bankruptcy restrictions altogether. Put another way,
if bankruptcy proceedings are conceptualized as possessing mechanisms for
both (i) gathering, preserving, and maximizing the value of the bankrupt
estate (preservation mechanisms), and (ii) distributing that value
(distribution mechanisms), then priorities engage the distribution
mechanisms, whereas immunities disengage the preservation mechanisms.
Note that to disengage preservation mechanisms is also to render irrelevant
76. U.N. COMM7N ON INT7L TRADE L., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY
LAW, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]; WORLD BANK,
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR/DEBTOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS (2015)
[hereinafter WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES]. For a thoughtful, though controversial, discussion of the
genesis and development of the ICR Standard, see TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G.
CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 38V165
(2009) (ch. 3 is co-authored by Susan Block-Lieb).
77. Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems, FIN. STABILITY BD.,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key_stan
dards/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
78. See Factsheet: Standards and Codes: The Roles of the IMF, INT7L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/sc.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
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the distribution mechanisms: value not preserved in the bankruptcy estate is
also not available for distribution according to bankruptcy rules. It follows
that a claim accorded immunity would usually also, as a matter of fact,
enjoy priority in relation to the proceeds of the relevant assets over
nonimmune claims.
The immunity/priority distinction is crucial since priorities primarily
affect the distribution of value from the bankruptcy estate, whereas
immunities primarily affect how much value is available for distribution in
the first place. As a corollary, the primary cost of ill-chosen priority rules is
the misallocation of value from the bankruptcy estate, that is, the
misallocation of bankruptcy loss. The primary cost of wrong immunities is
not merely the misallocation but the destruction of value from the estate.
1. Priority
An important role of bankruptcy proceedings is to allocate loss from the
insolvency in a normatively defensible manner. The key here is not the
formal equality of treatment represented by the famous, if much
misunderstood, pari passu principle, 79 but the substantive equality of
concern that is, or at least ought to be, enshrined in the statutory priorities
regime.80 This regime is a critical tool, channeling the loss pro tanto from
creditors placed at a higher ranking to those placed at a lower one. All else
equal, a normatively defensible priorities regime would accord a higher
ranking to claims whose holders could not reasonably be expected to
protect their position ex ante by choosing whether to lend at all; bargaining
for a higher interest rate; obtaining security; achieving exit in anticipation
of their debtor7s distress; and/or those who would not be well placed ex post
to bear loss, because they were proportionately undiversified and not
shielded from insolvency loss through another reasonably feasible method.
Consider, by way of illustration, the position of a commercial debtor7s
tort claimants (those wrongfully injured by the debtor7s activities and owed
compensation for their injuries), employees, main bank lender, trade
creditors, and also the government7s tax departments. In general, the
average tort claimant, employee creditor, or tax authority has no choice
whether to Rlend,;81 has little control over the interest it may charge on their
claims, cannot obtain security, and cannot effectively obtain exit from a
given debtor. This is primarily because it has little to no knowledge of the
79. There are three conflicting ways in which the pari passu principle is usually understood,
often with little appreciation that the meanings differ, let alone conflict. See, e.g., Rizwaan J.
Mokal, At the Intersection of Property and Insolvency: The Insolvent Company1s Encumbered
Assets, 20 SING. ACAD. L.J. 495, 527V28 (2008).
80. See RIZWAAN J. MOKAL, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: THEORY AND APPLICATION 32V
132 (2005).
81. Characteristically, torts are inflicted without the consent of the tort victim, and wages and
taxes are paid in arrears.
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debtor7s prospects and little to no influence over its repayment decisions.
However, tax authorities are maximally diversified; they enjoy some
influence on tax rates and thus on the total quantum of their claim, and may
also have special investigative and enforcement powers. These factors
distinguish them from both tort and employee claimants, and substantiate
the familiar intuitionTthough one not always given full, or any, effect in
bankruptcy codesTthat tax authorities are less vulnerable to insolvency
harm than either tort or employee claimants. While tort and employee
claimants are not diversified in relation to their claims, important categories
of tort claimants may have the benefit of compulsory insurance schemesT
as in relation to workplace injury and road traffic accidentsTor reasonably
effective recovery mechanisms, such as class action suits. Considerations
similar to those sketched out here justify the statutory priority for wage and
other employee claims accorded by the bankruptcy codes of many
jurisdictions, and the existence of wage protection funds, into which all
employees and/or employers make payments, and against which the
employees of an insolvent employer may claim.82
In the paradigm case of a bankruptcy priorities regime gone askew, loss
flowing from some or all bankruptcies would be allocated to those who
were unable to protect their position ex ante and least able ex post to bear it.
The law would have failed to perform its legitimate and crucial role of
protecting those unable to protect themselves. The outcome might also be
value destructive downstream, with parties required to absorb an inordinate
proportion of the bankruptcy loss themselves, in turn, suffering avoidable
distress.
2. Immunity
The socially undesirable effects of a poorly designed bankruptcy
priorities regime can be harsh. However, such effects can be compounded
by the presence of ill-advised immunities. Notice that bankruptcy
proceedings are paradigmatically governed by what we may call the
Rprinciple of collectivity,; that is, by the objective that the whole of the
bankrupt7s estate be dealt with together, rationallyTat least
presumptivelyTin a value-maximizing manner, with a view to providing
the best feasible returns to all relevant claimants considered as a group.
The bankruptcy regime7s preservation mechanisms are critical to
achieving this objective. A distressed business may retain a Rgoing-concern
surplus,; inhering in the fact that some or all of its assets are more valuable
if retained as a productive unit than if split up from each other and disposed
of piecemeal. A key role of reorganization proceedings is to identify and
preserve any going-concern surplus, since it may maximize the returns of
creditors as a group. It may also be socially value-maximizing by
82. See WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, princs. C10.4(iv), C12.4.
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preventing unnecessary productive capacity destruction, job losses, and
other resource misallocations. In liquidation proceedings, the distressed
business, in whole or in part, may be sold off to new claimants as a going
concern. Even an inappropriate priorities regime generally allows for the
preservation of the going concern, so long as efficacious preservation
mechanismsToperating upstream from distribution mechanismsTare in
play.
Contrast this with the effect of according immunity to some of the
bankrupt7s claims or assets. A party immune from, say, the bankruptcy
moratorium may enforce its claim against some of the debtor7s assets,
removing those assets from the bankruptcy estate. The value represented by
those assets, which in the absence of the immunity would have to be shared
with other relevant creditors, is now allocated first, and perhaps exclusively,
to the bankruptcy-immune claimant. However, this allocation results from
tinkering with the bankruptcy law7s mechanisms, not merely for
distributing value, but for preserving and realizing it in the first place. If the
assets in question formed part of the going concern of the debtor7s business,
their removal results in a loss to the estateTand, as explained, to societyT
which is greater than the gain of the bankruptcy-immune claimant. The
difference represents the destruction of synergetic values. In the paradigm
case of a poorly designed immunities process, bankruptcy losses would
again be loaded on to claimants in the worst place to bear them through no
fault of their own, in a way which is inequitable, and downstream, is
destructive to the value of the estate. This time, however, the misallocation
would be caused even in the first instance by the destruction of any
synergetic values, potentially resulting in unnecessary loss of productive
capacity, avoidable loss of employment, and consequent losses to the
taxpayer.
B. FOUR PRESERVATION MECHANISMS
We now consider four preservation mechanisms: (1) the bankruptcy
moratorium; (2) the invalidation of contractual termination and acceleration
rights; (3) the treatment of set-off rights; and (4) the adjustment or
avoidance of certain pre-bankruptcy transactions. Each mechanism is
supported by the principle of collectivity, and while not optimally utilized
in all bankruptcy regimes, each can or would play a critical role in the
bankruptcy law7s ability to prevent value destruction and resource
misallocation.
The four mechanisms perform several indispensable countercyclical
functions. Ex ante, counterparties fearing potential entanglement with
bankruptcy proceedings become more sensitive to information about each
other7s creditworthiness and viability. Over the duration of the relationship,
the counterparties retain incentives to monitor each other7s behavior. These
incentives discourage excessive uncertainty in markets and thwart
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deteriorations in lending standards.83 Post default, friction is created in the
asset disposal process, thus counteracting asset value contagion and
common lender effects. To similar effect, asset disposals on the eve of
bankruptcy are discouraged.84
1. Moratorium
Bankruptcy lawyers around the world are familiar with the moratorium,
or the stay on claim enforcement, upon the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings. The moratorium defines the collective bankruptcy regime by
mitigating creditors7 individualistic incentives to engage in wastefully
duplicative pre-bankruptcy monitoring of the debtor and to dismember the
debtor7s estate by Rrunning; for its assets upon distress.85 This preservation
of the estate is, in principle, particularly beneficial for vulnerable creditors
and other stakeholders unable to mount the sort of effective private
responses to their debtor7s distress outlined above. A normatively justifiable
bankruptcy regime takes due account of the interests of such creditors by
providing them with appropriate priorities or other protections within the
bankruptcy process.86
In bankruptcy law, international best practice is to automatically impose
a moratorium upon the commencement or continuation of proceedings
concerning the assets or obligations of the debtor. This includes actions to
execute secured claims against encumbered assets, 87 as well as those to
create or perfect security interests.88 Unless lifted by a court, a stay should
remain in place until a reorganization plan takes effect.89 Secured creditors
are protected in a variety of ways. In liquidation, a moratorium on secured
claim enforcement lifts within a stipulated periodTusually thirty or sixty
daysTunless extended by a court persuaded that retention of the collateral
is necessary to maximize the value of the estate and that the secured
creditor can be protected against diminution in the collateral7s value.90 In
liquidation and reorganization alike, collateral may be retained as part of an
estate only if the secured creditor7s position is protected through cash
payments from the estate, the provision of additional collateral, or other
means.91 Similar measures should be available for the period from the filing
of a bankruptcy petition to the actual commencement of a case.92

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

This is discussed further infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part VII.
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 9, 12, 16 (2001).
MOKAL, supra note 80, at 82V86.
LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, rec. 46(c).
Id. rec. 46(b), (e).
Id. rec. 49.
Id. rec. 49(c), n.28.
Id. rec. 50.
Id. recs. 39V45.
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2. Contractual Termination and Acceleration
A bankrupt business should survive as a going concern if and only to
the extent that it generates a going-concern surplus, that is, it possesses
greater value as a going concern than would result from the piecemeal
disposal of its constituent assets. Most synergetic value arising from the
continued harnessing of productive factors to their present use is
conditional upon business relationships, for instance, from existing
contracts and goodwill. The latter is in part the inclination for past
counterparties to engage in future dealings on favorableTor at least not
unfavorableTterms. A bankruptcy law devoted to preserving goingconcern value will not allow the destruction of business relationships. It
will also recognize the collective action problem facing solvent
counterparties, of whom some might be willing to continue doing business
with the distressed entity, but only if it has sufficient prospects of being
rehabilitated, with the latter being a function, among other things, of the
number and importance of contractual relationships it could maintain
through a bankruptcy process.
Accordingly, in relation to nonfinancial contracts, the ICR Standard
requires the moratorium on claim enforcement to extend to the termination
of contracts on the basis simply that the debtor has become subject to
bankruptcy proceedings. 93 Contractual clauses providing for automatic
termination and/or for the acceleration of contractual obligations upon
bankruptcy (Ripso facto clauses;) also ought to be rendered unenforceable.94
The ICR Standard seeks to mediate carefully between the interests of
the estate and its counterparties. This serves considerations of fairness,
reduces the chances of distress radiating to solvent counterparties, and
strikes a balance between preserving extant contracts and the goodwill that
would affect whether, and on what terms, future contracts will be formed.
The ICR Standard vests the option to continue a bankrupt7s executory
contracts in its bankruptcy estate; the option to reject or assign them may
also do so. The option must be exercised within a reasonable time.95 The
contract must be treated in its entirety, meaning that an estate may not
Rcherry-pick; favorable parts of a contract and reject others. 96 Where an
estate elects to continue a contract, it must cure any breaches, place its
counterparty substantially in the position in which it was prior to the breach,
and henceforth perform its obligations under the contract. 97 Performance
received by the estate prior to its election to affirm or reject the contract
should be paid for at the contractual rate and as a bankruptcy administrative
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. rec. 46(d).
Id. rec. 70.
Id. recs. 72V76, 83V85.
Id. rec. 73.
Id. rec. 79.
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expense, and the nonbankrupt counterparty should be protected against any
diminution in the value of its assets.98
3. Set-off
A bankruptcy regime which does not recognize set-off would require
the solvent counterpartyTwho both owes money to and is owed money by
the bankrupt partyTto pay a hundred cents on the dollar into the estate
while being restricted to a bankruptcy dividend that, by definition in the
bankrupt7s insolvency, would fall below that level. Thus, the recognition of
set-off causes the estate to lose value. This is only true ceteris paribus,
however, and parties who are not permitted to use their own indebtedness as
collateral might be less willing to lend. While this counterfactual is difficult
to assess and there is no empirical evidence bearing directly upon it, many
legal systems uphold some form of bankruptcy set-off.
International best practice is to preserve, within bankruptcy
proceedings, any general, pre-bankruptcy set-off rights, while subjecting
them to scrutiny under the standard bankruptcy avoidance rules. 99 In
particular, transfers of claims occurring within the Rsuspect period;
preceding a counterparty7s bankruptcy that alter the relative position of
some creditors may be avoided.100
4. Avoidance or Adjustment of Pre-bankruptcy Transactions
Well-designed bankruptcy regimes recognize and respond to valuedestructive incentives arising during the suspect period.101 These include the
incentives of those controlling the distressed firm, acting in their own
and/or the formal equity-holders7 interests, to bet the firm7s assets on
negative net present-value transactions in the hope of staving off
bankruptcy. Similar incentives may result in straightforward asset stripping,
with value being tunneled from the firm to favored parties. Such
transactions are injurious to the distressed entity7s creditors, taken as a
whole, and to prospects for a rational, value-maximizing decision about its
assets and affairs. Further, knowledgeable and influential creditors also
have value-destructive incentives to engineer repayments to themselves,
thus removing assets, including cash, some of which might be necessary to
preserve the distressed firm7s going concern. Such preferential repayment
might also be regarded as inequitable, placing influential lenders of the
debtor in a better position compared to legally similar, but less influential,
creditors.
98. Id. rec. 80. Should the estate reject the contract, the counterparty7s damages rank as
ordinary unsecured claims. Id. rec. 82.
99. Id. paras. 204V06, rec. 100; WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, princ. C10.4.
100. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, at 144.
101. See, e.g., MOKAL, supra note 80, at 305V39.
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Accordingly, the ICR Standard requires bankruptcy regimes to
retroactively overturn a range of transactions occurring during the suspect
period. These include undervalue or preferential transactions where the
debtor was factually insolvent, as well as other transactions intended to
defeat, delay, or hinder a creditor7s ability to collect.102
III. IMMUNE FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
In relation to each of these four preservation mechanisms, financial
contracts are accorded a privileged position. Employing the
immunity/priority distinction introduced in Part II, it becomes clear that this
special treatment amounts not only to (super)priorities over other claim
categories, as several commentators suggest, but also immunities from a
significant part of the standard armory of value preservation mechanisms.
Accordingly, what is at stake is not mere misallocation of value, but also its
destruction.
This Part describes the relevant contracts and the privileged treatment
accorded to those party to them, in comparison to the treatment the ICR
Standard accords to other types of solvent counterparties. This comparison,
by reference to internationally recognized best practice guidelines, provides
an important corrective to the misapprehension that worrying about the
privileged position of financial contracts is Rbiased; toward or suffering
from a Rdomestic tunnel vision; in relation to the Ridiosyncratic; U.S.
bankruptcy system. 103 This Part then introduces the legal framework
applicable to financial contracts, including the FCD, the Guide, and the
UNIDROIT Netting Principles.
Crucially, the ICR Standard, consisting of the UNCITRAL Guide and
the World Bank7s Principles, is not unified in relation to financial contracts.
Until 2015, the Principles simply directed national lawmakers7 attention to
the importance of Rupholding automatic termination, netting, and close-out
provisions contained in financial contracts.;104 In January 2009, the World
Bank7s ICR Task Force initiated a process to ascertain whether guidance on
the legal regulation of insolvency ought to be modified in light of any
lessons from the financial crisis. A key element of this process was the
amendment of the recommended treatment of financial contracts. 105 By
102. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, rec. 87. The same rules apply to the creation or
enforcement of a security interest. Id. rec. 88. See also WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76,
princ. C11.
103. For the terms quoted in this sentence and for variants of the accusation of excessive U.S.
centeredness, see Paech, supra note 5, at 4V5, 7V13, 29.
104. WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, princ. C10.4.
105. See Edward J. Janger, Rizwaan J. Mokal & Robin Phelan, Treatment of Financial
Contracts in Insolvency V Analysis of the ICR Standard 5 (Oct. 24, 2014) (unpublished discussion
paper), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/WB_ICR_TaskForce_2014_Fina
ncialContractsInInsolvency_DiscussionPaper.pdf. The Principles were revised, not without some
considerable headwind, by Professor Janger at the request of the Bank7s ICR Task Force, which
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contrast, the Guide has not benefitted from a post-crisis updating,
notwithstanding UNCITRAL7s specialist insolvency working group
concluding in December 2013 and April 2014 that the Guide7s treatment of
financial contracts is out of date and in need of revision. 106 This Part
concludes by outlining the guidance on financial contracts provided by the
revised World Bank Principles.
A. THE CONTRACTS
Financial repurchase agreements (repos) are short-term, secured lending
agreements structured as sales and buy-backs of financial instruments. 107
These financial instruments include government-backed securities such as
U.S. Treasury bills, bank-backed and corporate bonds, and, occasionally,
equity instruments.108 The debtor sells these instruments to the creditor and
simultaneously agrees to buy them back later at a slightly higher price. The
difference between the sale (spot) prices and repurchase (forward) prices, in
effect, constitutes interest on the loan. Lower quality collateral is
discounted below market value (i.e., subjected to a Rhaircut;) to account for
the additional risk. Parties may trade on the basis of Rgeneral collateral
baskets; in which multiple types of instruments are, by agreement, treated
approved the revisions in May 2015. The process owes much to Professor Janger7s ability to
combine scholarly acumen with delicate diplomacy, to the leadership of Irit Mevorach, my
successor as head of the World Bank7s Insolvency Initiative, and to the dexterity and insight of
World Bank Chief Counsel, Vijay Tata. Elsewhere in this volume, Professor Mevorach identifies
and addresses current gaps in the cross-border resolution framework for financial institutions. Irit
Mevorach, Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-Border Resolution Gap, 10
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183 (2015).
106. See U.N. Comm7n on Int7l Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the
Work of Its Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/798, at 8V9 (2014); U.N. Comm7n on Int7l
Trade Law, Rep. of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Session,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/803, at 13 (2014); see also Secretariat of the U.N. Comm7n on Int7l Trade
Law, Insolvency Law, Treatment of Financial Contracts and Netting; Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/851, at 2 (2015).
107. Strictly, two different types of transactions go under the label of repo: repurchase
agreements, which are always documented in writing, and the higher-risk Rsell/buy-backs,; which
may or may not be documented in writing. Repurchase agreements are the norm in markets such
as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland,
whereas Italy, Spain, and emerging markets, in general, rely upon sell/buy-backs because of legal
obstacles to the validity of repurchase agreements. See Frequently Asked Questions on Repo,
INT7L CAPITAL MKTS. ASS7N 9V10, http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Repo
/Repo-FAQs-20-May-2015.pdf [hereinafter Questions on Repo].
108. A large survey of the European repo market suggests that 81.5% of EU-originated
collateral consisted of government bonds with German (19.2%), United Kingdom (11.5%), and
Italian and French (10.5% each) government bonds predominating. International financial
institutions, for example, World Bank, bonds accounted for 2.2%, various fixed income
instruments for 8.1%, and equity for 0.1%. INT7L CAPITAL MKTS. ASS7N, EUROPEAN REPO
MARKET SURVEY NO. 28, at 15 (2015) [hereinafter
MARKET SURVEY],
http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Market-Info/Repo-Market-Surveys/No-28December-2014/ICMA-ERC-European-Repo-Survey-December-2014.pdf. In the United States,
Treasury securities constitute two-thirds of the collateral while government-backed agency debt
account for a significant proportion of the remainder. See Questions on Repo, supra note 107, at 8.
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as fungible inter se. Repos may be tri-party, meaning agents are entrusted
with post-trade collateral selection and management responsibilities, or they
may be bilateral, with the parties themselves performing these functions.109
The financial collateral mitigates the lender7s counterparty credit risk and,
through the lender7s ability to reuse or rehypothecate it, 110 also its own
liquidity risk. The repurchase is frequently agreed to occur the day after the
sale, 111 though the term may be seven, thirty, or ninety days, or even
longer. 112 From the lender7s point of view, the transaction is a Rreverse
repo.; Over the course of the repo, the lender, as legal owner, has the right
to coupon or dividend payments on the collateral. Two aspects of standard
practice underline the reality of the transaction as security rather than a sale:
the borrower is promised a sum equivalent to coupon or dividend payments
on the collateral (in UK usage, Rmanufactured payments;); and, the
collateral remains on the debtor7s balance sheet.113 The global repo market
is divided into two segments: (i) a repo financing segment consisting of
banks and broker-dealers borrowing cash from central and retail banks and
money market funds, with the borrowing collateralized by government and
corporate bonds, money market instruments, structured products, and
equities;114 and (ii) an interdealer segment consisting of banks and brokerdealers, with the borrowing mostly collateralized by government bonds, at

109. About two-thirds of the U.S. market and only about a tenth of the European market consist
of tri-party repos. Questions on Repo, supra note 107, at 10, 21. U.S. data from the recent
financial crisis suggest that haircuts and funding in the tri-party market remained more stable than
in the bilateral one, even controlling for collateral type. ADAM COPELAND, ANTOINE MARTIN &
MICHAEL WALKER, REPO RUNS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET, FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y. 2V3, http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr506.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2015).
110. Reuse in the repo markets occurs when collateral owned outright by a repo lender is sold
by the lender to a third party, with the lender remaining subject to a contractual duty to Rreturn; its
equivalent upon the repo7s maturity. By contrast, when collateral has merely been pledged, with
the pledger/borrower retaining title, the pledgee may be granted power to rehypothecate or
repledge that collateral to a third party. When the power is exercised, title transfers from the
pledger to the third party without ever vesting in the pledgee. See Questions on Repo, supra note
107, at 11.
111. See id. at 9 (RThe US repo market is mainly overnight . . . .;).
112. Maturities in the EU-originated market, which tend to be longer than for the U.S. market,
are one day (24.3%); two days to one week (15.9%); one week to one month (15.1%); one to three
months (19%); three to six months (5.9%); six to twelve months (3.1%); greater than 12 months
(1.5%); forward repos, that is, those starting one or more months subsequent to the contract date
(8%); and open or demand repos with no fixed maturity date (5.9%). MARKET SURVEY, supra
note 108, at 21.
113. Questions on Repo, supra note 107, at 2, 19, 27. Industry groups acknowledge that repos
are sales only in legal form, not economic substance. Id. at 27, 31V33.
114. Since the global financial crisis, higher risk aversion and regulatory pressures have driven
other commercial banks, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, insurance companies,
endowments, and corporate treasuries into this market as well. See id. at 7V8.
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overnight maturities, and in the United States, Europe, and Japan, involving
central counterparty (CCP) clearing.115
A derivative is a risk transfer arrangement deriving its value from an
asset (the reference asset) such as stocks, bonds, commodities, or market
indices. Derivatives may be agreed bilaterally between parties through
dealers and either booked directly with each other (over-the-counter or
OTC) or with a clearinghouse acting as CCP (cleared derivatives).
Alternatively, they may be standardized instruments traded on an exchange
(on-exchange) and booked with a CCP. Derivatives are used to hedge risk
or to speculate. The OTC derivatives market is divided into distinct
customer and interdealer segments. 116 Customers, or end users, include
hedge funds, assets managers, institutional investors, and nonfinancial
enterprises. Dealers, who are large financial institutions, execute trades on
behalf of customers, hedge their own risk on-exchange or in the interdealer
market, and engage in both market making and proprietary trading (i.e.,
trading on their own behalf). Interdealers do not engage in proprietary
trading or market making, but do provide price discovery and risk
management services.117
A swap is an OTC derivative involving an exchange of risks. It can take
any of several forms. For example, an interest rate swap involves Party X
promising for the duration of the agreement to periodically pay a floating
interest rateTsay, the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)Ton a
notional amount to Party Y in return for Y7s promise to pay X a fixed
rateTsay, 3 percentTon the same amount. In a currency rate swap, X may
promise to pay a fixed or floating rate of interest on a notional amount in
one currencyTsay, U.S. dollarsTin return for Y7s promise to pay a fixed
or floating rate of interest on the same notional amount in another
currencyTsay, Japanese Yen. Credit default swaps (CDSs) are OTC
contracts under which the Rprotection seller; in effect guarantees to the
Rprotection buyer; the creditworthiness of the bonds or other financial
instruments designated as the reference assets. Upon the occurrence of a

115. See FIN. STABILITY BD., SECURITIES LENDING AND REPOS: MARKET OVERVIEW AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY ISSUES 1, 3V5 (2012) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY BD., SECURITIES
LENDING], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_120427.pdf (providing
the origin of descriptions of both segments of the repo market). It is worth noting that repos are a
staple of central bank operations and are used temporarily to add or drain away reserve balances to
or from the banking system. That function, however, is not directly relevant to this Article, which
focuses on repo use by other market participants. Central bank repo operations are
characteristically excluded from discussions of the sorts of issues relevant to this Article. Id. at 1
n.4.
116. See, e.g., Richard Heckinger, Ivana Ruffini & Kirstin Wells, Over-the-Counter (OTC)
Derivatives, in UNDERSTANDING DERIVATIVES V MARKETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 27, 29 (2014),
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/understanding-derivatives/index.
117. See Questions on Repo, supra note 107, at 6.
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Rcredit event;118Tfor example, default by the bond issuerTthe protection
seller would pay the difference between the par value of the bonds and their
prevailing market value. Whereas a CDS protects only against Rcredit risk,;
that is, the risk that the reference assets would suffer a credit event, Rtotal
return swaps; protect against both credit and interest rate risk. CDSs and
certain other swaps may usefully be compared with insurance. Generally, in
order to purchase insurance, a person must demonstrate an Rinsurable
interest,; and relatedly, in order to claim under the contract, that person
must demonstrate loss. Neither of these requirements applies in relation to
CDSs. A protection buyer may have an interest in the financial instruments
whose performance is, in effect, being guaranteed, in which case it is likely
hedging through the CDS; or, it may have no interest in those instruments,
and is likely speculating through acquisition of a Rnaked; swap.
A securities contract is an agreement for the purchase of financial
instruments, mostly equities, or an interest therein. It differs from a repo
primarily because a securities contract is economically motivated by a
desire to lend and borrow securities, whereas repos are driven by a desire to
lend and borrow cash. 119 Insurance companies, pensions, and investment
funds lend securities to banks and broker-dealers, collateralized by cash or,
mostly in Europe, securities.120 Commodity and forward contracts are also
relevant.121 A commodity contract is an on-exchange agreement for future
delivery of a commodity. A forward is an OTC agreement for future
delivery of a commodity for a price determined as of the date of contract.
B. THE IMMUNE PROCESSES: MARGINING AND CLOSE-OUT
NETTING
In relation to these contracts, two processes are of particular
importance: margining and close-out netting.
Margining may take place at commencement of a repo or derivative
transaction (initial margining) and/or periodically thereafter (variation
margining), often at least daily.122 Initial margining, like a haircut, responds
to potential future exposure arising over the duration of the contract.
Whether initial margining is provided and in what quantity depends on
118. See, e.g., 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT sec. 5(b)(v) (INT7L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS7N
2002).
119. Questions on Repo, supra note 107, at 13. Whereas voting rights associated with the
collateral in repos generally vest in the lender, securities contracts usually provide the borrower
with a right of recall to enable exercise by the borrower of voting rights. Id. at 12, 19.
120. FIN. STABILITY BD., SECURITIES LENDING, supra note 115, at 2.
121. These, together with repos, swaps, and securities contracts, constitute Rqualified financial
contracts; benefitting from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Rsafe harbors.; See 11 U.S.C. §§
362(b)(27), 546(e)V(g), 546(j), 555, 556, 559, 560, 561, 562 (2012).
122. See BANK FOR INT7L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MARGIN
REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES 10 (2015) [hereinafter BCBS &
IOSCO, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS], http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.pdf; Questions on Repo,
supra note 107, at 18.
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factors such as the frequency with which the contract is revalued and
variation margins exchanged, volatility of the underlying instruments, and
how long it would take to terminate and replace the contract upon default.123
For on-exchange derivatives, a CCP member posts a margin with the CCP
while the customer may post a margin with the CCP member. For OTCs,
best practice is moving toward requiring both parties to exchange collateral
constituting initial margins on a gross basis (i.e., without netting the
amounts the parties owe each other) and segregated from the recipient7s
other assets.124
Variation margining results from a periodic revaluation of a contract
and responds to the loss accrued to one of the parties from market
movements since the most recent margin call. In either type of margining,
an important consideration in the selection of collateral is Rwrong-way
risk,; which arises where there is a significant positive correlation between
contractual counterparty creditworthiness and the probability of collateral
value deterioration.125 Collateral is subject to haircuts, and parties may draw
on standardized haircuts promulgated by international supervisory
authorities.126 Margining brings private benefits to counterparties, shifting
the costs of default from a nondefaulting party, who on the Rsurvivor pays;
model would otherwise have to absorb it, perhaps through regulatory
capital, to the defaulter.127 In addition, it is thought to reduce systemic risk
by reducing uncovered exposures in the financial system, and thus
contagion and spillover effects.128
Margining also helps in understanding the interaction between repos
and derivatives. Repos often fund buyers7 (long) positions and cover
sellers7 (short) positions in derivative transactions, and it has been
suggested that Ran active repo market is an absolute prerequisite for liquid
markets in derivative instruments. Attempts to establish new derivative
123. See BCBS & IOSCO, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, supra note 122, at 12.
124. See id. at 4V5. The requirement applies only to financial firms and systemically important

nonfinancial ones, and only where the margin exceeds a stipulated threshold.
125. See id. at 17.
126. Id. at 8. For example, in relation to noncentrally cleared derivatives, cash is exempt, highquality government and central bank securities maturing within a year bear a 0.5% haircut, those
maturing within and exceeding five years are at 2% and 4% respectively, high-quality corporate
bonds and covered bonds maturing within one year, those exceeding one year but under are five
years, and those exceeding five years at 1%, 4%, and 8%, respectively; and equities included in
major indices as well as gold are each at 15%. See id. at 27 app. B.
127. Id. at 4. The regulatory literature contrasts the survivor-pays and the defaulter-pays
models. These labels are liable to mislead. The primary objective of margining is not to protect
solvent party (S) and instead load default costs on to the defaulting party7s (D) other claimants
after default. The objective, rather, is to change the parties7 behavior ex ante, mitigating solvent
D7s decision makers7 incentives to take on excessive risks, because the benefits from doing so
would all accrue to themTand to D7s equity-holdersTwhile some of the costs would arise only
upon D7s insolvency and thus fall on D7s creditors and other stakeholders. Such Rfinancial agency
costs; are further discussed infra Part IV.
128. See, e.g., BCBS & IOSCO, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, supra note 122, at 3.
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markets, exchange-traded or over the counter, have floundered where there
have been no active repo markets.;129
Close-out netting results from contractual provisions in financial
contracts, which, upon default by one counterparty, entitle the other to do
any combination of the following: (i) termination of the contract (closeout); (ii) acceleration of contractual obligations; (iii) valuation of the
transaction; and (iv) aggregation of the parties7 obligations to an overall net
amount (netting). 130 The first and fourth of these stepsTclose-out and
netting, respectivelyTare of particular importance. The value of ensuring
the validity of close-out netting is said to lie in its ability to reduce exposure
by as much as 85 percent, to protect against adverse market changes, and
thus to promote financial system stability.131 Also of particular importance
is the solvent counterparty7s ability upon closeout to dispose of collateral.
These elements of the broad close-out netting process are considered in the
remainder of this Article.
C. THE IMMUNITIES
A directive is a key instrument of EU law, regarded as Rmysterious;132
because of its dual character: it is binding upon each member state, but only
Ras to the result to be achieved . . . [leaving] to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods.; 133 Directives may be contrasted with
regulations and decisions. The former are binding in their entirety and
directly obligate the member states, while the latter are also directly binding
but only upon those they address.134 Instruments of the latter two types have
both vertical and horizontal direct effect, in that individuals may invoke
them in national courts against, respectively, the state and private parties. A
directive may only have vertical direct effect, and only has such effect if a
state fails to properly implement it.135
By virtue of the FCD, all of the member states of the European Union
are obligated to accord immunities to financial contracts. 136 The FCD
129. Questions on Repo, supra note 107, at 6.
130. UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, princ. 2, para. 32. For the definition of

RNetting Agreement,; see the LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, at 6.
131. UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 3. See also David Mengle, The
Importance of Close-Out Netting 1 (Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, Research Notes No. 1,
2010).
132. ROBERT SCHÜTZE, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 95 (2015).
133. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288(3),
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
134. Id. art. 288(2), (4).
135. Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337; Case 152/84, Marshall v.
Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723; Case C-91/92,
Faccini Dori v. Recreb, 1994 E.C.R. I-3325. For an accessible and up to date discussion, see
SCHÜTZE, supra note 132, at 89V93.
136. The Financial Collateral Directive has been implemented by all member states as well as
Iceland and Norway, who are members of the European Economic Area. Directive 2002/47/EC, of
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applies to Rfinancial collateral arrangements,; including both Rtitle transfer;
arrangements, in which the creditor obtains ownership of the collateral,137
and Rsecurity; arrangements, which leave ownership with the debtor. 138
Financial collateral includes (i) cash, or money credited to an account,
money-market deposit, or any similar claim for repayment; (ii) financial
instruments, which include company shares, bonds, and other market-traded
debt instruments;139 and (iii) credit claims, that is, pecuniary claims arising
from bank loan agreements. 140 In such arrangements, the creditor, or its
trustee, must possess or control the collateral.141 The financial contracts are
only included where both the creditor and debtor areTor are representatives
of or trustees forTpublic authorities, such as central banks,
intergovernmental organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank,
financial institutions subject to prudential supervision (including banks,
investment firms, and insurance undertakings), CCPs, settlement agents, or
similar financial market infrastructure participants. 142 Also included are
arrangements where only one counterparty is one of the aforementioned
entities and the other is not a natural person.143 Significantly, however, in
implementing the FCD, member states have the option to make it applicable
only where both are institutions of the aforementioned sort.144
The FCD requires member states to uphold the validity of the provision
of collateral, regardless of whether collateral was provided in the suspect
period or on the date of bankruptcy commencement.145 The states must also
ensure the enforceability of close-out netting provisions, again
notwithstanding a counterparty7s bankruptcy. 146 Their laws must permit
financial collateral to be realized through sale, appropriation, or set-off as
agreed by the parties, regardless of a counterparty7s bankruptcy, and

the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on Financial Collateral Arrangements
(L 168) 43 [hereinafter FCD]; Evaluation Report on the Financial Collateral Arrangements
Directive (2002/47/EC), COM (2006) 833 final (Dec. 20, 2006).
137. Recharacterization of repos as secured credit transactions is prohibited. FCD, supra note
136, art. 6(1).
138. Id. art. 2(1)(a)V(c). In the interest of readability but at the expense of accuracy, the FCD7s
references to Rcollateral taker; and Rcollateral provider; are rendered as creditor and debtor.
139. Id. art. 2(1)(e). In implementing the FCD, states have the option of excluding from its
ambit arrangements where the collateral consists of shares in the debtor itself or an entity affiliated
to itTwhere wrong-way risk would be acuteTor where it is a consumer or a micro or small
enterprise. Id. art. 1(4)(a)V(b).
140. Id. art. 2(1)(d), 2(1)(e), 2(1)(o). Somewhat misleadingly, Rcash; excludes banknotes. Id.
pmbl., para. 18.
141. Id. arts. 1(5), 2(2).
142. Id. art. 1(2)(a)V(d).
143. Id. art. 1(2)(e).
144. Id. art. 1(3).
145. Id. art. 8(3).
146. Id. arts. 5(5), 6(2), 7. Close-out netting is defined as including contractual and, in their
absence, statutory provisions. Id. art. 2(1)(n).
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without the need for notice, approval, or any other noncontractual step.147
States must also uphold contractual rights of use, withdrawal, and
substitution of collateral. 148 Finally, the FCD requires member states to
exempt the creation, validity, perfection, enforceability, and admissibility of
such financial collateral arrangements, and of the collateral, from any
formal requirement such as registration or notification.149
The soft-law instruments discussed in this Article have requirements
similar to those of the FCD, though with certain significant differences. In
particular, the Guide exempts financial contracts in their entirety from the
stay, while the UNIDROIT Netting Principles require the same for closeout netting provisions. 150 Both also require national laws to permit
termination of financial contracts, and the Guide, in addition, bids laws to
allow financial contract counterparties to enforce security interests.151 Both
protect extensive contractual set-off rights. 152 As to avoidance rules, the
Guide exempts Rroutine pre-bankruptcy transfers consistent with market
practice, such as the putting up of margin for financial contracts and
transfers to settle financial contract obligations.; 153 Similarly, the
UNIDROIT Netting Principles provide that close-out netting provisions
should not be susceptible to classification as voidable preferences, and their
operation in the suspect period should not be caught by avoidance
actions.154
The World Bank7s Principles, 155 amended in early 2015 to reflect
emergent best practice, perforce take an inclusive, more nuanced
position.156 In accordance with existing international instruments, the World
147. Id. art. 4(1), (4), (5). States are permitted to subject collateral realization or valuation to
commercial reasonability requirements. Id. art. 4(6).
148. Id. arts. 2(1)(m), 5, 8(2), (3).
149. Id. art. 3(1).
150. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, recs. 101, 103; UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES,
supra note 7, princ. 7(1)(a).
151. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, recs. 101, 103; UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES,
supra note 7, princ. 7(1)(a).
152. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, recs. 101, 102; UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES,
supra note 7, princ. 7(1)(a).
153. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, rec. 104 (footnote omitted).
154. UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, princ. 7(c)V(d).
155. WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76.
156. Id. princ. C10.4(ii), at 21 n.10. This Principle was revised so as to ensure that it would not
penalize national bankruptcy regimes complying with any of the various instruments arguably
evidencing best practices. Since there are important differences in the treatment such instruments
recommend for financial contracts, the Principle was by necessity required to be nuanced and
inclusive. The instruments include the UNCITRAL Guide, the FSB Key Attributes, the FCD, the
EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, and the UNIDROIT Netting Principles. For a
review of the differences in the treatment of financial contracts recommended by these various
instruments, see Janger, Mokal & Phelan, supra note 105, at 5V11. See also Rizwaan J. Mokal,
Presentation at the U.N. Comm7n on Int7l Trade Law Colloquium: Financial Contracts and Netting
7 (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/insolvency-2013/B2_financial_contracts_3_Mokal.
pdf.
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Bank7s Principles require careful, policy-justified legislative identification
of the contracts that will be privileged. The relevant criterion is the risk to
market stability arising from the absence of close-out netting. The
Principles suggest that such risks may arise because of the nature of the
counterparty or transaction. Close-out netting provisions should only enjoy
bankruptcy immunity in relation to this clearly defined sub-category of
financial contracts. In turn, this immunity may be subject to a short stay for
a defined period under the national laws governing bank resolution or
enterprise insolvency, with a view Rparticularly [toward] accomplish[ing]
the orderly transfer of the contracts to a solvent counterparty.;157 The stay
must be subject to appropriate safeguards. 158 In particular, the bankrupt
counterparty must continue to perform its substantive obligations.159
IV. IMMUNITIES, LENDING STANDARDS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK
We now turn to assessing the effect of the privileged treatment that
bankruptcy regimes and best-practice guidelines accord to financial
contracts. This Part contrasts the functioning of security interests enjoying
limited or no bankruptcy immunity with that of the financial contract
immunities.
It has been asserted that Rthere are no fundamental differences between
traditional security interests and safe harbours,; in that both Rentail a shift
of the risk from one segment of the market to another.;160 This reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of Rtraditional; security interests, which in
fact are comparable to financial contract immunities in one respect alone:
reducing the particular lender7s private counterparty risk. The precise
mechanism by which they do so is not identical, however. Security interests
characteristically reduce counterparty credit risk for all creditors of the
borrower that has encumbered its assets. By contrast, bankruptcy
immunities move risk from immune to nonimmune claimants and might
even exacerbate it. By creating a powerful means to externalize the
downside risk of poor lending decisions, immunities also contribute to
accumulating uncertainty about counterparty quality, declining lending
standards, the corresponding increase in funding for negative net present
value assets, credit booms in the markets for such assets, and increased
concentrations and leverages amongst lenders. Correspondingly and

157.
158.
159.
160.

WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, princ. C10.4(ii), at 21 n.10.
Id.
Id.
See Paech, supra note 5, at 14, 20V21. Paech draws on arguments by Vanessa Finch,
Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?, 62 MOD. L. REV. 633 (1999), and; VANESSA
FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES (2d ed. 2009). Finch7s
arguments receive a detailed theoretical and empirical rebuttal in MOKAL, supra note 80, at 133V
87.
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considered in the aggregate, while security interests tend to reduce systemic
risk, all else equal, financial contract immunities more likely compound it.
The critical insight is as follows: parties enjoying immunity from
bankruptcy7s preservation mechanisms would tend to lend more and at a
lower price than they would in the absence of those immunities, and they
would tend to monitor their counterparty7s transactions less than they
otherwise would. The effect is to increase not only the availability of funds,
but also the overall risk of the debtor7s activities, to the detriment of its
other creditors. Yet these other creditors are unable or unwilling to respond
in a way that would force the debtor to fully internalize the costs of this
additional risk. As a result, bankruptcy immunities enable some riskier and
less transparent activities to be funded, activities that, in the absence of
those immunities, either would not have been funded, would have been
structured in a more transparent manner, or both. 161 They tend also to
increase the degree to which the relevant parties are exposed to each other.
A. SECURED CLAIMS AND COUNTERPARTY RISK MITIGATION
In order to provide context for the discussion to follow, let us briefly
consider the economic rationale for, and the best practice recommendations
on, the bankruptcy treatment of secured claims. 162 Let us begin with the
reminder that whether secured or not, creditors wish to reduce the
probability of their debtor7s bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors tend to receive
little or nothing in such an eventuality.163 Even secured creditors tend to
161. For illuminating variants of the argument to follow, see Janis Sarra, Credit Derivatives,
Market Design, Creating Fairness and Sustainability 8V12 (Network for Sustainable Fin. Mkts.,
Consultation
Paper
No.
1,
2009),
http://www.sustainablefinancialmarkets.net/wpcontent/uploads/2009/02/sarra-credit-derivatives_20jan091.pdf; Roe, supra note 4; Franklin R.
Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special
Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2005).
162. The discussion here is restricted to the paradigmatic situation where new money is
provided and fixed proprietary security is obtained over the debtor7s assets. The distinctive issues
arising from floating securityTthat is, security where the debtor may unilaterally, without
obtaining the creditor7s consent, alienate or consume the collateral, or otherwise place it beyond
the ambit of the securityTand security given for past value, are not considered here. For a
detailed discussion, see MOKAL, supra note 80, at 133V224. My argument owes much to Steven
L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425
(1997).
163. The well-designed U.S. Bankruptcy Code (its financial contract immunities apart) is an
exception. For a comparison of direct costs and recovery rates for secured and unsecured creditors
in various jurisdictions, see Oscar Couwenberg & Abe de Jong, Costs and Recovery Rates in the
Dutch Liquidation-Based Bankruptcy System, 26 EUR. J.L. ECONS. 105, 110 (2008). For small
firms in particular, see Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of Financial
Distress: The Direct Costs of Chapter 11, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629, 654V56 (2000). For Chapter 11
liquidation plans, see Stephen J. Lubben, Business Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 79V81
(2007). The uniquely high returns to unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 proceedings should give at
least some pause for thought to anyone tempted to think of the U.S. system as Rdebtor friendly; in
contrast with Rcreditor friendly; comparators in the UK and other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Paech,
supra note 5, at 5, 9, 13, 29. The U.S. regime is far Rfriendlier; to creditors in affording them
better process rights as well as higher returns. This, however, is an argument for another day.
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lose out as measured by the terms of their loan agreement, 164 and the
entanglement of the collateral in the bankruptcy process requires that, rather
than focusing exclusively on the value of the collateral, they continue to
also pay at least some attention to the value of the debtor7s fundamentals.
Consider now the fictional world in which Debtor wishes to borrow $1
million USD from a variety of Creditors, who start off being equal in every
respect, including, were it to come to it, their share of Debtor7s bankruptcy
estate. Debtor7s dealings with each Creditor are perfectly transparent to
each of the other Creditors, each utilizes this knowledge in writing their
loan agreement, and each has equal influence over Debtor. Now suppose
that Debtor were to offer Creditor1 a security interest, and thus payment
priority in its bankruptcy over Creditor2, Creditor3, and so on. Anticipating
that they would now each receive less from Debtor7s bankruptcy estate by
virtue of their lower ranking, all of the other Creditors would raise their
interest rates to compensate. The priority of secured credit thus turns out to
be harmless to all unsecured creditors. Debtor7s motivation for offering the
security also goes unexplained, however, since any interest rate gains it
made by offering security to Creditor1 are negated by corresponding rate
rises by the other Creditors.
This final observation, coupled with the artificiality of the assumptions
in this hypothetical about the equality of the various creditors7 knowledge
of and influence over their debtor, have motivated various criticisms of
secured credit7s bankruptcy priority. 165 At the core of each of these
criticisms is the quite correct observation that not all creditors can adjust the
terms on which they lend to compensate themselves for being subordinated
to the secured lender in their mutual debtor7s bankruptcy. At the same time,
however, the criticisms are marred by an insufficient appreciation that, at
least in the standard case of Rnew money; security, the grant of the security
interest reduces, not merely the proportionate share of the bankruptcy estate
available to unsecured creditors, but also the risk of the debtor becoming
insolvent in the first place. This reduction in the risk of their mutual
debtor7s insolvency raises the expected value of the claims of all creditors,
including unsecured ones. The argument revolves around the role of
security in controlling Rfinancial agency; and Radverse selection; costs.
Financial agency costs arise from the debtor7s incentive to engage in
excessively risky projects in the anticipation that it would capture the
upside benefitsTthe lender being restricted to its principal and interestT
whereas the downside costs would be shared also with the lender, who in
164. Court-determined Radequate protection; good enough to satisfy bankruptcy code
requirements is frequently not good enough to place the secured creditor in the same position that
it would have been had there been no bankruptcy proceedings at all.
165. See, e.g., John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT7L REV. L. & ECONS.
47, 51V52 (1995); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 903 (1996).
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the debtor7s bankruptcy would lose some or all of what it was owed. Note
that while financial agency costs are costs from the perspective of lenders,
debtors may regard their ability to create them as privately beneficial, since
the increase in variance in the expected returns from the projects they
undertake represents higher expected debtor returns. With this in mind, note
also that security interests create effective ways of controlling agency costs.
They encumber the debtor7s title to the collateral, disabling the debtor
unilaterally, without the lender7s consent, from placing the collateral
beyond the ambit of the security. 166 The collateral acts as a Rhostage,;
enhancing the lender7s ability and incentive to stipulate and enforce loan
covenants. This is true particularly in relation to nonfinancial debtors, 167
and true, though to a lesser degree, for financial institution debtors. 168
Through lending covenants, the lender characteristically obtains the right to
declare a Rtechnical; default even when the debtor is dutifully making
repayments on the loan, for example, if the debtor7s income or the value of
the collateral falls below a particular multiple of the outstanding secured
liability.
The threat that, in any such eventuality, the lender may seize the
collateral (the Rhostage;) and sell it, thus disrupting the debtor7s business
and inflicting disproportionate harm on it, gives the lender considerable
166. The transferee7s title to the collateral would remain encumbered with the original security
if the transfer occurred without the lender7s consent.
167. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan & Andrew Winton, Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to
Monitor, 50 J. FIN. 1113, 1115 (1995); Arito Ono & Iichiro Uesugi, Role of Collateral and
Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan1s SME Loan Market, 41 J.
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 935, 939 (2009); Geraldo Cerqueiro, Steven Ongena & Kasper
Roszbach, Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates, and Monitoring 1 (Sept. 17, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Journal of Finance). Raghuram Rajan and Andrew Winton argue and
present evidence consistent with the proposition that both covenants and collateral motivate lender
monitoring. Rajan & Winton, supra, at 1115. Arito Ono and Iichiro Uesugi present evidence that
Rmain banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively,; a finding that
is Rconsistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank7s seniority
and enhances its screening and monitoring.; Ono & Iichiro, supra, at 935. They also find that
personal guarantees do not appear to strongly incentivize banks in this way. Id. at 953V54.
Geraldo Cerqueiro, Steven Ongena, and Kasper Roszbach show that R[w]hile pledging highquality collateral enables borrowers to pay lower loan rates and benefit from increased credit
availability . . . lenders preserve their incentives to monitor the borrower.; Cerqueiro, Ongena &
Roszbach, supra, at 30.
168. For financial sector debtors, a market discipline literature review of sixty-two peer
reviewed empirical studies of banks and twenty studies of insurers provides evidence of
Rmonitoring; and refers to modeling that suggests weak Rinfluence; by monitors. See Martin
Eling, What Do We Know About Market Discipline in Insurance?, 15 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV.
185, 193 (2012). Monitoring was weak where investors (equity-holders as well as various lender
categories, including depositors and other unsecured and secured lenders) were protected by safety
nets, or where there were Rtoo-big-to-fail; distortions, etc. Id. at 197, 203. Evidence since the
review has been consistent. See, e.g., Zhichao Zhang, Wei Song, Xin Sun & Nan Shi,
Subordinated Debt as Instrument of Market Discipline: Risk Sensitivity of Sub-Debt Yield Spreads
in UK Banking, 73 J. ECONS. & BUS. 1, 1V2 (2014); Scott Miller, Eric Olson & Timothy J.
Yeager, The Relative Contributions of Equity and Subordinated Debt Signals as Predictors of
Bank Distress During the Financial Crisis, 16 J. FIN. STABILITY 118, 118 (2015).
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influence over the debtor. The debtor thus has strong incentives to comply
with loan covenants, to take early steps to anticipate and remedy falls in the
value of the business or the collateral, and if this is not practicable, to
commence negotiations with the lender in an attempt to head off
enforcement action. The cumulative effect is to moderate financial agency
costs, thus lowering the riskiness of the debtor7s projects, and hence, the
probability that it would be rendered insolvent. By lowering the probability
of the debtor7s insolvency, the operation of security interests raises the
expected value of unsecured as well as secured claims against the debtor.
Note, however, that from the debtor7s point of view, the loss in its freedom
to add to the variance of its projects is itself a cost.
Second, and again from the debtor7s perspective, the grant of security
has opportunity costs. Anticipating that if the debtor becomes distressed, it
would need financing but would find it difficult or impossible to borrow on
an unsecured basis, a firm would prefer to leave its assets unencumbered
until just such a time. Also, if it foresaw growth opportunities that could
only be taken up with additional outside funding, it would anticipate a
potential lender7s reluctance to lend, arising from its anticipation that they
would be subordinated to existing secured creditors. This Rdebt overhang;
represents another opportunity cost for the debtor in prematurely
encumbering some or all of its assets. Third and finally, granting security to
one or more of its lenders might harm the reputation of a debtor operating
in some sectors of the economy.169 It follows that a debtor would agree to
grant security only if the benefits from doing so sufficiently outweigh the
sum of these costs.
In broad analytical terms, security would be offered in either of two
situations. The first of these situations is where the borrower is able to
borrow on an unsecured basis, but nevertheless chooses to borrow on a
secured basis. Here, its choice would be a factor of the interest rate
difference on the secured and unsecured loans available to it. The difference
between these two rates would be determined byTamong other thingsTa
potential lender7s ex ante assessment of the extent of financial agency costs
and the ability to control these costs through the extraction of security. A
lender anticipates facing one of two states of the world: it would either lend
unsecured and charge more in compensation for the high risk that a debtor
might over-invest and suffer insolvency, thus causing it to share
proportionately with like creditors; or alternatively, a lender could obtain
security and lend at a lower rate, reflecting its increased influence over the
riskiness of its debtor7s choice of projects and also the increased comfort it

169. The strongest firms in the economy do not offer security over their assets, other than
nonrecourse security in relation to particular projects. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the
Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629 n.15 (1997).
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obtains in being able to stand first in the queue for the distribution of the
collateral7s value. Here, security is a substitute for a higher interest rate.
In the second situation, the borrower simply cannot borrow on an
unsecured basis. This would be the case where lenders assess its ex ante
risk profile to be such that no level of interest alone would compensate
lenders for accepting it. An important factor here is adverse selection.
Charging a very high interest rate becomes counterproductive when (1) the
obligation to pay it itself significantly increases the probability of the
borrower7s insolvency by encouraging it to take excessive risks that it
would not have taken if under a lower repayment obligation, (2) when only
those potential borrowers agree to borrow at the high rate who intend to
overinvest in any event, or (3) in marginal cases, when the borrower does
not intend to repay at all. In each of these scenarios, a higher interest rate
tends to exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the lender7s risk. Here, security
would be combined with a relatively high interest rate rather than
substituting for it.
In summary, Rtraditional; security interests are not used simply to shift
risk.170 Instead, the existence of security provides a secured creditor with
both ability and incentive to accomplish either or both of two things. A
secured creditor may effectively exercise a moderating influence on a
debtor7s decision making, thus reducing the expected variance of its returns,
and it may lend at a price that does not attract adverse selection,
compensating for the remaining risk through its rights in and to the
collateral.
The critical point is that the outcome in both scenarios is to reduce the
probability of the debtor7s defaultTthat is, to reduce, not merely shift,
counterparty riskTand in turn, to raise the expected value of all credit
claims against it, unsecured as well as secured. That secured claims bring ex
ante benefits to the very partiesTnamely, unsecured creditors as a groupT
who are harmed by it, provides the core justification for bankruptcy regimes
to accord priority to them.171
Equally critically, no immunity from standard bankruptcy restrictions is
thereby justified, with a secured creditor being presumptively bound by the
moratorium unless a court is persuaded that its collateral was not required
in order to preserve any going-concern surplus, or alternatively, that it was
not practicable to provide a secured claimant with adequate protection
within bankruptcy proceedings. 172 The same holds for bankruptcy law7s
other preservation tools, including those guarding against preferential and
170. This point and many of the arguments in this sub-Part thus far are brought together in an
empirical study based on one multinational bank7s lending to 9,211 small and medium enterprises
in fifteen countries. Jose Maria Liberti & Jason Sturgess, Uncovering Collateral Constraints (Feb.
28, 2014) (unpublished discussion paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2407959.
171. WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, princ. C12.2.
172. Id. princ. C5.3.
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undervalued transactions. Bringing about this delicate balance between
priority and graduated absence of immunity allows for a socially valuemaximizing retention of both the benefits of security, and also those of
bankruptcy law7s preservation tools.
The exposure of market participants to some counterparty risk is a
crucial lever for market discipline. An extensive review of the empirical
literature on banking and insurance-firm borrowers concludes that R[o]nly if
stakeholders consider themselves at risk and are able to observe risk
efficiently will market discipline work.; 173 The review lists several
discipline-weakening dampeners of risk sensitivity, including depositorguarantee schemes, R9too-big-to-fail7 effects, compulsory insurance and
judgment-proof buyers, and product and business complexity.; 174 The
argument in this sub-Part has been that well-designed mechanisms for
entangling a secured lender in a debtor7s bankruptcy processTprotecting its
priority but not giving it excessive immunityTbeneficially expose a lender
to risk, while the priority and hostage roles of security interests improve
both a secured lender7s ability and incentives to observe and moderate
debtor risk. The next sub-Part shows how financial contract immunities act
as massive dampeners of lender risk sensitivity, with consequent worsening
of lending standards.
B. FINANCIAL CONTRACTS AND COUNTERPARTY RISK
Return to the hypothetical introduced in the previous sub-Part. Now,
however, Creditor1 is not simply offered payment priority within Debtor7s
bankruptcy, but instead is rendered immune from the bankruptcy process
altogether. Several points are worth noting.
First, since Creditor17s fear of becoming entangled with Debtor7s
bankruptcy is likely to be far lower, it is likely to engage in lower levels of
pre-lending due diligence, to extract fewer loan covenants, and to engage in
lower levels of monitoring to ensure continuing compliance. Counterparty
risk would now be dealt with, to some considerable degree, through reliance
on bankruptcy immunity, that is, on exit from the distressed counterparty at
the first public sign of distress. Funding of this type is strongly associated
with increased systemic risk.175
Second, Creditor1 would possess weaker incentives to obtain collateral
from or close to the beginning of the transaction. Obtaining and exercising
173. Eling, supra note 168, at 219.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Rocco Huang & Lev Ratnovski, The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding, 20 J.

FIN. INTERMEDIATION 248, 249 (2011); Germán López-Espinosa, Antonio Moreno, Antonio
Rubia & Laura Valderrama, Short-Term Wholesale Funding and Systemic Risk: A Global CoVaR
Approach, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 3150 (2012); Joon-ho Hahm, Hyun Song Shin & Kwanho Shin,
Noncore Bank Liabilities and Financial Vulnerability, 45 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 3
(2013); Roe, supra note 4.
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control over collateral can have costs, which Creditor1 would wish to
minimize. Consistent with this observation, the literature notes that
nonfinancial corporate users of derivatives and also large, highly rated
financial institutions have not been required to post collateral. 176
Bankruptcy-immune Creditor1 could demand such collateral at a late stage
in the transaction, even on the eve of Debtor7s distress, to highly
procyclical, and thus systemically damaging, effect. 177 Further, since
Creditor1 does not hold the collateral until this late stage, it also lacks the
ability )0 4O)OQs)U wUr)0+7* 0'U+-investment incentives, which would arise
precisely from collateral7s Rhostage; role.
Third, creditors generally have an incentive to diversify, since they
anticipate a proportion of their debtors becoming insolvent, with a
consequent risk of loss. Diversification is a strategy for increasing the
probability that the creditor will be able to make a profit across a portfolio
as a whole, by overcompensating for its losses from these failed loans
through the profits it makes on other, successful loans in the portfolio. By
contrast, bankruptcy-immune Creditor1 would not anticipate having to share
with nonimmune creditors in any of its debtors7 insolvencies. It therefore
anticipates being able to recoup itself against all of a failed debtor7s relevant
assets, without having to share any proportion of that value with
nonimmune creditors. Creditor1 is thus more likely to be relatively
undiversified.178 The problem is that if and when a significant debtor does
become insolvent, Creditor1 may still be exposed to nontrivial losses, for
example, because asset value contagion erodes its loss-given-default
calculations, or because it might have to compete against other immune
creditors, etc. Given its relative lack of diversification, such losses, when
they do occur, are likely to be more significant. When put together with the
observation in the previous paragraph on how immunity would tend to
weaken external checks on the debtor7s excessive risk taking, the potential
for significant losses to occur is greater still.
Fourth, the fact that Creditor1 no longer fears entanglement with
Debtor7s bankruptcy is likely to induce it to lend more and at a lower cost.
As noted, it can now afford to incur lower costs on pre-lending due
diligenceTexcept as to the sufficiency of collateral, on which costs are also
176. Lubben, Safe Harbors, supra note 4, at 126 n.17.
177. RInitial margining typically was very low at the start of the crisis and increased rapidly

during the turmoil. This had a destabilizing effect on many market participants and sometimes
caused or precipitated defaults.; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR 29 (2009),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf. Such margining practices were an important channel for the
procyclical destabilization of the system during the recent crisis. Id. at 7.
178. See, e.g., PRESIDENT7S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE
LESSONS
OF
LONG-TERM
CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT
8
(1999),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf (cited by Schwarcz,
Derivatives, supra note 4, at 706 n.45). As shown infra Part V, bankruptcy immunity compounds
the pro-concentration effect of netting. See also Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 60V62.
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saved by obtaining it at a later point in the transaction than would be the
case for bankruptcy nonimmune lendersTand extracting covenants and
monitoring them. The reduced rate also reflects Creditor17s anticipated
greater share of Debtor7s bankruptcy estate.
Fifth, some of the costs thereby saved can be passed on to Debtor,
which here means its managers through higher salaries and bonuses, and
equity-holders through dividends and higher equity values. This is
frequently a strong inducement for solvent debtors and their managers to
make use of bankruptcy-immune contracts in the first place. Another
inducement is Debtor7s continuing freedom of action, relatively
unconstrained by creditor monitoring. As we have seen, the solvent Debtor
values this freedom of action, precisely because it is thereby enabled to
increase the riskiness of its projectsTand thus the variance of its expected
returnsTand the pay-outs it can make to its shareholders and managers.
Riskier projects definitionally involve a greater risk of loss, but the solvent
Debtor7s managers and shareholders anticipate externalizing much of this
loss onto Creditor2, Creditor3, and so on. In effect, then, the decision to
borrow from bankruptcy-immune Creditor1 as opposed to nonimmune
creditors is a manifestation of financial agency costs. Debtor7s managers
and shareholders collude with Creditor1 to run greater risks. The upside is
captured by Debtor7s shareholders and managers, the downside is
disproportionately loaded onto nonimmune Creditors, while the position of
Creditor1 is protected through the existence of the immunity.
Sixth, following from that, Creditor2, Creditor3, etc., no longer have a
share of the financial collateral to the extent of Creditor17s claim. Further,
and for the reasons explained above, they are now exposed to increased
levels of Debtor risk-taking. They may therefore have an incentive to lend
less, to expend greater monitoring efforts, and/or to charge more on their
loans. Not all Creditors would be able to do all or any of these things. Three
types of Creditors are worth mentioning. First, certain categories of
nonadjusting creditors were discussed in Part II. Second, bank depositors
enjoy state guarantees of repayment for some or all of their exposure. Third
and relatedly, in cases when Debtor is a systemically significant and/or
politically salient firm, the state itself potentially and implicitly stands as
the lender of last resort.179 Leaving aside the bankruptcy law itself, the state
179. Roe, supra note 4, at 558. For post-crisis measures to reduce the need for state bailouts of
financial institutions, see, for example, DoddVFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); INDEP. COMM7N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT:
RECOMMENDATIONS (2011); ERKKI LIIKANEN ET AL., HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON
REFORMING
THE
STRUCTURE
OF
THE
EU
BANKING
SECTOR
(2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf; Directive
2014/59, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 15 May 2014 Establishing a
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and
Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC,
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU, 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No.
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has no, even implicit, contractual relationship with such firms, and may
have little or no ex ante influence over the terms on which it might be
forced to lend. Nor is it best placed to monitor the Debtor transaction-bytransaction, week-by-week.
Seventh, and to reiterate, not only would Creditor1 be less likely to
monitor Debtor and possess less of an incentive to mitigate its overinvestment incentives, but the loss of these socially beneficial effects is
brought about by giving Creditor1 the power to withdraw collateral from
Debtor7s bankrupt state, thus reducing or destroying the potential for an
effective reorganization or synergy-preserving sale.180
Eighth, and finally on this point, since the bankruptcy regime provides
more favorable treatment for repos than for secured loans, potential lenders
have a powerful pro tanto incentive to adopt the repo form for their
transaction. Further, while loans are long-term banking book holdings with
attendant capital requirements, repos are short-term trading book holdings
regarded as being sold and repurchased according to their (mostly very
short) maturity dates, with attendant diminution of capital requirements:
Such distortions push counterparties toward designing complex products
that can help shift assets from the banking to the trading book, which are
then financed using short-term repos in the repo market, away from the
monitoring of regulators and at substantially lower capital requirements.
The effective outcome is tremendous liquidity in repo markets for these
products in good times, with systemic stress and fragility when the
products are anticipated to experience losses. The expansion of safe
harbor to repo transactions with underlying mortgage-based assets in the
Bankruptcy Act of 2005 has thus been cited as one of the reasons for the
growth in mortgage-based derivatives over the period from 2005 to
2007.181

Here, then, is how you pro tanto prime a financial system for crisis. The
system is left undercapitalized, overleveraged, and experiencing a bubble in
net negative value transactions with short maturity periods (in the example
just given, mortgage-backed structured assets). Too many of the system7s
constituents are mutually ignorant counterparties reliant upon fair-weather
Rliquidity,; there in good times, but gone exactly when it is most needed.
A critical question is whether this Rtremendous [fair-weather] liquidity;
is actually froth. That would certainly explain the accompanying fragility.
Froth, unlike liquidity, characteristically carries the seeds of its own
1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L
173) 190 [hereinafter EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive].
180. See generally Mark J. Roe & Stephen Adams, Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in
Bankruptcy: Selling Lehman1s Derivatives Portfolio, 32 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2015).
181. Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, A Proposal for the Resolution of Systemically
Important Assets and Liabilities: The Case of the Repo Market, 9 INT7L J. CENT. BANKING 291,
307V08 (2013) (emphasis added).
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destruction: the frothier a market in the upswing, the worse hit it is likely to
be when the cycle turns. Let us consider this Rliquidity.;
V. NETTING, AND WHAT IT !EXPONENTIATES"
It has recently been suggested that an importantTperhaps, the most
importantTrationale for financial contract immunities is that they
Rexponentiate; liquidity.182 This rationale is said to have Rnever received
the degree of prominence in the policy debate it would have deserved.;183
The immunities are said to possess Rfour novel effects . . . that represent a
quantum step in terms of increasing liquidity, in particular if taken in
combination with one another.;184
A. EXPONENTIATION MECHANISMS
First, immunities are said to facilitate more efficient use of collateral.
Parties need only collateralize net, rather than gross, exposures, which
enable the collateral to be Rstretched; to cover a greater volume of
transactions. 185 Variation margining on an ongoing basis, unhindered by
bankruptcy avoidance mechanisms, enables collateral to be adjusted in line
with exposure. There are opportunity costs to depleting the pool of unused
assets, but, it is implied, these are worth bearing in return for the benefits.186
Second, and relatedly, financial contract immunities are said to enable
efficient use of regulatory capital, that is, the ratio between risk exposure
and the capital raised by issuing its own shares. Since banks are able to
calculate capital requirements on a net rather than gross basis,187 they take
on several times as much gross risk to their balance sheets, not just in repo
and derivatives markets but across the board, including in ordinary lending.
182. Paech, supra note 5, at 1 (R[T]he true argument for the existence of safe harbours is . . .
liquidity in the financial market.;). Paech defines liquidity as the ability to sell any asset for other
assets or cash at will. Id. at 5 n.22 (drawing on Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J.
COMP. ECONS. 315, 316 (2013)). While there is much to admire in Pistor7s paper, her definition of
liquidity is defective because, surely unintentionally, it assumes away market failures. It thus
annihilates utterly indispensable distinctions between liquid and illiquid, and depressed and frothy
markets, and between best use, forced, and fire sale values. This definition of liquidity discerns no
difference between a market in which an asset with a fundamental or best use value of $1 million
USD may be disposed at will for no more than $1 USD, and one in which a fundamentally
worthless but highly rated subprime mortgage-backed security instrument trades at inflated prices.
In order to ascertain whether she provides a satisfactory account of liquidity, see Pistor, supra, at
316V17 (discussing distressed markets and fire sales).
183. Paech, supra note 5, at 13V14 (noting that legal instruments and industry group advocacy
documents emphasize the immunities7 contribution to risk reduction and hardly ever mention their
liquidity enhancing role).
184. Id. at 14.
185. Id. at 15V16 (calculating that up to 80% of derivatives exposures are covered by netting,
leaving only 20% in need of collateralization).
186. Id. at 17V18.
187. Barbara C. Matthews, Capital Adequacy, Netting, and Derivatives, 2 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 167, 170V75 (1995) (providing context for the advent of this change initiated in 1994).
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There is also a corresponding reduction in the relative cost of share
capital.188
The third way in which financial contract immunities are said to
enhance liquidity is that they allow Rflexibility across legal categories and
asset types.; 189 They do so by blurring the Rboundaries between claims,
cash and securities,; leaving positions Rinterchangeable; and allowing them
to be treated Ras a mere accounting position, the only parameter being
current market value.;190 Further, there is a functional amalgamation of title
transfer and security arrangements, with parties to the former remaining as
well-protected as under traditional security interests, but given far greater
power to use and alienate the collateral so long as they can return assets of
the same kind. RThis high degree of flexibility,; defenders of the
immunities enthuse, Ris nothing less than revolutionary, overthrowing
traditional legal restrictions on the use of assets with a view to obtaining
cash and creating liquidity more generally.;191
The fourth mechanism, the cross-border availability of assets facilitated
by harmonization on the immunities, is described in Part VII.
B. NETTING, LEVERAGE, AND RISK
In considering these arguments, it helps to think separately about
different elements of close-out netting. The real engine for exposure
exponentiation is netting, which is said to have had Rthe greatest impact on
the structure of the derivatives markets. Without netting the current large
size, liquidity and concentration we see in the derivatives markets would be
unlikely to exist.;192
Netting enables an end-user with, say, a derivatives exposure, to hedge
its risk by taking on an offsetting position, or multiple exposures to
imperfectly correlated risks, with the same counterpartyTcharacteristically,
the same dealerTwhile using a dealer7s obligations to it as a pro tanto
substitute for collateral and/or higher spreads. In addition, dealers can
manage their market risk exposures, maintaining a balanced portfolio book
by taking offsetting positions with multiple counterparties, each using their
obligations to the other to reduce both spreads and capital and collateral
costs, which are calculated on net rather than gross bases. This
Reconomizing; on capital and collateral enables the market to grow faster
188. Paech, supra note 5, at 17V18 (suggesting on the basis of the same derivatives exposure
figures that banks are able to take on as much as six times more risk if proceeding net rather than
gross).
189. Id. at 14V15.
190. Id. at 15.
191. Id. at 14.
192. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 60. Bliss and Kaufman compare the relative
contributions of netting, collateral, and close-out, generalizing beyond the derivatives markets. Id.
at 56 n.2.
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than the risk exposures of market participants. 193 In terms of the present
discussion, this is how netting Rexponentiates;Twhat the argument being
considered refers to asTliquidity.
Pause and dig a bit deeper, however. Note, first, another way of looking
at this pro-netting argument. Netting enables, even invites, greater leverage.
This can be brought out by comparing its effect to that of offering collateral.
Consider this simple scenario. If P owes Q $100, Q may expand its own
indebtedness to P by the same amount, effectively offering a pro tanto
discharge of P7s liability as assurance for repayment by Q. But what if Q
wishes to borrow more from P? One way to do so would be to allow P to
expand its indebtedness to Q. If that indebtedness doubled to $200, so
would Q7s ability to borrow from P. This feature is symmetrical between P
and Q. The more credit each allows the other in relation to it, the more
leverage it itself is able to take. Contrast the position where, in order to
borrow $100 from P, Q must offer collateral, and in order to increase its
borrowing to $200, must correspondingly provide additional collateral. The
(un)availability of collateral constrains Q7s ability to take on additional
debt, and thus additional risk. All else equal, the feature is symmetrical
between P and Q. This shows that netting leans toward greater leverage in
the system compared to collateral, and at least prima facie, leads to greater
risk as well. Netting7s admirers claim that the additional leverage does not
result in additional risk, precisely because netting mitigates it.
This leads to the second observation, that netting redistributes risk
rather than diminishing it, at least ex post. Upon counterparty P7s default,
netting results in the pro tanto diminution of an asset, viz., P7s claim against
Q, thus diminishing P7s estate to the detriment of all of P7s other creditors.
Considered purely from this ex post perspective, netting in effect provides
its beneficiary with bankruptcy payment priority just as a security interest
does. It thereby redistributes bankruptcy loss from the favored party to the
other claimants as a group.194
Third, from the ex ante perspective, netting weakens lending standards
by exacerbating both financial agency and adverse selection effects. Recall
from the discussion in the previous Part that, netting aside, lenders would
respond to agency costs by raising interest rates and/or demanding security.
In diminishing a lender7s incentives to do either, netting correspondingly
frees up a debtor to engage in riskier behavior. The increased financial
agency costs are passed on, including to the other participants in the netting
193. See, e.g., id. at 60V63.
194. William R. Emmons formally demonstrates that netting redistributes bank default risk

from interbank claimants that are party to the netting arrangement to nonbank creditors who are
not party to it. William R. Emmons, Interbank Netting Agreements and the Distribution of Bank
Default Risk 14 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 1995-016A, 1995),
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/1995/95-016.pdf. See also Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi,
Contagion and Efficiency in Gross and Net Interbank Payment Systems, 7 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 3 (1998).
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arrangement.195 Adverse selection may be modeled thus: banks with good
assets, such as safer loans to good borrowers, have an incentive to sell those
assets to informed buyers and use the resulting cash to settle their own
interbank liabilities. In this informed market, banks with poorer assets are at
a disadvantage in having to sell them at a larger discount. Such banks
would prefer a less informed market. Alternatively, they would like to be
able to use those assets themselves to settle their interbank liabilities, so
long as the assets would bear a higher return in the interbank market than in
the nonbank one. Interbank netting is analogical to this latter state. Where
there is a choice between gross and net settlement, good banks can signal
the quality of their assets by settling interbank obligations gross rather than
net.196 As a corollary, banks have incentives to take on good assets and to
ensure a good flow of information about them to the market. Where net
settlement is the norm, however, these incentives are weaker. 197 The
average bank asset under a netting-based settlement system is thus likely to
be of poorer quality than under a gross settlement system.198 This shows
that netting is like the bankruptcy immunities in that it tends to exacerbate
both financial agency and adverse selection costs. Netting makes the
financial system more vulnerable.
Fourth, netting increases market volatility. 199 Net exposures are
susceptible to changes that are multiples of the movements in underlying
195. Charles M. Kahn and William Roberds formally show that while reducing the costs of
holding noninterest-bearing reserves, netting can cause banks to overinvest in risky assets by
enabling a proportion of the resulting costs to be passed on to the other participants in the netting
arrangement, as well as to their creditors and guarantors. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds,
Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives, 11 REV. FIN. STUD. 845, 862 (1998).
196. Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, On the Efficiency of Cash Settlement 14 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Atl., Working Paper No. 95-11, 1995).
197. It is possible that interbank monitoring might compensate. However, there is no direct
evidence on the incentive effects for such monitoring of gross versus net settlement. General
evidence on interbank monitoring is mixed. For those detecting evidence of interbank monitoring,
see Craig Furfine, The Interbank Market During a Crisis, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 809 (2002)
[hereinafter Furfine, Interbank]; Craig H. Furfine, Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence
from the Overnight Federal Funds Market, 74 J. BUS. 33 (2001); Valeriya Dinger & Jürgen von
Hagen, Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?, 41 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 491
(2009); Falk Bräuning & Falko Fecht, Relationship Lending and Peer Monitoring: Evidence from
Interbank
Payment
Data
(Feb.
1,
2012)
(unpublished
discussion
paper),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2020171. For those finding weak or no evidence of interbank monitoring,
see Paolo Angelini, Andrea Nobili & Maria Cristina Picillo, The Interbank Market After August
2007: What Has Changed and Why? (Banca d7Italia, Working Paper No. 731, 2009); F.R. Liedorp
et al., Peer Monitoring or Contagion? Interbank Market Exposure and Bank Risk (De
Nederlandsche Bank, Working Paper No. 248, 2010); Irina Andrievskaya & Maria Semenova,
Market Discipline in the Interbank Market: Evidence from Russia, 53 E. EUR. ECONS. 69 (2015).
198. Consistently with this, Itai Agur observes that because of adverse selection in the bank
wholesale funding market, all the banks as a group face higher average borrowing costs that
penalize good banks yet fail to force poorer ones to internalize the costs of their risk-taking. Itai
Agur, Bank Risk Within and Across Equilibria, 58 J. BANKING & FIN. 322, 322 (2014).
199. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 64 (RNetted positions are inherently more volatile than
their underlying gross positions, and require continuous monitoring and management.;).
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obligations. Consider A and B, who at time T1 owe each other $5 and $10
respectively, leaving A with a net exposure of $5. At a later time T2, A still
owes B $5 but B7s indebtedness to A rises to $15, increasing A7s net
exposure to $10. The 50% change in an underlying obligation has resulted
in a 100% change in the net exposure. What is more, the larger the
difference between gross and net exposures, the larger the resulting
volatility. Take the 80% risk reduction that Rcan be taken for granted; on
the basis of recent derivatives market data.200 A owes B $100 million while
B owes A $80 million. Suppose A7s indebtedness to B increases to $105
million, with no other change. The 5% change in gross exposure is
exponentiated to a 25% change in net exposure. Since A7s exposure
increases much faster than it would have if measured on a gross basis, so
may A7s need for capital and B7s obligation to post a variation margin (i.e.,
collateral). This suggests that netting exponentiates Rliquidity; when gross
exposures move more or less in line with each other, and it sucks
Rliquidity; dry when gross exposures diverge. In other words, netting
engenders fair-weather liquidity. Further, since higher volatility is
associated with higher default probability,201 netting makes both A and B
more vulnerable to distress.
Fifth, and following from that, netting is a risk transmission channel,
propagating the effect of shocks to the system. Bilateral gross exposures
between A and B are most likely to diverge, and to the greatest degree,
when A suffers distress. Netting exponentiates the divergence, potentially
causing contagion by heightening B7s capital and collateral needs. C, D,
and E, A7s other counterparties, would suffer symmetrical pressure. What
starts off as A7s crisis threatens to spread much wider. It is in recognition of
at least the potential for these costs that netting is combined with close-out
and collateral disposal immunities. In other words, it is the new channels
for risk transmission created by netting immunities that supposedly give
rise to the need for close-out and collateral disposal immunities. This
creates significant risk of asset value contagion, however, so that the closeout/asset disposal cure may prove worse than the netting disease.202
C. THE !EFFICIENCIES" REVISITED
It is against this background that we should place a series of basic
lessons that financial sector regulators have had to relearn. Take the
Refficiencies; arising from the focus on net rather than gross exposure.
There is at least some acknowledgement that this focus is misleading and
causes regulatory authorities to take their eye off the ball:

200. Paech, supra note 5, at 15.
201. See, e.g., Borio, Furfine & Lowe, supra note 39, at 7.
202. See supra Part I and, in greater detail, infra Part VII.
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Before the crisis, market participants and regulators focused on net risk
exposures of [major derivatives market players], which were judged to be
comparatively modest. In contrast, less attention was given to the large
size of their gross exposures. But the crisis has cast doubt on the apparent
safety of firms that have small net exposures associated with large gross
positions. As major market-makers suffered severe credit losses, their
access to funding declined much faster than nearly anyone expected. As a
result, it became increasingly difficult for them to fund market-making
activities in OTC derivatives marketsTand when that happened, it was the
gross exposures that mattered.203

The phenomenon described here is easy to understand if we remember
that the major derivatives market players were creating and operating in a
hugely frothy market. The fair-weather Rliquidity; that enabled them to
access funding in the risk-accumulation phase of the cycleTresulting in
part from the focus on net rather than gross exposures, as explained
aboveTwas inherently fragile and bound to disappear as soon as the cycle
began to turn, to unsurprising procyclical effect.
In regard to capital, two key desiderata are that it should increase when
risk increases, and that it should be raised when it is cheapest. As argued in
Part I, risk accumulates as credit booms and asset prices bubble. This is also
the time when capital is likely to be cheapest and easiest to raise. For both
of these reasons:
capital should be raised in booms to be drawn down as risk materialises. . .
. By holding additional capital over and above that needed to achieve the
target probability of default at a particular point in time, each individual
bank can smooth its cost of capital over time and increase its survival
prospects. This is a critical insurance function. From the perspective of the
system as a whole, raising capital in good times to be drawn upon in bad
times has the additional benefit of limiting the amplification of the
financial and business cycle, especially the headwinds that accompany
periods of widespread bank retrenchment. 204

Exactly the opposite is achieved by the focus on net exposure, which, as
shown above, is likely to remain small as the boom builds up and the
bubble inflates, only to explode when one of the parties to the netting
arrangement experiences difficulty. Netting7s procyclical effect on
regulatory capital, presented as Refficiency,; weakens an individual
institution7s balance sheets and acts as a potent systemic risk amplifier.
The lesson here is subtle, and has not yet been learnt if you are tempted
by something like the following proposition: Rwhat is beneficial generally
203. Stephen Cecchetti, Jacob Gyntelberg & Marc Hollanders, Central Counterparties For
Over-The-Counter Derivatives, in BANK FOR INT7L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 45,
50 (Sept. 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0909.pdf.
204. Borio, Furfine & Lowe, supra note 39, at 31V32. See also IMF, Financial Stress, supra
note 57, at 125.
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(collateral more easily available) may turn out to be dangerous in times of
stress (no asset reserves).;205 That is like saying that smoking is generally
beneficial, but may turn out to be dangerous if one7s lungs were to fill with
disease. There are not two discontinuous states, Rgeneral,; in which
immunities are good, and Rstressed,; in which they suddenly turn out to be
bad. The hard-won intellectual achievement underlying the macroprudential
approach to systemic risk is precisely that crises are not exogenous to
behavior during booms, but in fact result from it, and that the primary way
of reducing the incidence and severity of crises is to mitigate boom-time
negative net value risk-taking of the sort that the immunities incentivize.
Such behavior emphatically includes false Reconomizing; on capital and
collateral.
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF BOUNDARIES
Recall the argument that the immunities are in part justified because
they enhance liquidity by scrubbing out legal boundaries and blurring the
distinctions between claims, cash, and securities. As should already be
clear, it is often inadvisable to treat as equivalent claims against
counterparties, and other types of assets, particularly more genuinely liquid
ones. A Gilt worth £100 (collateral) cannot be treated on par with a claim
against a distressed debtor (netting) nominally worth the same amount, but
not bearing anywhere near that value either fundamentally or in the market.
This suggests that while netting and collateralization may be
Rinterchangeable; when considered as Rmere accounting position[s],; 206
their effects on counterparty credit and systemic risks are not.
Consider the important case of initial margining in the multi-trillion
dollar, noncentrally cleared derivatives market. If parties agreed to a
bilateral initial marginTwhich is not always the caseTmarket practice has
been to calculate it on a net basis. As we have seen, however, netting and
collateral are not perfect substitutes. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and the Board of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions recently pronounced that:
when two parties to a derivatives transaction exchange initial margin on a
net . . . basis, there can be little or no actual increase in the extent to which
either firm is protected from the default of the other. Although one firm
has received initial margin as collateral, the firm also now bears the risk of
additional loss on the initial margin that it has provided to the counterparty
if the counterparty defaults, which may offset some or all of the benefits of
initial margin received.207

205. Paech, supra note 5, at 29.
206. Id. at 15.
207. BCBS & IOSCO, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, supra note 122, at 19.
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Accordingly, and notwithstanding market resistance, guidance is now
for practice to move to exchanging initial margins on a gross rather than net
basis, with the attendant shrinkage in Rliquidity; regarded, in relation to
financial and systemically significant nonfinancial firms, as a price worth
paying.208
Take another example. Proponents of the alchemizing effect of closeout netting privileges claim that a financial contract counterparty7s ability to
rehypothecate collateral is Rremarkable . . . [in] that the rights of [the
rehypothecating lender] . . . appear to grow whereas the risk borne by the
[collateral-providing borrower] . . . remains unchanged.;209 That would be
remarkable, but any such appearances are deceptive and the borrower7s risk
would usually increase. It ought to go without saying that there is a
difference between the in rem right to reclaim liquid assets upon the
pledgee7s default, and a mere in personam claim in its bankruptcy
proceedings because the collateral you provided has been alienated to a
third party. What is truly remarkable is that regulators are only now
announcing this truism, familiar to Gaius, 210 as a new and controversial
discovery: R[t]he legal capacity in which initial margin is held or exchanged
can have a significant influence on how effective margin is in protecting a
firm from loss in the event of the default of a derivatives counterparty.;211
Acknowledgement of this truth allows regulators to think of suitable
restrictions on rehypothecation (and indeed, reuse), and encourages them to
keep such restrictions under review in case they require strengthening. 212
Accounting positions will not do; legal form matters when, as here, it
makes a substantive economic difference.213
The point generalizes. Money and different types of claims and
securities are not the same. They offer different risk/reward profiles, affect
their holders7 incentives in different ways, and have different effects on
systemic stability. It may sometimes be useful, for some purposes, to treat
some of these asset types as interchangeable in some respects. However,
this has costs as well as benefits, and there is no reason to think that the
latter always exceed the former. To acknowledge this fact is not to be
crushed by Rconceptual burdens.;214
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 4V5, 8V9, 20.
Paech, supra note 5, at 15 (emphasis added).
See G. INST. 4.1V4.3.
BCBS & IOSCO, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, supra note 122, at 19.
Id. at 20V22 (among other things, restricting rehypothecation and reuse Ronly for purposes
of hedging the initial margin collector7s derivatives position arising out of transactions with
customers for which initial margin was collected,; where Rcustomers; refers only to nonfinancial
firms and buy-side financial ones). Recall that, overall, these requirements only apply to financial
and systemically important nonfinancial entities.
213. This should not be news to immunity apologists. After all, repos epitomize the triumph of
difference-making legal form over economic substance.
214. Paech, supra note 5, at 15.
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E. FROTH AND FAIR-WEATHER LIQUIDITY
Recall that asset liquidity is a function of the asset7s fundamental value.
We have not been able to identify any mechanism by which the immunities
might increase liquidity for net positive value assets. The bankruptcy
immunities, and netting in particular, do facilitate funding of net negative
value assets by enabling the externalization of the downside risks of
creating and holding such assets.215 This causes the market values of such
projects to exceed their fundamental values. If it did not, then, ex hypothesi
and all else equal, the assets would not obtain funding. This is just another
way of saying that the markets funding these assets are frothy.
Immunities do not enhance the liquidity of markets, (i) since, as noted,
they contribute to the inflation of asset price bubbles, in which assets are
distortedly overvalued above their fundamentals, and (ii) since the volatility
of netting and the asset value contagion resulting from unimpeded close-out
and collateral disposals216 contributes to illiquid markets in which prices fall
below fundamentals. Institutional liquidity also declines as balance sheets
shift away from softer and longer-term liabilities, such as capital and
unsecured or standard secured borrowing, and toward short-term, close-outprone, repo-like bankruptcy immune funding. Capital becomes procyclical
as netting encourages less of it to be raised in booms and demands more in
busts.
It turns out after all, that liquidity has received about the right degree of
prominence in attempts to justify the immunities. What has been lacking is
a focus on their systemically harmful procyclical relationship with the types
of liquidity described above.
Against this background, here is how to decode talk about immunities
Rexponentiating liquidity.; Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin set out to
understand financial press and market commentary references to Rexcess
liquidity; in financial markets, or to such markets being Rawash; with it.217
Their empirical detective work reveals that, in this discourse, Rliquidity;
should be understood as the rate of growth of aggregate financial sector
balance sheets.218 The market becomes Rawash; with this Rliquidity; when
asset price bubbles, particularly when combined with marked-to-market
valuations of financial intermediaries7 assets, make financial institution
balance sheets appear stronger, and all else equal, leave their leverage
215. In perhaps the most remarkable part of his paper, Paech puts forward this contribution to
what he calls liquidity as a justification for the immunities: R[t]he amount of liquidity created
through safe harbours, which mirrors the degree to which risk is shifted, depends on the scope of
safe harbours.; Id. at 28 (emphasis added). Paech admits that the parties to whom risk is shifted
include those unwilling and/or unable to respond to such risk-shifting. Id. at 20V21. In other
words, then, Paech thinks that the immunities are justified precisely to the extent that they
facilitate the creation of negative externalities.
216. See infra Part VII.
217. See Adrian & Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, supra note 60, at 419.
218. See id. at 436.

2015]

Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and Financial Contracts

67

lower. 219 The institutions then have additional regulatory capital leeway.
Since this is when risk is starting to accumulate, it would be systemically
sensible to build up this capital. However, financial intermediary decision
makers are afflicted with perverse incentives,220 and are often rewarded for
adding to the riskiness of their firms.221 Such decision makers would tend to
expand balance sheets by taking on more short-term debt on the liabilities
side and by seeking to lend more on the assets side. Lender-driven searches
for projects to fund, while asset prices bubble and credit booms, are the
textbook recipe for the funding of riskier projects undertaken by poorer
quality borrowers. This conflict of managerial interest and duty in relation
to the quality of the employer7s lending book, and the absence of any link
between that duty and considerations of systemic riskTwhich would count
in favor of accumulating capital in boom timesTis a potent mechanism in
the deterioration of lending standards and the creation of systemic
vulnerability.222
It is the Rliquidity; brought about through this boom-time inflation in
the size of balance sheets to which immunities in general and netting, in
particular, contribute. To reiterate, it is precisely this type of Rliquidity; that
paradigmatically generates systemic risk:
The main channel [for increased systemic risk] is excessive credit and
leverage. In fact, these variables show the strongest ex ante correlation
with the incidence of financial crises as shown in the empirical literature
analyzing large historical and cross-country episodes of systemic financial
crises. Credit (debt and leverage) acceleration notably increases the
likelihood of financial crises, and conditionally on a crisis occurring, it
increases its systemic nature and the negative effects on the real economy
associated with the crisis.223

The reference to R[c]redit (debt and leverage) acceleration; 224 is
synonymous with Rliquidity exponentiation.; It is, unfortunately, all too
easy to see why this harmful phenomenon should be attractive to perversely
incentivized financial institution decision makers, and to those paid to

219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?, in

THE GREENSPAN ERA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 313, 316, 334V39 (2005),
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2005/pdf/rajan2005.pdf.
221. See, e.g., Robert DeYoung, Emma Y. Peng & Meng Yan, Executive Compensation and
Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 165
(2013); Jens Hagendorff & Francesco Vallascas, CEO Pay Incentives and Risk-Taking: Evidence
from Bank Acquisitions, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1078 (2011); Marc Chesney, Jacob Stromberg &
Alexander F. Wagner, Managerial Incentives to Take Asset Risk (Swiss Fin. Inst., Research Paper
No. 10-18, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595343.
222. Adrian & Song Shin, supra note 60, at 436 (referring, as an example, to the U.S. subprime
sector).
223. de Bandt, Hartmann & Peydró, supra note 14, at 688.
224. Id.
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advocate on their behalf. It is not easy to understand why anyone else
should celebrate it.
VI. DOMINO RISK
We confront the core argument proffered in favor
bankruptcy immunities. The confrontation may
notwithstanding its near-universal acceptance by
argument does not withstand serious scrutiny.
The Guide provides the canonical statement in
context:

of financial contract
feel anticlimactic:
policymakers, the
the bankruptcy law

Without the ability to close out, net and set off obligations . . . a debtor7s
failure to perform its contract . . . could lead the counterparty to be unable
to perform its related financial contracts with other market participants.
The insolvency of a significant market participant could result in a series
of defaults in back-to-back transactions, potentially causing financial
distress to other market participants and, in the worst case, resulting in the
financial collapse of other counterparties, including regulated financial
institutions. This domino effect is often referred to as systemic risk, and is
cited as a significant policy reason for permitting participants to close out,
net and set off obligations in a way that normally would not be permitted
by insolvency law. 225

This is the Rdomino risk; view of systemic contagion: the failure by one
institution to meet its obligations triggers a similar failure by one or more of
its counterparties. Though never vindicated, the domino risk view has been
so frequently asserted, and with so little contradiction, that it has become a
truism.226 In reality, however, the domino risk view, which is a product of
the unsatisfactory microprudential approach to systemic risk, is
theoretically implausible and empirically false. 227 Five of its assumptions
are worth considering. It will become apparent that financial contract
immunities, rationalized as protecting the system against phantom domino
risk, end up contributing to real systemic risk through the mechanisms
discussed above.
First, for the domino risk view to accurately describe the onset of a
systemic crisis, the initial failureTthe first domino to fallTwould need to
be implausibly large. While contagion can occur more rapidly in the
banking sector than in others, there is no evidence in real-world scenarios
that banking sector contagion would result in the failure of solvent banks, or
225. LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, at 157.
226. This is a close paraphrase of Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 67.
227. For recent surveys of evidence about domino risk, see Xavier Freixas & Bruno M. Parigi,

Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy: A Post-Crisis Perspective, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BANKING 474, 483V85 (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson
eds., 2d ed. 2015); de Bandt, Hartmann & Peydró, supra note 14, at 684V91. Some of the evidence
explored in this Part draws on these surveys.
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that, in and of itself, it would spread to the real economy. 228 For example,
Craig Furfine runs various stress simulations on bilateral credit exposures
arising from U.S. federal fund transactions Rto explore the likely contagious
impact of a significant bank failure.;229 He finds that:
multiple rounds of failures are unlikely, and that aggregate assets at
subsequently failing banks would never be expected to exceed 1% of total
commercial banking assets when loss rates are kept to historically
observed levels. . . . Overall, the results suggest that contagion resulting
from direct interbank linkages does not necessarily present a system-wide
threat to the U.S. banking system. 230

Similarly, Rplausible but extreme; stress tests of the Canadian banking
sector, simulating credit losses totaling a million loan loss scenarios with a
loss-given-default of 50 percent each during a severe recession, still do not
result in domino risk.231 These results in the United States and Canada are
consistent with evidence from the Austrian, 232 Belgian, 233 Italian, 234 and
UK 235 interbank markets, among others. The result generalizes: R[t]he
domino model of contagion has been examined in many simulation studies
conducted at several central banks, but the universal conclusion has been
that the impact of the domino model of contagion is very small. It is only
with implausibly large shocks that the simulations generate any meaningful
contagion.;236

228. George G. Kaufman, Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence, 8 J. FIN.
SERV. RES. 123, 139V43 (1994) (finding that, even in the absence of deposit insurance, average
losses to individual depositor creditors are smaller than to creditors in nonbank industries).
229. Craig H. Furfine, Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion, 35 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 111, 125 (2003) [hereinafter Furfine, Quantifying].
230. Id. Furfine also notes that the 1998 Russian sovereign default and Long-Term Capital
Management near-default, discussed infra in Part VII, while conceivably exposing banks to
significant losses, did not spark off contagion. See Furfine, Interbank, supra note 197, at 810.
231. Céline Gauthier, Alfred Lehar & Moez Souissi, Macroprudential Capital Requirements
and Systemic Risk 18 n.20 (Working Paper, Oct. 2011) http://prism.ucalgary.ca/jspui/bitstream/18
80/47851/1/Lehar_bocpaper15academic_2010.pdf. The phrase quoted in the text here does not
appear in the abbreviated published version.
232. See generally Helmut Elsinger, Alfred Lehar & Martin Summer, Risk Assessment for
Banking Systems, 52 MGMT. SCI. 1301 (2006).
233. See generally Hans Degryse & Grégory Nguyen, Interbank Exposures: An Empirical
Examination of Contagion Risk in the Belgian Banking System, INT7L J. CENT. BANKING, June
2007, at 123.
234. See generally Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, Assessing Financial Contagion in the Interbank
Market: Maximum Entropy Versus Observed Interbank Lending Patterns, 35 J. BANKING & FIN.
1114 (2011).
235. See generally Helmut Elsinger, Alfred Lehar & Martin Summer, Using Market
Information for Banking System Risk Assessment, INT7L J. CENT. BANKING, Mar. 2006, at 137,
137.
236. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Financial Contagion, FIN. STABILITY
REV., Feb. 2008, at 1, 2V3.
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Indeed, domino risk only materializes in models assuming an initial
failure so large,237 or another state of affairs so implausible,238 as to have Ra
probability of zero,; which leaves these models Rdevoid of any practical
relevance.;239
Second, and relatedly, the domino risk view underplays the importance
of the intrinsic weakness of the institutions likely to be worst affected by
any contagion. It has already been noted that banking-sector contagion does
not result in the failure of healthy, solvent banks. 240 Even during the
Chicago banking panic of 1932, the only banks to fail were weak prior to
the onset of the panic, and in any case, the failures resulted from common
asset value shocks rather than domino contagion.241 Individual institutions
contribute to systemic risk, not through their exposure to each other, but by
how well they have addressed such exposure as part of their broader
approach to risk. Contagion is more likely to result when financial
institutions have been hollowed out because of the Roverstretching; of
capital and/or collateral, for example.
Third, and again relatedly, the domino risk view underestimates the
relative importance of procyclical channels and associated vulnerabilities.
As Furfine and others have noted:
experience indicates that widespread financial system stress rarely arises
from contagion or domino effects associated with the failure of an
individual institution owing to purely institution-specific factors. More
often, financial system problems have their roots in financial institutions
underestimating their exposure to a common factor, most notably the
financial/business cycle in the economy as a whole. 242

It is because financial market participants fail to understand and/or
respond appropriately to credit booms, frothy markets, and asset price
bubbles, and because they contribute to associated failures in lending
standards, that systemic risk matures into crisis. This observation is
consistent with banking panics in the United States and the United

237. Such as the failure of the aggregated European banking system excluding that of the
Netherlands. See generally Iman van Lelyvelda & Franka Liedorp, Interbank Contagion in the
Dutch Banking Sector: A Sensitivity Analysis, INT7L J. CENT. BANKING, June 2006, at 99.
238. Such as the absence of any financial safety net in Germany. See generally Christian Upper
& Andreas Worms, Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German Interbank Market: Is There a
Danger of Contagion?, 48 EUR. ECON. REV. 827 (2004).
239. Christian Upper, Simulation Methods to Assess the Danger of Contagion in Interbank
Markets, 7 J. FIN. STABILITY 111, 118 (2011).
240. Kaufman, supra note 228, at 139V43. Banks and other financial firms are generally
sufficiently diversified to withstand the bankruptcy of any particular counterparty. See, e.g., Jean
Helwege, Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk, 20 J. INT7L FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS &
MONEY 1, 4V7 (2010).
241. Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great
Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 863, 881 (1997).
242. Borio, Furfine & Lowe, supra note 39, at 5.
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Kingdom,243 and from the U.S. subprime crisis in 2007.244 The lesson for
financial contract immunities seems clear: they are undesirable since they
are strongly procyclical and conducive to many of the vulnerabilities just
noted.
Fourth, the domino risk view ignores the effect of information
contagion, which is associated with market opacity and excessive
uncertainty. Furfine7s work provides a useful example. 245 He identifies
liquidity shocks arising from information contagion, which he models as a
rumor about the largest lender in the market that leads all other banks to
refrain from lending to it, and in turn to the largest lender lending to anyone
else,246 as a more important concern:
Simulations of the sudden illiquidity of a major institution suggest that the
potential for illiquidity contagion is greater than failure contagion.
Although the simulations are likely to overstate the likely effects, the
sudden illiquidity of the largest federal funds borrower was estimated to
spread to banks holding up to 9% of industry assets.247

This counts against bankruptcy immunities, which increase uncertainty
in the markets by dulling counterparties7 incentives to gather information ex
ante and to monitor and seek to moderate borrower behavior over the
duration of the transaction.
Fifth, returning to the failure of very large institutions, the domino risk
view ignores the role of asset value contagion. For the dominos to start
falling, the initial failure would have to be very, indeed Rimplausibly,;
large.248 The larger the distressed borrower, however, the more likely the
amplifying effect of asset disposals, as the borrower itself bids for liquidity,
and as its counterparties attempt to minimize losses. The implication for our
purposes is that the larger the distressed entity, the less appropriate the
bankruptcy immunities are in relation to it. It is not domino risk but asset
value deteriorationTfrom the bursting of bubbles, the melting away of
froth, and/or asset value contagionTthat precipitates a systemic crisis.249
The financial crisis of 2008 onward has changed our view of how a
systemic banking problem can emerge. Before the crisis, the conventional
wisdom was that the main mechanism was the Rdomino effect;, whereby
243. See generally Gorton, supra note 47; R. H. INGLIS PALGRAVE, DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1894). Both are cited by Borio, Furfine & Lowe, supra note 39, at 5 n.11.
244. See generally Adrian & Song Shin, supra note 60.
245. For another example, see Eric Santor, Banking Crises and Contagion: Empirical Evidence
(Bank of Can., Working Paper No. 2003-1, 2003), http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/wp03-1.pdf.
246. Furfine, Quantifying, supra note 229, at 123.
247. Id. at 125.
248. Even the failure of the entire derivatives market would be unlikely to impair any critical
financial system function. See Schwarcz, Derivatives, supra note 4, at 713V15.
249. For empirical evidence from the Canadian banking sector, see generally Gauthier, Lehar &
Souissi, supra note 16.
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the default of one bank generated both a change in depositors7 and
investors7 confidence in the banking system as well as losses and
illiquidity for the banks that were the defaulting banks7 creditors. The
current crisis has shown that the decrease in the prices of the assets the
banks were holding . . . was the main driving force.250

RThe main conclusion of the literature,; agrees another trio of
economists, Ris that contagion is usually not a serious risk provided there
are not significant price movements in response to the turmoil. If there are, .
. . then contagion effects can be significant.; 251 This improved
understanding of the nature of systemic risk has increasingly been
acknowledged by regulators,252 and has resulted in the new requirement for
regimes designed to resolve major distressed financial institutions to
incorporate moratoria on close-out netting and thus collateral disposals.253
Even ISDA, the powerful financial market lobbying group that has played a
critical and troubling role in legislative entrenchment of the immunities
around the world, 254 has now performed something of a volte-face and
acknowledges that cross-border recognition of moratoria on close-out
netting reduces systemic risk.255
The conclusion is obvious. Financial contract immunities have been
rationalized as protecting against domino risk. The evidence discussed in
this Part shows that there is simply no basis on which they should be
applied to most firms in the economy, which on any view are nowhere near
large enough to set the dominos falling.256 Any conceivable domino risk,
while still fanciful, could only be associated with the failure of the largest
firms. It is precisely in relation to these very large firms that the immunities
250. Freixas & Parigi, supra note 227, at 483.
251. Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti & Xian Gu, The Role of Banks in Financial Systems, in THE

OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 27, 38 (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson
eds., 2d ed. 2015).
252. The process began with the BANK FOR INT7L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION
GROUP para. 115 (2010) [hereinafter BASEL REPORT], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf.
253. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 10, 51, 64 (2014) [hereinafter FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES],
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf; FCD, supra note 136,
art. 1(6); WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 21.
254. See infra Part VII.
255. ISDA now promotes a RResolution Stay Protocol; that effectively amends the ISDA
Master Agreements, the industry standard, to incorporate recognition in one jurisdiction of
moratoria on contractual termination rights imposed by a relevant resolution regime in a different
jurisdiction. It describes this as Ra major step in strengthening systemic stability and reducing the
risk that banks are considered 9too big to fail.7; See Major Banks Agree to Sign ISDA Resolution
Stay Protocol, ISDA (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www2.isda.org/news/major-banks-agree-to-sign-isdaresolution-stay-protocol. For a discussion of some of the limitations of the Protocol, see, for
example, Mevorach, supra note 105.
256. For belated regulatory recognition of the obvious fact that the fate of most firms in the
economy, considered in and of themselves, does not implicate systemic risk, see BCBS & IOSCO,
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, supra note 122, at 20V22.

2015]

Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and Financial Contracts

73

must be curtailed to dampen asset value contagion, which is all too real. It
follows that the domino risk-based rationalization of the immunities applies
to a null set. While privately beneficial to individual financial institutions
operating in generally stable markets that must respond to a counterparty7s
distress, they do not play any role in mitigating systemic risk.
VII. HOW THE IMMUNITIES DEVELOPED: AN
INTERNATIONAL PATH-DEPENDENCE FRAMEWORK
We now have a puzzle to solve. Over the last many years, policymakers
in some of the most sophisticated economies in the world have come to
accept the financial contract immunities. The core justification offered for
them, that they mitigate systemic domino risk, is without merit. This fact,
while particularly obvious in the wake of the 2007V2009 crisis, has been
known to the relevant policymakers all along.257 Given these observations,
the puzzle is to understand how regulators and policymakers were
persuaded that bankruptcy regimes should be distorted to accord privileged
treatment to dominant financial market players whose decision makers
derive the greatest benefit from them.
Defenders of financial contract immunities tell a triumphalist tale. They
argue that the immunities have facilitated cross-border harmonization and
thus enabled market participants to access assets across boundaries.
Measures, of which the FCD is most prominent, have Rsomehow silently
overcom[e] statutory legal hurdles from which parties traditionally could
not derogate,; creating Ra harmonised legal space in which financial
institutions can source and use collateral quasi-globally,; and thus, there
has been a consequent reduction in Rthe importance of domestic policy
towards insolvency,; a reduction, indeed, in Rthe importance of legal
considerations in risk management to a significant extent.; 258 Since the
observation about Rsilent; legal harmonization is proffered as part of a
justificatory argument, it should presumably be understood as suggesting
that the immunities7 welfare-enhancing qualities have won over national
decision makers.
A debunking explanation is more plausible. After all, it may be
dispiriting, but is not very surprising, that some of the world7s most wellresourced interest groups have managed to win Rsilent; expansions of
unique legal privileges, which, it should be clear by now, are really just
immunities exempting compliance with the rules applicable to everyone
else. The U.S. process by which these immunities were won has been
illuminatingly analyzed within a path-dependence framework.259 This may
257. See, e.g., Adrian & Song Shin, supra note 60, 2V3. Further evidence for this assertion is
provided in the discussion in this Part.
258. Paech, supra note 5, at 16V17.
259. See generally Schwarcz & Sharon, supra note 4; see also Mark J. Roe, Commentary,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996).
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be adapted for and supplemented from an international perspective.
Attention will also be drawn to the costs of this process, which
characteristically do not receive any recognition from immunity apologists.
In this context, the basic path-dependence mechanisms are the
following: financial innovation gains recognition through a liberalizing (i.e.,
deregulatory) change in the law, thus enhancing the power of particular
interest groups. Being sufficiently concentrated and/or resourced, such
groups then wield this power systematically to shape subsequent legal
development, with each incremental unit of change further entrenching or
enhancing their advantage. Each change gets locked in, and regarded
thereafter as representing the uniquely correct Rnorm.; Alternative paths for
legal development are obscured and their discovery is subjected to
increasing informational, political, and reputational costs. For financial
contracts in particular, the obscuring of alternatives operates through
emphasis on the complexity, sophistication, and esotericism of the
instruments, and the sheer scale of the markets. 260 In the international
context, national policymakers are pushed down the favored path through
comparisons with sophisticated markets and through regional
competitiveness considerations. In short, the path-dependency framework
enables an understanding of legal change with no necessary reference either
to social welfare or, indeed, to fairness considerations. The demonstration
that things have turned out thus, may be cleaved apart from the claim that
this is how they ought to have turned out.261
A. THE U.S. GENESIS AND THE DISMISSAL OF ASSET VALUE
CONTAGION
The current status in U.S. law of financial contract immunities is aptly
described as Ran outcome of decades of sustained industry pressure on
Congress to exempt the derivatives market from the reach of the
Bankruptcy Code, with each exemption serving as a historical justification
for subsequent broader exemptions.;262
The process began in 1978 when Congress accepted untested assertions
by industry representatives about systemic domino risks in the commodities
futures market. As a result, the Bankruptcy Code included a relatively
narrow exemption from the moratorium for set-off and another from
260. Financial contract immunities in the United States Rwere sought on the theory that certain
relatively esoteric markets were so international in nature and so removed from ordinary
commerce that they required bankruptcy exemption to function properly and would not interfere
in the ordinary functioning of the bankruptcy laws.; Exemption of Financial Assets from
Bankruptcy, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. of
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 67 (2008) (testimony of Jay L. Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt Chair of
Business Law, Univ. of Texas School of Law).
261. See Schwarcz & Sharon, supra note 4, at 1750.
262. Id. at 1724.
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avoidance powers. 263 Congress, though, apparently envisaged that the
bankruptcy court would have the power to stay a set-off on the basis that it
would harm an estate.264 In 1982, contractual termination immunities were
made available to securities and derivatives contracts, with no court power
to stay termination. Further, what in 1978 had been declared potential
domino risks were promoted in importance, and were now described as
threats of a market collapse. 265 In 1984, narrow repo immunities were
added, giving lenders the additional power to liquidate collateral. 266 In
1990, ISDA endorsed netting immunities for swaps, citing prior
Congressional recognition of the need for certainty and speed in financial
contracts, and claiming that previous immunities had worked well.267 ISDA
has formally stated that it played a leading role in the drafting of these
immunizing provisions.268
In the summer of 1998, the near collapse of the Long-Term Capital
Management hedge fund (LTCM) and its bailout by its fourteen main
creditors at the behest of the New York Federal Reserve (the Fed) proved
particularlyTand paradoxicallyTsignificant to this development. The
circumstances of the bailout are worth recalling. The President of the Fed,
testifying to Congress only a few weeks later, explained how LTCM7s
collapse would have Rpose[d] unacceptable risks to the American
economy.;269 The reasoning is directly pertinent, yet appears to have been
lost in much subsequent debate:270
Had Long-Term Capital been suddenly put into default, its counterparties
would have immediately Rclosed-out; their positions. If counterparties
would have been able to close-out their positions at existing market prices,
losses, if any, would have been minimal. However, if many firms had
rushed to close-out hundreds of billions of dollars in transactions
simultaneously, they would have been unable to liquidate collateral or
establish offsetting positions at the previously-existing prices. Markets
would have moved sharply and losses would have been exaggerated.
Several billion dollars of losses might have been experienced by some of
Long-Term Capital7s more than 75 counterparties. . . .

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 1724V26.
Id. at 1726.
Id. at 1727V28.
Id. at 1728V29.
Id. at 1729V31.
See id. at 1729V31, 1741 n.154.
Private-Sector Refinancing of the Large Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management,
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. 30 (1998)
(statement of William J. McDonough, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) [hereinafter
Refinancing Hearing]. The statement as a whole is worth reading, and strongly underlines the
driving real-time motivation to avoid systemic fallout from widespread close-out netting.
270. It is reproduced by Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 201 (2008)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk].
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[T]hese direct effects on Long-Term Capital7s counterparties were not our
principal concern. While these losses would have been considerable, and
would certainly have adversely affected the firms experiencing them, this
was not, in itself, a sufficient reason for us to become involved.
Two factors influenced our involvement. First, in the rush of Long-Term
Capital7s counterparties to close-out their positions, other market
participants, investors who had no dealings with Long-Term Capital,
would have been affected as well.
Second, as losses spread to other market participants and Long-Term
Capital7s counterparties, this would lead to tremendous uncertainty about
how far prices would move. Under these circumstances, there was a
likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would
experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a
period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a
vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, leading to a rush out of private
credits, leading to a further widening of credit spreads, leading to further
liquidations of positions, and so on. Most importantly, this would have led
to further increases in the cost of capital to American businesses. 271

This textbook statement of the risk of asset value contagion clearly
underlines how then existing immunities served as amplifiers, nearly
precipitating a systemic crisis and forcing the Fed7s hand. In normal times,
when markets are stable, close-out and asset realization immunities are
privately beneficial for individual counterparties who can liquidate the
collateral they hold in a value-preserving manner. By contrast, simultaneous
liquidation of significant quantities of collateral triggers a collective action
problem as collateral values collapse. While such disorderly simultaneous
liquidation would have inflicted massive losses on the seventy-five LTCM
counterparties, these private losses to consenting trading partners did not in
themselves justify the Fed7s intervention. The primary justification was the
prevention of social losses, including for those market participants who had
not chosen to deal with LTCM and, more broadly, the loss of market
confidence that would trigger further liquidations, thus setting up a vicious
feedback loop. As a result, the real economy would have suffered a general
increase in the cost of credit. Therefore, it was the risk of these social costs
that justified the Fed7s involvement.
LTCM7s fate showed that close-out and attendant collateral disposal
immunities can generate significant externalities, reducing market liquidity
precisely at the point when it is most needed, and thus amplifying systemic
risk. Nor was LTCM unique in driving this point home. Referring to the
near-collapse under similar circumstances of a Japanese bank, the LongTerm Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. (LTCB), a 2001 Group of Ten (G-10)
report recognized close-out netting immunities as an amplifier of systemic
271. See Refinancing Hearing, supra note 269, at 33V34.
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risk, stating that Ralthough arrangements like close-out netting would
contribute to reducing credit risks, actual execution may result in higher
volatility and thus greater market risk, despite the fact that risk management
efforts at individual institutions are completely rational.; 272 There is
unintended comedy in the observation that close-out netting arrangements
reduce risk except if and when they are actually implemented, presumably
together with collateral disposals. However, the observation should
charitably be understood as referencing the collective action problem:
close-out may be individually rational, yet prove systemically disastrous.
Against this background, one might naively think that the U.S.
regulatory response to LTCM would be to shrink bankruptcy immunities as
a bulwark against asset value contagion. In fact, the President7s Working
Group on Financial Markets turned the Fed7s understanding of the systemic
crisis precipitant on its head. It ignored the dynamic value-depressing role
of mass collateral liquidation, particularly in falling markets, and focused
exclusively on the static benefit of close-out netting to individuals operating
in stable markets. On that basis, it simply asserted that the Rability to
terminate most financial market contracts upon an event of default is central
to the effective management of market risk by financial market
participants.;273 This is the fallacy of composition writ large: the President7s
Working Group tells us that since it may be useful for a seated spectator
whose view of the game is obscured to stand up, it follows that all of the
spectators at the event would improve their view by simultaneously rising
from their seats. Even if close-out netting were individually risk reducing, it
does not follow, and is not the case, that it is systemically risk reducing.
That this fallacy makes an appearance in this context is doubly remarkable.
The extent, if any, to which industry lobbying played a role in standing on
its head the Fed7s understanding of the effects of close-out netting and
resulting collateral disposals, is a matter for historians of financial
regulation.274
Be that as it may, the recommendations of the President7s Working
Group were reflected in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Act of 2005 (BAPCA). Around the time that some of the lessons from the
LTCM crisis were being rehearsed by no less a figure than Alan Greenspan,

272. Report on Consolidation, supra note 18, at 167.
273. PRESIDENT7S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 178, at 19 (cited by Schwarcz &

Sharon, supra note 4, at 1732 n.93). The reader is referred to the Working Group7s threeparagraph hand-waving acknowledgement of, and nonresponse to, what this Article refers to as
the dynamic value-depressing role of mass collateral liquidation. Id. at 20V21.
274. As part of its international lobbying efforts, ISDA has stated that it Rassisted; the
President7s Working Group. See, e.g., Letter from Jacqueline Low, Co-Chair of ISDA7s AsiaPacific Legal & Regulatory Comm., Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Angela Papesch, Dir. of
Policy & Head of ISDA7s Asia-Pacific Office, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, respectively, to
Legal Affairs Senior Pub. Prosecutor, Ministry of Justice (Jan. 30, 2006).
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then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,275 the BAPCA wrought five
notable changes in the opposite direction.276 First, bankruptcy immunities
were extended to cover virtually the complete range of financial contracts,
and in addition, also included catch-all clauses for contracts Rsimilar to any
agreement or transaction referred to; or Rany other similar agreement.;277
Second, repos and reverse repos were explicitly covered, thus excluding
them from the risk of recharacterization as standard secured loans.278 Third,
margin loans were accorded immunity so long as they involved the
extension of credit for the purchase, sale, carrying, or trading of
securities. 279 Fourth, cross-product netting was allowed if covered by a
single master agreement. 280 Fifth, and relatedly, the full range of these
broadened immunities extended beyond financial institutions to Rfinancial
participants; and Rmaster netting agreement participants.; 281 The
cumulative effect, rationalized by reference to now-familiar systemic risk
considerations, was to provide virtually complete bankruptcy immunity to
close-out netting arrangements.282 ISDA once again proposed language and
provided other drafting support.283
The U.S. legislature was not yet done. In 2006, the systemic risk
rationale received one more outing, when the Financial Netting
Improvements Act further strengthened close-out netting immunities.284
At each stage of this process, interest groups persuaded legislatures and
some regulators to accept unjustified assertions about the necessity to
systemic stability of close-out netting immunitiesTsome, as in the LTCM
and LTCB cases, flying directly in the face of reasoned regulatory
judgments acknowledged at national and international levels. At each step,

275. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the Forty-first Annual
Conference on Bank Structure (May 5, 2005).
[W]hen counterparties hold very large net positions in illiquid markets, as the hedge
fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) did in 1998, the effectiveness of
collateral as a risk mitigant may be reduced significantly. In such circumstances, when
the nondefaulting counterparties seek to close out their positions with a defaulting
counterparty, those actions can cause market prices to move rapidly in directions that
may amplify losses to levels significantly exceeding even very conservative collateral
requirements.
Id. Remarkably, Greenspan had been a member of the President7s Working Group.
276. See generally Michael Krimminger, The Evolution of U.S. Insolvency Law for Financial
Market Contracts 15V18 (June 13, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=916345.
277. Id. at 16; 11 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(ii)(I)V(II) (2012).
278. 11 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(ii)(I).
279. Krimminger, supra note 276, at 17; 11 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(ii)(V).
280. Krimminger, supra note 276, at 18; 11 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(vii).
281. Krimminger, supra note 276, at 18; 11 U.S.C. § 553(o).
282. Schwarcz & Sharon, supra note 4, at 1735.
283. Id. at 1741.
284. See id. at 1736.
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the purported rationale was increasingly enlarged in scope and shorn of
qualification.
B. CROSS-BORDER CONTAGION
The international process by which the immunities expanded is similar.
Three further points should be noted here, using examples of ISDA
lobbying in Asia and from the process of formulation of Rbest practice;
guidance: (i) the use of the U.S. developments outlined above; 285 (ii)
international competitiveness considerations; and (iii) the raising of
informational and reputational costs.
Industry advocacy groups have repeatedly cited developments in the
United States in lobbying other governments for privileged treatment. In
terms of the path-dependence framework, the intention is to lock in the
advantages internationally that have been secured in one influential
jurisdiction. Often coupled with this is the reminder that regional
competitors are embarking to establish financial contract immunities, so
that failure to follow suit would harm the local economy. The result can be
seen as a deregulatory race to the bottom.
The first example is from Malaysia, where Bank Negara, the central
bank, had been proposing implementation of a moratorium on close-out
netting upon the appointment of a Rspecial administrator; or Rconservator;
for a distressed financial contract counterparty.286 Under the general law,
the moratorium could extend to twelve months. 287 Over a protracted
exchange between 2006 and 2010, ISDA sought to persuade the Malaysian
authorities away from this course.288 A July 2006 letter provides a taster:
citing the BAPCA amendments as a model and enclosing three pages of
legislative wording Rpurely for purposes of discussion,; ISDA sought a
complete immunity for the full rangeTtwenty-one categories both specific
and generalTof financial contracts.289
Malaysian authorities seemed persuaded that the U.S. experience
provided a model for them to consider. They turned not to the BAPCA,
however, but to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI). 290 Seeking to
adapt the FDI tools to local circumstances, the Malaysian Deposit Insurance
Corporation (the Corporation) proposed to reserve to itself the power to
285. See supra Part VII.A.
286. Letter from Jacqueline Low, Co-Chair of ISDA7s Asia-Pacific Legal & Regulatory

Comm., Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Angela Papesch, Dir. of Policy & Head of ISDA7s
Asia-Pacific Office, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, to Gopal Sundaram, Bank Negara Malay.
(July 13, 2006).
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. Id.
290. Letter from David Geen, European Gen. Counsel, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Bay
Way Yee, Asia Pacific Dir. of Policy, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, to Lim Yam Poh, Gen.
Counsel, Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malay. (Sept. 10, 2007).
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enforce or repudiate financial contracts within a reasonable time. 291 The
proposal was to reserve this power in resolution or bankruptcy proceedings
in relation both to depository institutions and to their nonbank, financial
institution counterparties. In a September 2007 letter to the Corporation,
ISDA objected to the latter on the basis that it was not justified by reference
to the protection of the deposit insurance scheme.292 ISDA also objected
that whereas the FDI process had come to be well understood and respected
in the U.S. market, the introduction of the proposed process Rinto a new,
untested, statutory regime [could] . . . foreseeably and understandably give
rise to concerns among ISDA members about how it is to be
implemented.;293 ISDA also warned that imposition of a reasonable time
requirement on close-out Rmight dissuade foreign counterparties from
entering into transactions.;294 The Malaysian authorities would have been
left in no doubt that new and untested regimes imported from foreign
jurisdictions are not all alike. Their resistance was progressively whittled
down over subsequent years.295
The Republic of Korea provides another example. Addressing the
Ministry of Justice in 2006, ISDA officeholders commended the country7s
forthcoming Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Law, which proposed to
implement certain immunities.296 They pointed out that ISDA had assisted
not only the U.S. Presidential Working Group, but also the central banks of
Malaysia, India, and China, in designing netting-protective legislative
provisions. 297 With its credentials thus established and regional trade
competitors referenced, ISDA cited the 2005 BAPCA expansions to request
similar all-inclusive coverage of similar types of contracts and
counterparties. 298 Otherwise, the letter noted that the Korean law would
soon be out of date, thus demanding legislative attention all over again.299 A
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
For a taste of the process, see, for example, Letter from Angela Papesch, Dir. of Policy &
Head of Sing. Office, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Jacqueline Low, Senior Counsel Asia,
Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, to Lim Yam Poh, Gen. Counsel, Perbadanan Insurans Deposit
Malay. (Aug. 7, 2008); Letter from Angela Papesch, Dir. of Policy & Head of Sing. Office, Int7l
Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Jacqueline Low, Senior Counsel Asia, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives
Ass7n, respectively, to Mohd Isa Hussain, Deputy Under Sec7y, Ministry of Fin. Malay. (Sept. 12,
2008); Letter from Keith Noyes, =UQ7L wO+f, Asia Pacific, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, &
Jacqueline Low, Senior Counsel Asia, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, respectively, to Lim Lee
Na & Lim Tai Ching, Perpadanan Insurans Deposit Malay. (July 30, 2010).
296. Letter from Jacqueline Low, Co-Chair of ISDA7s Asia-Pacific Legal & Regulatory
Comm., Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Angela Papesch, Dir. of Policy & Head of ISDA7s
Asia-Pacific Office, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, to Legal Affairs Senior Public Prosecutor,
Ministry of Justice, S. Kor. (Jan. 30, 2006).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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schedule attached to the letter marked up ISDA7s suggested wording on the
relevant provisions of the draft law.300 In September of the same year, ISDA
addressed the country7s bank supervision authority, noting that Singapore
and Hong Kong had provided capital relief following recognition of closeout netting, as had the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, and
offering assistance in designing similar treatment in Korea.301
These instances302 exhibit the same process of inciting this deregulatory
race to the bottom. Immunities are Rsilently; entrenched by global reach,
unremitting persistence, loudly proclaimed repeat-player status, claimed
technical expertiseTincluding, least plausibly, in the determinants of
systemic riskTand encompassing this all, brute financial power:
ISDA is a powerful association which represents the largest financial
institutions and their clients engaged in the derivatives market. . . . As well
as the lobbying power which it can exercise alongside its individual
members, ISDA uses its own expert power and that of the law firms which
it employs in different parts of the world. . . . It pressurizes governments to
establish a legislative basis for derivatives trading along the lines of the
ISDA Master Agreement and the Model Netting Act. Further it is
concerned that this should be put in place even if it is at the expense of
other actors in the system, as is most obvious in terms of bankruptcy rules
and regulations and the use of netting procedures. Other concerns about
derivatives such as their proximity to gambling, their contribution to
speculation and financial instability, their centrality to increasing levels of
inequality and reward between top earners in the financial sector and the
rest of the population, are swept aside as irrelevant to the basic technical
problem of how to ensure that the market works properly for its
participants. The agenda is set and potentially discomforting debates
placed at the margins of public discourse.303

Sub-Parts C and D directly examine the mechanisms by which these
socially critical, but for dominant financial market players, Rpotentially
discomforting; debates are marginalized.

300. Id.
301. Letter from Tricia Bowden, Chair of ISDA7s Asia-Pacific Legal & Regulatory Comm.,

Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Angela Papesch, Dir. of Policy & Head of ISDA7s AsiaPacific Office, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, to Kim Jong Min, Mgmt. Guidance Team, Bank
Supervision Dep7t of Fin. Supervisory Serv., S. Kor. (Sept. 15, 2006).
302. There have been several other such instances. See, e.g., Hong Kong and Israel. Letter from
Keith Notes, =UQ7L wO+f Asia Pacific, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, & Jing Gu, Assistant Gen.
Counsel Asia, Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, to The Hong Kong Fin. Servs. & Treasury Bureau
(Jan. 27, 2010); Letter from Peter M. Werner, Policy Dir., Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n, to
Davida Lachman-Messer, Deputy Attorney-Gen., Ministry of Justice, Isr. (July 28, 2005).
303. Glenn Morgan, Market Formation and Governance in International Financial Markets:
The Case of OTC Derivatives, 61 HUMAN RELATIONS 637, 656 (2008).
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C. INFORMATIONAL BURDENS
We have noted that the U.S. President7s Working Group, which
reported on the lessons from the LTCM crisis, overturned the actual basis
on which the Fed felt compelled to intervene. The report also failed to
address views challenging bankruptcy immunities, including those from the
National Bankruptcy Conference. 304 Indeed, there was not even
acknowledgement of the existence of such views. This pattern of exclusion
of alternative views repeats in the formulation of international best practice
standards. Consider two relevant instruments: UNCITRAL7s Guide and the
UNIDROIT Netting Principles.
UNCITRAL7s Guide provides detailed guidance on the creation of a
domestic bankruptcy regime. Its RCommentary; sections list the varying
approaches to each issue that legislators must resolve. The Guide engages
in a painstaking analysis of these approaches, weighing up the pros and
cons. Then, in its RRecommendations; sections, the Guide identifies the
approach supported by the weightiest reasons, all things considered. This is
true even in relation to such paradigmatic bankruptcy institutions as the
moratorium and the avoidance mechanisms. 305 The sole exception to this
reasoned approach in its hundreds of pages is the section on RFinancial
contracts and netting.; 306 In four brief pages, the Guide lists, without
analysis, the alleged systemic risk-reduction justifications routinely
proffered on behalf of bankruptcy immunities before proceeding to
recommend the most widely conceived immunities reminiscent of those
introduced by the BAPCA.307 While the Guide mentions a couple of minor
variants for entrenching immunities, no alternatives to the immunities
themselves are considered, and there is no identification of any costs
associated with them. The reader is left with the impression that, uniquely
amongst all of the myriad issues requiring resolution in the design of a
bankruptcy regime, there is no downside to implementing the widest
financial contract immunities. It is also here that we encounter the sole
Recommendation in the Guide lacking any explanation whatsoever in the
preceding Commentary. 308 This neatly symbolizes the tendency of the
immunities to outstrip whatever justifications are proffered for them.
304. Schwarcz & Sharon, supra note 4, at 1735V36, 1740.
305. See LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 76, at 83V103 (carefully charting the nuances of

various aspects of the moratorium, on its application in liquidation and reorganization, on the
extent to which it should apply to unsecured and secured creditors, and on how it might be lifted).
Mutatis mutandis on avoidance. Id. at 135. Similarly, the discussion on avoidance provisions
highlights the potential costs for contractual predictability and certainty, as well as the need to
strike a balance between the interests of the estate and those of counterparties. Id. at 135V55.
306. Id. at 156V59.
307. See id.
308. Recommendation 103 requires the solvent counterparty, in the wake of close-out netting,
to be given the power to liquidate its collateral. See id. at 159 and accompanying commentary at
156V58. I owe this point to Monica Marcucci.
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While UNCITRAL drafted the Guide prior to the 2007V2009 crisis,
UNIDROIT7s Netting Principles appeared well after it. By this time,
regulators were allowing themselves to rediscover that, in distress
scenarios, the risk of asset value contagion means close-out netting and
collateral disposal can do more systemic harm than good.309 Accordingly,
the FSB, while requiring respect for close-out netting rights, recommended
that they be subject to a brief stay to facilitate orderly resolution of
distressed systemically important financial institutions. 310 UNIDROIT7s
Netting Principles delicately note this Remerging international regulatory
consensus; about asset value contagion311 and make space for the sort of
brief stay the FSB requires.312 This, however, is the sole concession to the
possibility that close-out netting might have any costs whatsoever, and even
here, the document appears oblivious to the actual mechanics of asset value
contagion as identified by Fisher, 313 the Fed, 314 Greenspan, 315 and the G10. 316 It states that R[i]n deteriorating market conditions, the ability to
terminate contracts and thus to limit exposures is important in guarding
against the situation where the failure by one of the parties to perform its
obligations causes its counterparty likewise to become unable to perform its
obligations vis-à-vis third parties.;317 If the objective is to reduce systemic
risk, Rdeteriorating market conditions; present just about the worst
circumstances in which to allow unimpeded close-out netting and
consequent asset disposals. The positions taken in the document closely
resemble the derivatives industry7s perspective, and it is difficult to
distinguish most of them substantively from those championed in that
industry7s advocacy documents.318 That immunities mitigate systemic risk
is asserted or assumed no fewer than twelve times on ten of the document7s
sixty-seven pages. 319 The document stipulates a level of what it calls
Rminimum harmonization,; under which close-out netting provisions in a
very wide range of contract types are exempted from the normal operation
309. See BASEL REPORT, supra note 252, para 115.
310. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 253, 3.2(xi), 4.1V4.4, I-Annex 5.
311. The document refers to Rsome concern; amongst regulators about the costs of close-out

netting and claim that Rregulatory authorities have contemplated the need for a brief stay . . . in
certain situations.; UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 3V5. In fact, as noted, the
regulators7 rediscovery of the asset value contagion mechanism goes beyond an abstract
Rconcern,; and accordingly, the FSB Key Attributes do a little bit more than merely
Rcontemplating; a brief stay on close-out netting. Id.
312. Id. princ. 8, at 63.
313. Fisher, supra note 36, at 341V42, 344.
314. Refinancing Hearing, supra note 269, at 33V34.
315. See generally Greenspan, supra note 275.
316. Report on Consolidation, supra note 18, at 167.
317. UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 28.
318. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Int7l Swaps & Derivatives Ass7n on the Implementation
of Netting Legislation: A Guide for Legislators and Other Policy-Makers (Mar. 2006),
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/MjM4NQ==/Memo-Model-Netting-Act.pdf.
319. UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 3, 9, 20, 22V24, 28, 30, 37V38, 52.
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of bankruptcy and bank resolution laws, so long as one of the parties is an
authorized financial market participant or a public authority, and the other is
not a natural person acting primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes.320 The document emphasizes that there is no Rmaximum scope of
harmonisation,; and national authorities are repeatedly remindedTno fewer
than fourteen timesTof their right to extend the scope of the immunities
even further. 321 Again, and apart from the FSB-mandated exception, a
reader of the document would likely conclude that, uniquely amongst legal
phenomena, unhindered close-out netting has no costs, just benefits. The
impression is of an advertisement telling you to buy stocks if you want to
get rich, and repeatedly reminding you that you can always buy even more
stocks, presumably in case you wished to get even richer.
The reader must not think that those drafting the UNIDROIT Netting
Principles were simply unaware of the extensive regulatory and scholarly
literature on the costs of close-out netting. It appears that members of the
study group who undertook the groundwork and prepared the first iterations
of the document drew attention to material exploring those costs, but were
unable to surmount the informational barriers to bringing these critical
considerations to bear on the drafting process. The chairman of the
UNIDROIT study group has lamented that Rpreparatory studies, and the
final explanatory memorandum accompanying the UNIDROIT Draft
Principles . . . submitted to Member States did not contain a single
reference to critical legal and economic studies of netting superpriorities,
despite specific requests made during the works of the Study Group.;322
This is consistent with the RSelect Bibliography; made available on
UNIDROIT7s website in relation to its netting document.323 Only six items
are listed from just five authors, one of whom is an ISDA officeholder
explicitly providing RISDA7s perspective.;324 The criteria for the selection
of these particular items are as mysterious as those for all of the exclusions.
D. REPUTATIONAL COSTS
Reputational costs arise when those seeking to highlight the downsides
of existing trends and/or to chart alternative possibilities are stigmatized as
naive, isolated, out of touch, or simply outnumbered. This results in a
Rremarkably one sided; debate, 325 which fails to draw policymakers7
attention to the downside of the path-dependent process. Here are two
320. Id. princs. 3V4.
321. Id. at 6, 9V10, 21, 22, 23, 25V26, 28, 33V37.
322. <)s1O*3sp <03)n*OB*MOh The Importance of the Principles of Equality of the EU Member

States and Economic Actors in EU Law, 1 ELTE L.J. 73, 95V96 n.86 (2014).
323. Netting: Select Bibliography, INT7L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
http://www.unidroit.org/netting-select-bibliography-e (last updated Oct. 14, 2014).
324. See id.
325. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 57.
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examples. First, The Importance of Close-Out Netting, published on behalf
of ISDA, is a modern classic of the reputational cost imposition genre. It
refers to a Rhandful of academics and bankruptcy lawyers in the United
States,; none of whom it names or cites.326 This mere handful of unnamed
antagonists is painted as making excessive demands such as that the
financial contract immunities should be abolished327Tso that counterparties
would play by the rules applicable to everyone else. In doing so, this minute
group is doing no less than threatening to put its country in conflict with the
Rcross-border convergence of the treatment of derivatives in insolvency.;328
The document portrays advocates of alternative ways of treating financial
contracts as out of line with regulatory recommendations and at odds with
Rwidespread acknowledgement by policy makers of the contribution of
netting to financial stability.;329
The second example of reputational costs takes us back to the
UNIDROIT Netting Principles7 drafting process. The Chairman of the
UNIDROIT netting study group records that he eventually prevailed upon
UNIDROIT7s Governing Council to recommend Rthat [his] critical
observations be included in the material submitted to UNIDROIT Member
States.; 330 This Article has drawn attention to some of the extensive
finance, economics, and legal literature that has amassed over decades, as
well as to regulatory pronouncement, such as those from the Fed
responding to LTCM or from the central bankers and finance ministry
mandarins of the G-10 surveying international systemic risk. Material such
as this would have cast a more balanced light on financial contract
immunities. Evidently, none of it made the grade. Instead, all that member
governments apparently received from the study group were seemingly
dissenting remarks from oneTalbeit importantTmember. Busy national
policymakers looking at the official document alongside these remarks may
be forgiven for wrongly regarding the latter as one lonely, aberrant view.331
This isTno doubt a minute fraction ofTthe background against which
we should seek to understand Rsilent; expansions of financial contract
immunities.
E. THE COSTS OF CROSS-BORDER INTEGRATION
Increasing international financial integration has often brought with it
financial deepening, opportunities for risk sharing, competition, and wealth.
It has also created new channels for the transmission of systemic risk. The
most extensive study to date of systemic crises charts the dramatic rise in
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See Mengle, supra note 131, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
<03)n*OB*MOh supra note 322, at 96 n.86.
Notwithstanding the view7s merits or the learning in which it was rooted. See id.
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the number of banking crises associated with higher cross-border capital
mobility and notes that R[p]eriods of high international capital mobility
have repeatedly produced international banking crises, not only famously,
as they did in the 1990s, but historically.; 332 The 2007V2009 crisis provides
a vivid illustration of new vulnerabilities and cross-border risk transmission
channels enabled by financial integration.
Consider the new vulnerabilities. Financial innovation opens up new
possibilities for risk sharing, but the way risk is shared is not always
desirable. This became particularly salient as the crisis broke, prompting a
distinguished commentator to observe that R[t]he proposition that
sophisticated modern finance was able to transfer risk to those best able to
manage it has failed. The paradigm is, instead, that risk has been transferred
to those least able to understand it.;333 A particularly acidulous example
relates to regional German banks, West LB and Industriekreditbank, whose
much-mocked gullibility about AAA-rated U.S. mortgage-backed securities
brought them to the brink of ruin and cost European taxpayers billions.334
Consider also new cross-border risk transmission channels. The crisis
spilt over so rapidly from the United States because foreign institutions held
U.S.-originated mortgage-backed securities and similar instruments. In the
first phase of the crisis, which started in the first quarter of 2007 with a
sharp rise in subprime mortgage delinquency, a collapse in the market for
such securities spread losses across borders by directly hitting the balance
sheets of non-U.S., particularly European, holders. Housing markets,
particularly in Western Europe, started to feel the wake-up call effect, as
investors generalized from the U.S. subprime crisis. The crisis7s second
phase, in the third quarter of 2007, began to hit non-U.S. markets through
asset value contagion, and through common lender effects as financial
institutions starting to take account of U.S. losses began to retrench
elsewhere. Uncertainty intensified about the viability of financial
institutions principally active in the higher-risk derivatives markets. The
third phase, which commenced with the Lehman Brothers collapse in
September 2008, gave rise to concerns about banks7 excessive leverages.
Another wave of asset value contagion spread and several of the other
channels and amplifiers discussed above became active.335
332. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 22, at 155 (emphasis omitted).
333. Martin Wolf, Seeds of its Own Destruction, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2009),

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6c5bd36-0c0c-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3rzyJAOD1.
334. RWhenever we7d ask . . . who was buying this crap,; relates a protagonist in Michael
Lewis7s excellent account of the run-up to the 2007V2009 crisis, Rthe answer was always,
Düsseldorf . . . Stupid Germans. They take rating agencies seriously. They believe in the rules.;
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 67, 93 (2011). See also
ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS7 NEW CLOTHES: WHAT7S WRONG WITH
BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 259 n.29 (2013).
335. This discussion draws on two works co-authored by Stijn Claessens. See Claessens et al.,
Lessons, supra note 18, at 8V9, 11V13; Claessens et al., Cross-Country, supra note 22, at 287.
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Note also the observation that R[e]merging marketsTespecially those
who had heavily relied on external financing, and paradoxically those with
more liquid marketsTwere affected through capital account and bank
funding pressures.;336 When international regulatory borders are lowered,
froth is amongst the systemic crisis contributories to travel across.
The point, to reiterate, is that cross-border financial integration has
considerable costs, in this case represented by a global financial crisis
whose Rspread was unprecedented in scope and ferocity,;337 and the fallout
from which dogs the world economy to date. It is important to acknowledge
these costs alongside the benefits. 338 What is more, the harmonization
toward financial contract immunities is a particularly troubling component
of global financial integration because, as argued in this Article, while the
immunities have numerous social costs, they are unlike several other
aspects of the integration process in having fairly limited compensating
social benefits.
VIII. THE BANKRUPTCY TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL
CONTRACTS
We should not conclude that all financial contracts should always
receive treatment identical to that accorded to other types of transactions. It
is not unfair to other stakeholders and may sometimes be welfare-enhancing
if bankruptcy law recognizes the peculiarities of financial contracts. The
literature has started to explore how bankruptcy laws could be designed to
preserve the socially valuable features of the operation of financial contracts
while mitigating some of the costs associated with expansive bankruptcy
immunities.339 The basic contours of such a fine-tuned legislative response
may now be regarded as reasonably clear, and the following draws on and
develops it. First, though, two bits of ground-clearing are called for.
A. SHOULD BANKRUPTCY !LAW" SEEK TO !REGULATE" SYSTEMIC
RISK?
Immunity enthusiasts often suggest that bankruptcy law is too blunt an
instrument to deploy in relation to financial contracts, whose treatment
should instead be left to regulation. While the justification for this position
336. Claessens et al., Lessons, supra note 18, at 8 (emphasis added).
337. Id. at 11.
338. Two good explorations of such costs are undertaken by Viral Acharya and Philipp

Schnabl, and Nicola Cetorelli and Linda Goldberg. See generally Viral V. Acharya & Philipp
Schnabl, Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During
the Financial Crisis of 2007M09, 58 IMF ECON. REV. 37 (2010); Nicola Cetorelli & Linda S.
Goldberg, Global Banks and International Shock Transmission: Evidence from the Crisis, 59 IMF
ECON. REV. HK lJdKKkf b0+ s +UQ(Ls)0+n -U+*-UY)O'Uh *UU !X(+qh supra note 11.
339. For illuminating contributions, see Lubben, Safe Harbors, supra note 4; Roe, supra note 4;
Edward J. Janger & John A.E. Pottow, Implementing Symmetric Treatment of Financial Contracts
in Bankruptcy and Bank Resolution, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 155 (2015).
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is difficult to discern, it may be gathered as lying in the special nature of
systemic risk mitigation, of financial market participants, and/or of financial
instruments:
Insolvency law should not be concerned with attempting to mitigate
systemic risk in the market: despite its obvious influence on managerial
decisions it is too bold a concept and not suitable for controlling the
behaviour of financial institutions. . . . It would not be possible to achieve .
. . well-calibrated solutions . . . by abolishing or restricting safe harbour
regimesTsuch an approach would be too bold and the resulting legal
uncertainty would paralyse the market as nobody could rely on
enforceability of contractual risk mitigation.340

This position is untenable. First, importantly, recall that systemic risk
does not arise from the failure of most firms, which means no immunities
are justified in relation to them; and systemic risk is associated with the
failure of large firms in ways that require curtailment of the immunities.341
The argument just quoted thus does not even get off the ground.
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that bankruptcy law should
not attempt to mitigate systemic risk, it does not follow that it should be
designed to furiously add to it in the countless ways that it does with the
immunities in place. Immunities encourage systemic opacity, frothy
markets, declining lending standards, the funding of negative value
projects, exponentiation of leverage, and procyclical reductions in capital
buffers and collateral.342 This is hugely corrosive to systemic stability. The
disapplication of standard bankruptcy moratoria and avoidance or clawback mechanisms enable an asset seizure and disposal frenzy by immune
creditors. This is harmful not merely to the bankruptcy estate and its
stakeholders, but also amplifies systemic stress through asset value
contagion. 343 It is unclear why Rlaw; should be deformed in ways that
demonstrably worsen systemic risk, making the task of Rregulation; that
much harder.
Consider, thirdly, the division assumed in this argument between Rlaw,;
which should not address systemic risk, and Rregulation,; which should.344
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Paech, supra note 5, at 6, 25.
See supra Part VI.
See supra Parts I, IV, V.
See supra Parts I, II, VI, VII.
Paech, whose version of this argument is explored here, correctly notes that the distinction
between financial Rlaw; and financial Rregulation; is Rnot very clear and in parts nonsensical.;
Paech, supra note 5, at 4 n.18. Unfortunately, he adopts the distinction nevertheless, explaining
that, in this context, Rlaw; addresses Rhorizontal rights between, in particular, creditors and
debtors or owners and non-owners,; whereas Rregulation; addresses Rthe state-to-market
relationship, mainly working on the basis of orders, prohibitions and sanctions for noncompliance.; Id. He then quickly proceeds to demonstrate the incoherence of the distinction by
giving as examples of financial regulation derivatives clearing (which, for example, at least
appears to concern horizontal rights and obligations between buyers, intermediaries, and sellers),
bank compensation practices (which govern horizontal employer/employee relationships), bank
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Take the exampleTcentral to many discussions of systemic riskTof Rtoobig-to-fail; financial institutions, which add to such risk in part because
they lack market discipline and are able to wallow in moral hazard.345 The
panoply of legislative and regulatory responses includes requiring
systemically significant institutions to plan their own orderly demise
through Rliving wills,; and by providing for effective recovery and
resolution processes. 346 It would be a curious classification system that
labeled enterprise bankruptcy law as Rlaw; and bank bankruptcy lawT
deploying many of the same tools, including enforcement moratoria, with a
view to achieving, inter alia, the same proximate objectives of value
preservation and distributionTas Rregulation.; It would be a curious theory
that condoned the latter as a finely honed response to systemic risk while
condemning the former as excessively bold, broad, brash, or brazen.
Fourth, systemic risk is not a unitary whole, to be dealt with once and
for all with either one unit of state responseTlabeled Rregulation;Tor
multiple units of the same type of response. Instead, as explored in Parts I
and IV to VII, systemic risk emerges as a result of the interaction of a
multitude of factors and mechanisms of various levels of interdependence.
Addressing it requires a similarly multifactorial response. To the extent that
systemic vulnerability results from procyclical marked-to-market
accounting approaches, the response lies in re-examining accounting
principles. Where the source is perverse remuneration incentives of
financial sector decision makers, it is the various determinants of
remuneration policies, including freedom of contract within the
employment context, and corporate governance in financial institutions that
come under the microscope. 347 The lender of last resort and deposit
guarantee schemes may need sharpening in the face of various types of
information contagion. Where the problem is destabilizing cross-border
capital flows, capital controls may be contemplated. Where bubbles are
getting to dangerous levels, there might be roles, sometimes controversial,
for monetary or fiscal policy or both.
Of course, if declining lending standards are a concern, or if inter-party
information flows ought to be stimulated, or if asset value contagion is
accepted as a key amplifier, etc., then bankruptcy law has critical roles to
play. Bankruptcy law7s preservation mechanisms, notably the moratorium
on close-out and asset disposals, and the ability to avoid eve-of-bankruptcy
resolution (considered in the text), and bank capital requirements (which particularly obviously
collapse the vertical/horizontal distinction in having the State Rvertically; (re)constitute the
Rhorizontal; bank/residual owner relationship). Id. at 5 n.19.
345. See generally Richard J. Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, Complexity and Systemic Risk:
What1s Changed Since the Crisis?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 77 (Allen N.
Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson eds., 2d ed. 2015).
346. See id.
347. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers1 Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. 247 (2009).
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asset disposals, have no easy substitute. This is a fortiori in relation to
distributive (i.e., fairness-based) concerns about the normatively defensible
allocation of bankruptcy loss, where the various priorities regimes are the
primary, and often the only, game in town.
This leads to the fifth, somewhat related point about the calibration of
the response to systemic risk. Ideally, the response would be perfectly statecontingent, targeting precisely the right behavior of the right addressees to
the right degree at the right point in time. In general, regulations such as
liquidity and capital requirements have been both relatively blunt since they
are less sensitive to the party7s activities and, often, even procyclical and
hence counterproductive.348 By contrast, bankruptcy nonimmunity is statecontingent, in principle (though, of course, imperfectly) responsive to the
level of counterparty risk involved in each of the projects undertaken by
each market participant. Its effects are thus likely to be better calibrated
compared to many blunter regulatory tools.349
B. IS SPECIAL TREATMENT MERITED BECAUSE OF VOLATILITY OR
UNCERTAINTY?
Derivatives contracts can present either, or both, of two types of risk
not commonly found in other transactions. Take these in turn.
First, any secured creditor is subject to the risk both that its debtor will
default and that its collateral will not have sufficient value to repay it.
Derivative transactions have an additional element of risk: movements in
the value of the reference asset. Consider a GBP/YEN currency rate swap
between G and Y in which G is currently in the money. G holds collateral
intended to cover its exposure to Y. G is subject to counterparty credit and
collateral value risks, just like any other secured creditor. However, G is
also at risk in the case that YEN loses ground against GBP, thus increasing
G7s exposure to Y. This third risk is conceptually distinct 350 from the
previous two, and G must manage it on an ongoing basis.
Second, consider S, a solvent fully hedged entity whose counterparty B
is now bankrupt. Absent immunity to close out its position, whether S
remained hedged would become uncertain. S remains exposed to this
uncertainty while B7s bankruptcy administrator considers whether to affirm
or reject the hedge. Additionally, depending on market movements, S might
be exposed to loss whether the contract is eventually adopted or disclaimed.
Were S to buy a rehedge with another solvent counterparty, it would

348. See, e.g., Krishnamurthy, supra note 49, at 13V14.
349. However, note that ongoing regulatory efforts seek to make capital and margining

requirements, among others, less procyclical.
350. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 64V65, 65 n.26. If netting arrangements are in play
between G and Y, the risk and volatility are likely to be heightened. See discussion supra Part
V.B.
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become exposed to an unhedged risk under its contract with B, which
would materialize if the market moved in B7s favor.351
These peculiar features of financial contracts, considered in and of
themselves, do not justify according them special bankruptcy treatment.352
The examples of G and S simply highlight the peculiar costs of the
particular structures of the G/Y and S/B transactions. The mere existence of
these costs provides no reason for shifting them through bankruptcy
immunities to Y/B7s other creditors,353 nor in the process for destroying any
going-concern surplus in Y/B7s estates.354
This simple point addresses such a widespread fallacy that it may be
worth hammering home. While Y and B are solvent, their decision
makersTacting on their equity-holders7, or frequently, predominantly their
own behalvesThave perverse incentives to enter into too many such
contracts, since the upside benefits from doing so accrue fully to them while
the downside costs are shared with the entities7 creditors and other
stakeholders. This is another way of saying that Y/B7s decision makers
have incentives to create negative externalities. As with any such
externality, presumptively, the legal and regulatory environment should
seek to force internalization by the solvent entities and their decision
makers of the full costs of the transactions.355 These high-reward/high-cost
transactions should be entered into only if and to the extent that they are
viable without loading significant costs (i.e., harms) on those unable to
respond. The response certainly must not be bankruptcy immunities for
such transactions, since these would only further facilitate the shifting of
costs away from the decision makers and their firm7s equity-holders, and
thus, incentivize ever-greater volumes of such negative net value
transactions.
The analysis might have been different if such transactions could be
shown to create social benefits (i.e., positive externalities). Social benefits
might justify proportionate socialization of costs. Externalization might also
have been justified if not permitting so would itself create even greater
negative externalities. The argument that financial contract immunities
exponentiate liquidity can be understood as suggesting social benefits from
flourishing financial markets, whereas the argument that not immunizing
351. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 65.
352. The UNIDROIT Netting Principles offer this as one of three justifications for the

immunities. UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 27.
353. RDerivatives counterparties to a failed hedge . . . may not be paid if the derivatives settle in
their favor, but this is no different than a company defaulting on its obligations to derivatives
counterparties, which again is addressed as a regulatory matter through bankruptcy law.;
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 270, at 203.
354. The immunities Rprefer one set of creditors over others, and they reduce the debtor7s
available cash, thereby limiting or eliminating the possibility for successful reorganization or
going concern sale.; Janger, Mokal & Phelan, supra note 105, at 3. See also supra Part I.A.
355. The recent expansion of initial margining requirements, explained supra, are an example
of the regulatory bid to force internalization of negative externalities.
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financial contracts creates systemic risk gestures at negative externalities.
Both of these arguments were considered above and found wanting.
Let us now turn to those peculiarities of financial contracts which
bankruptcy law ought to respect.
C. VALIDITY OF VARIATION MARGINING
As noted in Part III, the out-of-money party in a derivatives transaction
characteristically has an obligation to post additional collateral to reflect
additional losses resulting from market movements. This Rrepresents the
settlement of the running profit/loss of a derivative,; 356 and should be
conceptualized as analogous to an increase in a standard secured obligation
that thus bites deeper into the value of the collateral. Variation margining
reduces systemic risk compared to bare netting by countering the latter7s
exposure exponentiation tendencies.357 That consideration apart, it is neutral
in regard to systemic risk, since permitting the asset transfer merely shifts
risk from the transferee to the transferor without reducing it.
Contrast this situation with one in which parties agree to post variation
margin triggered by the circumstances, particularly the creditworthiness, of
the obligated counterparty. Analytically, this requirement to post collateral
is an attempt to improve the position of the beneficiary-counterparty
compared to what it would have been in the absence of the additional
collateral. The improvement comes in relation to all other creditors who
suffer at least as badly from the deterioration in their contracting party7s
creditworthiness as does the financial contract counterparty. This is a
classic case of avoidable preference and there is little reason to require
bankruptcy law to accord better treatment to the financial contract
counterparty than to all other types of creditors.358
D. ASSUMPTION, ASSIGNMENT, OR DISCLAIMER
A preliminary consideration here relates to whether retention of the
benefit of financial contracts is essential to the ability of the distressed firm
to successfully reorganize, or to maximize the value of the distressed
business upon sale.359 Financial contracts are neither like essential bits of
machinery that the distressed firm needs in order to continue operating, nor
like the expertise of skilled employees uniquely proficient in the firm7s
business activities. It may be thought that they do not need to be retained as
part of the bankruptcy estate in order to maximize the estate7s value. This
argument requires qualification. For nonfinancial firms, financial contracts
may be critical. Consider a fuel hedge held by an airline undergoing
356.
357.
358.
359.

BCBS & IOSCO, MARGIN REQUIREMENTS, supra note 122, at 9.
See supra Part V.
See Roe, supra note 4, at 573V75.
See, for example, Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 4, at 60, for the suggestion that it is not.
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bankruptcy proceedings.360 Under plausible assumptions, the hedge would
have significant firm-specific value, might create considerable synergetic
value in the bankrupt estate, and might indeed be decisive in determining
the success or failure of the restructuring effort. For nonfinancial end users
of such hedges and similar financial contracts, the argument for firm
nonspecificity clearly does not hold. Turning to financial firms, the
argument is again dubious in its generality. The going concern value of
financial firms might well be constituted in significant part by financial
contracts. Whether financial contracts are part of a distressed firm7s going
concern depends on the facts. The same is true of most other categories of
assets.
International best practice entitles the bankrupt to require performance
from standard contractual counterparties, notwithstanding any ipso facto
clauses in the relevant agreement. Recall that the solvent counterparty is not
obligated to perform so long as it is able and willing to pay the usual
expectation measure of damages. What it cannot do is rely on an ipso facto
clause to deprive the bankrupt both of performance and appropriate
damages. The bankrupt is symmetrically bound. It can either affirm an
executory contract and perform it in full, or disclaim it and be bound to pay
expectation damages. The asymmetry, economic rather than legal, is that
the solvent counterparty must pay up in full if it breaches the contract, but is
only restricted to a bankruptcy dividend if it is the bankrupt who
breaches.361 There does not seem to be much justification for privileging
financial contract counterparties in this regard.
What financial counterparties may legitimately require is that the
bankrupt counterparty7s decision as to affirmation or disclaimer be made in
a reasonably short period of time, so as not to expose the solvent
counterparty either to inappropriate uncertainty or excessive loss. By way
of analogy, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court requires the bankrupt to decide
within 120 days whether to affirm or disclaim a commercial lease.362 In the
context of the resolution of financial institutions, as noted, international best
practice has moved toward according the resolution authority one or two
trading days to make the decision, or in the event of the failure to do so, to
entitle the counterparty to terminate. 363 Scholarly analyses of valuepreserving resolution of systemically important financial institutions7
financial contract portfolios suggest that a somewhat longer period, of ten
360. See Lubben, Safe Harbors, supra note 4.
361. Id. at 130. Lubben provides a comprehensive and cogent response to the Rcherry picking;

argument invoked almost ritualistically by immunity enthusiasts. The argument is found, for
example, in UNIDROIT NETTING PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, princ. 7(1)(b); Mengle, supra note
131, at 5; Paech, supra note 5, at 9, 26.
362. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) (2012). See generally Skeel & Jackson, supra note 4.
363. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES, supra note 253, at 10, 51; EU Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive, supra note 179, art. 71; WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra
note 76, at 21.
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to twenty days, may be necessary. 364 If the bankrupt7s decision makers
conclude that some of the portfolio of contracts should be assigned, they
should be permitted to split the contracts along product lines (i.e., by
grouping together interest rate or foreign exchange swaps, respectively).365
Consider distressed nonfinancial debtors, and any financial ones who
are outwith the ambit of special resolution regimes. Three factors are worth
bearing in mind. First, subjecting the financial contract counterparties of
such entities to a stay simply cannot precipitate a systemic domino-like
crisis. 366 It follows that there is no systemic justification for financial
contract special treatment. Second, the debtor and its stakeholders as a
group have legitimate interests, based in both welfare and fairness
considerations, in seeking a value-maximizing treatment of the estate, 367
which may require retention of some financial contracts. Third, financial
contract counterparties also have legitimate interests in limiting their
exposure to the peculiar volatility and uncertainty of such contracts.
Together, these considerations justify a reasonably brief moratorium on
close-out netting and associated asset disposals. A period of ten to twenty
days seems an appropriate starting point for consideration. The solvent
counterparty should also be entitled to expect a cure of any substantive
default on the contract, and to reasonable assurances in the case of either
assignment or assumption.368
E. RECHARACTERIZATION
Recall, finally, the problem created by the harmful arbitrage
opportunities from differential bankruptcy treatment of secured and repo
claims and the ability of parties to disguise what are in fact secured
transactions as repos.369 This is particularly problematic when, as discussed,
the result is to weaken, in a systemically harmful way, the monitoring and
exposure-reduction incentives of lenders, and the credit structurestrengthening incentives of borrowers. One way of discouraging such
disguised transactions is for bankruptcy law to treat as repos only those
transactions that extend to a fairly short period of time, say, no longer than
thirty or perhaps sixty days.370 A Rrepo; that de facto extended beyond such
a period through being rolled over would carry the risk of being
recharacterized as a Rstandard; secured loan in bankruptcy proceedings,371
including as to the requirement for public recordation, as well as the length
364. Mark J. Roe and Stephen Adams suggest a ten-day period, with a possible extension for
another ten days by court order. See Roe & Adams, supra note 180.
365. Id.
366. See supra Part VI.
367. See supra Part II.
368. For a sophisticated working out of the details, see Janger & Pottow, supra note 339.
369. See supra Part IV.
370. Lubben, Safe Harbors, supra note 4, at 143.
371. See id. at 142V43.
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of time available to the estate to decide what to do with the collateral. The
real bite of this proposal, however, lies in the way the exposure under a
recharacterized transaction would affect the party7s regulatory capital
requirements, which is beyond the scope of bankruptcy law.
CONCLUSION
Close-out netting lies at the heart of the financial contract bankruptcy
immunities, and the special treatment it enjoys is the epitome of the
defective microprudential understanding of systemic risk. The regulatory
emphasis on it as a risk mitigant is premised on four assumptions in
particular. These are that market participants7 behavior is not adversely
affected by close-out netting immunities; that their behavior in turn does not
adversely affect systemic risk; that systemic crises occur when the default
of one market participant causes similar defaults by its counterparties; and
that incipient systemic crises are stemmed by enabling solvent
counterparties to seal themselves off from the insolvent entity.
This Article has drawn attention to the manifest invalidity of each of
these assumptions. Bankruptcy immune counterparties tend to lean toward
excessive leverage, excessively concentrated exposures to each other,
ignorance of each other7s fundamentals, and involvement in negative net
value projects funded only because some of the downside costs can be
passed on to others unable to respond. In the economic upswing,
immunities contribute to credit booms, asset price bubbles, intensified
correlations, capital buffer shrinkages, and collateral underutilization. These
behaviors constitute significant systemic vulnerabilities, adding to the
system7s fragility. When the economic cycle turns, bubbles burst, credit
dries up, and the volatility resulting from netting suddenly causes capital
and collateral requirements to explode. Contagion occurs not because of the
falling of dominosTevidence unambiguously shows that not even the
largest financial institution is significant enough in itself to set that offTbut
as undercapitalized and overleveraged financial institutions engage,
unimpeded by bankruptcy moratoria, in deleveraging through close-out and
fire sales. Asset value contagion spreads. Mutually ignorant counterparties
find themselves holding too little collateral that in any case is falling in
value. No longer able to rely on ever-expanding mutual exposures as the
alternative, netting-based risk Rmitigant,; they suddenly become
resensitized to each other7s fundamentals. Not possessing sufficient
information about each other, their rational strategy is to stop lending while
they gather that information. Liquidity evaporates and markets freeze.
Financial contract immunities, introduced to stem phantom domino risk,
end up contributing to systemically corrosive behavior and to real
contagion.
The excessive credit and leverage resulting in boom times from the
immunities do not constitute liquidity, contrary to recent assertions in the
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literature, but rather froth. By enabling the downside costs of negative net
value projects to be passed on to others, bankruptcy immunity contributes
to soaring divergences between market prices and fundamental values. This
is a primary mechanism for the inflation of bubbles, which in turn is a
primary mechanism for worsening correlations as lenders rush in for a piece
of the action. Froth, however, is inherently fragile. It is there in upswings,
but gone as soon as the economy begins to deteriorate. What goes up in a
bubble is doomed to come down with a crash. This fair-weather Rliquidity,;
which both results from and causes the hollowing out of institutions and
systems alike, is no defense for the immunities.
Regulatory authorities have rediscovered some of these truths. They
have found that their focus on net rather than gross exposures has left them
under-informed about the true vulnerabilities of institutions and markets.
They have responded by withdrawing some of their indulgence toward
netting, such as in relation to the provision of margins to cover OTC
derivatives positions. To stave off asset value contagion, they have required
brief moratoria on close-out netting and asset disposals. On this front,
however, policymakers still have not taken in the full implications of the
global financial crisis of 2007V2009. They have not yet acknowledged that
while close-out netting immunities are counterproductive in relation to large
financial institutions, they are utterly ungrounded when applied to most
financial and nonfinancial firms whose failure could not conceivably spark
off domino contagion. More generally, close-out netting continues to enjoy
some regulatory support as a risk mitigant, not least because of intense
interest-group lobbying.372 This is indefensible and harmful. We can only
hope that it does not take another global crisis to drive the point home.

372. Looking beyond the ambit of bankruptcy law, regulatory authorities in several
sophisticated markets proposed reducing the extent to which derivatives exposure could be
reported on a net rather than gross basis, but appear to have been defeated. The official ISDA view
is provided by ANTONIO CORBI, INT7L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS7N, NETTING AND
OFFSETTING: REPORTING DERIVATIVES UNDER U.S. GAAP AND UNDER IFRS (2012). Some of
the resulting damage to market transparency and counterparty incentives is explored in ADMATI &
HELLWIG, supra note 334, at 82V86, 190, 266V67 nn.11V17.

